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PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS AND
INVOLUNTARY COMMITMENT
Lessard v. Schmidt'
Oix October 29, 1971, two police officers took Alberta Lessard into
custody and delivered her to a mental health center, where she was detained
for mental observation based on the officers' determination that the deten-
tion was advisable. Three days later the police officers gave their reasons for
that determination at an ex parte hearing before a Milwaukee County Court
judge. He ordered the confinement be continued for 10 days. On Novem-
ber 4, 1971, a staff doctor of the mental health center filed an application
for a judicial inquiry in the same court, recommending permanent commit-
ment based on his diagnosis of schizophrenia. The judge immediately or-
dered an examination by two physicians and 10 additional days of deten-
tion. The following day the judge informed Miss Lessard she would be
examined and that a guardian ad litem would be appointed for her. Miss
Lessard, however, hired her own counsel. On the afternoon of November
15, 1971, she was notified that her hearing would be the following morn-
ing. Ultimately, the hearing was delayed for one week to allow her attorney
time to prepare his case.
Due to these delays, all of which were sanctioned by law, Miss Lessard
was confined, without recourse, for 26 days before being given the oppor-
tunity to present her case at an adversary hearing. At the hearing she was
committed for an additional 30 days, an order that was extended every 30
days up to the date of the decision in the principal case. 2
The Lessard decision was the result of a class action brought in a
Wisconsin federal district court on November 12, 1971, on behalf of Miss
Lessard and others involuntarily confined. Jurisdiction was asserted under
42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief
from certain provisions of Wisconsin's civil commitment laws on the ground
that they violated procedural due process. A three judge court was convened
because the suit raised substantial constitutional questions.3
After a careful review of all the applicable law, the court concluded
that Wisconsin civil commitment procedures violated procedural due process
as guaranteed by the United States Constitution in numerous respects.4
The court held the Wisconsin scheme unconstitutional insofar as it
1. 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972), appeal docketed, No. 73-568, U.S.,
Sept. 28, 1973.
2. Id. at 1081-82.
3. Id. at 1082.
4, Id. at 1103. It is generally accepted that the state has the right to in-
voluntarily confine the mentally ill under certain circumstances. The first basis
for involuntary commitment was the police power, which allowed commitment of
insane persons'dangerous to others. See, e.g., State v. Mullinax, 364 Mo. 858, 269
(645)
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fails to require effective and timely notice of the "charges" under
which a person is sought to be detained; fails to require adequate
notice of all rights, including the right to jury trial;5$ permits de-
tention longer than 48 hours without a hearing on probable
cause; 6 permits detention longer than two weeks without a full
hearing on the necessity for commitment; permits commitment
based upon a hearing in which the person charged with mental
illness is not represented by adversary counsel,8 at which hearsay
evidence is admitted,9 and in which psychiatric evidence is pre-
sented without the patient having been given the benefit of the
S.W.2d 72 (En Banc 1954). Later, the police power was found to be broad enough
to permit commitment of those dangerous only to themselves. See, e.g., In Re
Josiah Oakes, 8 Law Rep. 123 (Mass. 1845).
Parens patriae, a second basis for involuntary commitment, represents the
idea that the mentally ill require commitment for their own welfare (for treatment
or self-protection) and that the state, as sovereign, has both the right and the duty
of guardianship over them. State ex rel. Sweezer v. Green, 360 Mo. 1249, 1256, 232
S.W.2d 897, 902 (En Banc 1950); Harriford v. Harriford, 336 S.W.2d 113, 115
(K.C. Mo. App. 1960).
The first basis for commitment has been criticized because it allows mere
preventive detention, which is impermissible if the individual is sane and merely
dangerous. Ennis, Civil Liberties and Mental Illness, 7 CRIM. L. BULL. 101, 107-09
(1971). It is also attacked because it assumes the mentally ill are more dangerous
than sane people. Hearings on Constitutional Rights of the Mentally Ill Before
the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
91st Cong., 1st & 2nd Sess. 245 (1970) [hereinafter Hearings]. Finally, it is criticized
because it is impossible to predict the probability that mental illness will cause
a dangerous act sometime in the future. Ennis, supra at 108.
Parens patriae is criticized because it assumes that the mentally ill person
cannot make a rational decision as to his need for commitment when in fact many
are capable of doing so. Id. at 104. Further, even if they are not capable, the very
nature of personal freedom suggests that they should be permitted to make a
wrong decision when it does not infringe on other's rights. Id.
Now, almost all commitment procedures are governed by statute.
5. The court believed this deficiency fatal under In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1
(1966), wherein the United States Supreme Court required that a defendant be
afforded reasonable opportunity to prepare for his hearing.
6. See McNeil v. Director, Patuxent Institution, 407 U.S. 245 (1972), indi-
cating the undesirability of commitments based on ex parte hearings.
7. The court based this part of the holding on Boddie v. Connecticut, 401
U.S. 371 (1971), where the Supreme Court ruled that the deprivation of a signifi-
cant right must be based on an opportunity to be heard. Boddie involved an indi-
gent who sought use of the courts to obtain a divorce. See Barry v. Hall, 98 F.2d
222, 225 (D.C. Cir. 1938). For other court rulings that there is a right to be heard
within a reasonable time whenever substantial rights are involved see In re
Barnard, 455 F.2d 1370 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Fhagen v. Miller, 29 N.Y.2d 348, 278
N.E.2d 615, 528 N.Y.S.2d 393 (1972).
8. The court relied on Heryford v. Parker, 396 F.2d 393 (10th Cir. 1968),
which held that indigent persons detained on grounds of mental illness have a
right to counsel, and Argensigner v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972), which re-
quired appointment of counsel in all criminal proceedings in which the accused
could be deprived of his library.
The court could have analogized to juvenile proceedings. See, e.g., In re
Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 36 (1966). See also S. BRAKEL & R. RocX, THE MENTALLY Dis-
ABLED AND THE LAW 5, 61-63 (rev. ed. 1971); Schneider, Civil Commitment of the
Mentally Ill, 58 A.B.A.J. 1059, 1063 (1972).
9. The court relied on dicta in In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1966); and the
lack of policy reasons for admitting hearsay to justify its position. But see Sas v.
Maryland, 334 F.2d 506 (4th Cir. 1964).
[Vol. 8
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privilege against self-incrimination;' o permits commitment with-
out proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the patient is both
"mentally ill"" and dangerous;' 2 and fails to require those seeking
commitment to consider less restrictive alternatives to commit-
ment.'3
The court tested the procedures for civil commitment against the
rigorous requirements of procedural due process in criminal actions.14 The
Wisconsin statutes, like their Missouri counterparts,' 5 were designed to
meet only the less stringent requirements of procedural due process tradi-
tionally considered applicable to civil commitment actions. The ultimate
holding in Lessard was that all the unnamed members of the class repre-
sented in the class action must either be released from custody within 90
days or recommitted under procedures meeting the constitutional require-
10. The court recognized the patient's conflicting interests (i.e., the desire
for freedom and the need for treatment) and decided in favor of the patients
interest in freedom, refusing to make a technical civil-criminal distinction where
a loss of liberty was involved. A finding of mental illness is usually based on testi-
mony of an examining physician. Therefore, granting the privilege of remaining
silent seems to preclude the state's remedy for protecting society because, absent
overt acts, a psychiatrist would have very little basis for his testimony.
The court said that the privilege would not apply where insanity is used as
a defense to a crime because there the accused raises the issue of insanity.
11. The court relied on In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), which held that
due process requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt where a juvenile might be
confined if found guilty. Id. at 368. Cf. Dexter v. Hall, 82 U.S. 9 (1872), indi-
cating that a "lunatic" needs more protection than a minor.
The court pointed out that at least one state requires proof beyond a reason-
able doubt (Denton v. Commonwealth, 383 S.W.2d 681 (Ky. 1964)) and that
others require more than a preponderance of the evidence. See, e.g., Dixon v.
Attorney Gen. 325 F. Supp. 966, 974 (M.D. Pa. 1971).
Lessard's pronounced reliance on juvenile cases is appropriate because both
involve a possible loss of liberty of persons that are not fully competent. If any-
thing, the mentally ill should be given more protection because they have com-
mitted no criminal offense. Another consideration making the analogy credible
is the questionable benefit of the confinement in both instances. See Ennis, supra
note 4, at 110; Comment, The MDSO-Uncivil Commitment, 11 SANTA CLARE LAW.
169 (1970). For suggestions that the degree of proof required should vary inversely
with the degree of danger the patient represents see Postel, Civil Commitment: A
Functional Analysis, 38 BROOKLYN L. REv. 1 (1971); Comment, Hospitalization of
the Mentally Ill: Due Process and Equal Protection, 35 BROOKLYN L. Rnv. 187,
202-04 (1969).
12. It is unclear whether Lessard holds that the requirement the subject
be dangerous is constitutionally required or that the particular statute required
it and it was not proved. The "dangerous" requirement has been read into the Wis-
consin Statute. See Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 509 (1972) and note 4 supra.
13. 349 F. Supp. at 1103. This requires determining availability of alterna-
tives, which have been investigated, and the feasibility of using a less restrictive
one. See Lake v. Cameron, 864 F.2d 657 (D.C. Cir. 1966), interpreting a District
of Columbia statute which allowed alternatives as requiring inquiry into alterna-
tives to commitment. Covington v. Harris, 419 F.2d 617, 623 (D.C. Cir. 1969),
broadening the concept beyond mere statutory requirements. See also S. BRA.EL &
R. RocK, supra note 8, at 61-63; Chambers, Alternatives to Civil Commitment of the
Mentally Ill: Practical Guides and Constitutional Imperatives, 70 MicH. L. R~v.
1107 (1972); Ennis, supra note 4, at 112. But see State v. Sanchez, 80 N.M. 438,
457 P.2d 370 (1969).
14. 349 F. Supp. at 1090.
15. See Wisc. STAT. ANN. §§ 51.02-51.04 (1969); §§ 202.797-.807, RSMo (1969).
19751
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ments of Lessard.16 Miss Lessard, who had been conditionally released pre-
viously, was protected by the order insofar as it declared her previous com-
mitment defective and prevented its extension.1 7
There has been considerable debate for many years over the standard
procedural due process applicable to commitment cases. Some have agreed
withi the reasoning in Lessard, arguing that because civil commitment is as
serious an infringement of an individual's freedom and dignity as a criminal
'incarceration, the safeguards in commitment proceedings should be fully
as comprehensive as those in criminal cases.' 8 They point out that commit-
ment 3P.ot only results in confinement against a person's will, but that other
important civil rights are often lost as well. 19 In addition, statistical sur-
veys show that the death rate is higher among inmates in mental institu-
tions than in society at large.20
Those who believe procedural safeguards for commitment should be
less stringent than for criminal cases suggest that commitment is not pun-
ishment but rehabilitation;21 at the very most it is a form of protective
custody.2 2 Others suggest that the commitment proceeding is civil in nature
and thus criminal safeguards are not required.23 Some argue that formal
legal proceedings might be so traumatic to the prospective patient as to
16. 349 F. Supp. at 1103.
17. Id.
18. See, e.g., Cross v. Harris, 418 F.2d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Denton v. Com-
m6nwealih, 383 S.W.2d 681 (Ky. 1964); Ennis, supra note 4, at 108-09.
19. *49 F. Supp. at 1088-89. Section 202.847, RSMo 1969, states that the
*patient retains his "civil rights" unless he has been adjudicated incompetent. But,
apparently the head of the hospital can impose some restrictions if such are re-quired to pievent impairment of the patient's treatment. See also Ely, The Status
of Mental Incompetents in Civil Cases in Missouri, 33 Mo. L. REv. 1, 4 (1968).
20. 349 F. Supp. at 1089-90.
21. The extent of the patient's right to treatment (for a discussion of this
*right -ee Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966)) may determine the
alpplicable standards. Section 202.840, RSMo 1969, provides a right to treatment,
.but' only "to the extent that facilities, equipment and personnel are avail-
able .... " Of course, even an absolute right to treatment is of no consequence
where the mental disease is incurable. See Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972)
,(indicating more procedural protections should be provided where treatment
would not help). It is also of no consequence when the treatment is inadequate
or absent. See, e.g., Id. at 735 (indicating that many hospitals are not providing
!'adequate treatment). See also In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 22 (1966) (inadequate re-
habilitation was one of the bases for increasing the procedural safeguards in ju.
venile proceedings)., The theory of parens patriae logically supports the proposi-
tion that the degree of rehabilitation the state provides should help determine
"the extent of procedural safeguards in the commitment process.
22.1 In re Moynihan, 332 Mo. 1022, 62 S.W.2d 410 (1983). See cases cited
note 4 supra. But see In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), concerning juvenile
proceedings.
23. Glasco v. Brassard, 94 Idaho 162, 483 P.2d 924 (1971); State ex rel.
Sweezer v. Green, 360 Mo. 1249, 232 S.W.2d 897 (En Banc 1950); In re Moynihan,
S932 Mo. 1022, 62 S.W.2d 410 (1933). But see In re Winship, 397 U.S. 858, 365-66(1970;" Birry v. Hall,- 98 F.2d 222, 225 (D.C. Cir. 1938); Reade v. Halpin, 193
App. Div. 566, 184 N.Y.S. 438 (3d Dept. 1920). The labeling of an action as civil




Missouri Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 4 [1973], Art. 6
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol38/iss4/6
RECENT CASES
adversely affect his susceptibility to treatment.2 4 Thus, many psychiatrists
and psychologists favor commitment based on medical discretion alone.28
The entry of judgment in Lessard was delayed from the date of the,
opinion, October 18, 1972, until June 29, 1973, to allow the legislature an
opportunity to enact procedures conforming with its holding. When the
judgment was finally entered, however, the state appealed to the United
States Supreme Court.26 Lessard, if affirmed on appeal, will require radical
changes in Wisconsin commitment procedures and, if applicable generally,
in Missouri also.2 7 As illustrated below, Missouri's commitment procedure
has many of the same features as Wisconsin's.
Missouri statutes provide three ways to commence commitment pro-
ceedings. First, a person may be committed under a nonprotesting provi-
sion.28 This requires written application by a qualified person 29 and certi-
fication by, two licensed physicians that the subject is mentally ill, in need
of treatment, and lacks the capacity to responsibly make his own applica-
tion. The county welfare office must then inform the subject that unless
he requests a judicial hearing within five days he will be summarily com-
mitted. Should the subject request a hearing, the person seeking his com-
mitment must commence a judicial proceeding as authorized under section
202.807 within five days.30
Missouri provides for two methods of obtaining temporary, emergency
commitment. The first requires written application by a health or police
officer or any other person stating grounds for his belief that the individual
is likely to cause injury to himself or to others if .not immediately, re-
strained.31 The -statute also requires certification by a licensed physiciaA
that he has examined the individual and believes he is mentally ill and
should be restrained. This certificate, when endorsed by a judge, authorizes
confinement.3 2
A second emergency procedure permits any health or police officer,
without judicial involvement, to transport a person to a hospital for tem-
porary confinement if such officer has reason to believe that the individual
24. Ennis, supra note 4, at 110. This argument is discussed and rebutted.
Would not commitment itself cause these problems regardless of the procedure
used? See generally S. BRAxEL & R. ROCK, supra note 8.
25. S. BiRAK.L & R. RocK, supra note 8; Slovenko, Civil Commitment in Per-
spective, 20 J. PuB. L. 3 (1971); Comment, Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill:
Due Process and Equal Protection, supra note 11.26. The appeal to the Supreme Court was docketed Sept. 28, 1973. 42
U.S.L.W. 3201 (U.S. Oct. 9, 1973). For questions presented see 42 U.S.L.W. 3277
(U.S. Nov. 6, 1973).
27. Because Lessard stands a reasonable chance of being affirmed, Missouri
lawMakers, should now consider conforming changes in the Missouri commitment
proceduie. This would assure sufficient time for full consideration of the changes.
28. § 202.797, RSMo 1969.
29. A qualified person is either "a friend, relative, spouse or guardian of the
individual, a health or public welfare officer, or the head of any institution in
which such individual may be." Id.
. 80. Id. There is no confinement prior to the hearing unless the individual
"waives" the hearing.
31. § 202.800, RSMo 1969.
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is mentally ill and is, therefore, likely to injure himself or others.3 The
application for admission must state the circumstances under which the in-
dividual was taken into custody and the reason for the officer's belief.
Under both emergency procedures the hospital is required to notify the
probate court within 10 days of the individual's emergency confinement.8 4
If no proceeding is initiated within five days after notification, the patient
is ordered released. If proceedings are initiated, the court must hold the
hearing within 10 days. The judge may order continuation of the temporary
confinement until there is a judgment. But, the judgment must be rendered
within five days after the hearing ends.
All the above methods of involuntary confinement require an eventual
hearing. The hearing procedure is set out in section 202.807.35 It is com-
menced by filing a written application accompanied by a physician's cer-
tificate stating that the physician has examined the subject and believes he
is mentally ill and should be hospitalized, or that the subject refused to
submit to examination. The patient must be given notice of the application
and the time of the hearing. He is permitted to appear, testify, and cross-
examine witnesses, and is entitled to representation by counsel. He is not
required to be present. The court can order hospitalization for an indefinite
period if it finds the patient to be mentally ill; in need of custody, care,
or treatment in a mental institution; and incapable of making responsible
decisions about hospitalization.
The Missouri commitment statutes fail to meet many of the stringent
Lessard requirements. For instance, neither of Missouri's emergency com-
mitment sections provides for a hearing within 48 hours of the initial con-
finement. Although one section3 6 does require "endorsement" by a judge,
it fails to meet Lessard standards because the hearing is ex pare and the
judge's determination is not required to be based on probable cause.37 The
other emergency section fails more grievously, because it requires, to per-
mit confinement beyond the allowable 48 hour period, only that a health
or police officer have a "reason to believe" that the individual is mentally
ill and is likely to injure himself or others if not confined.38
The Missouri procedure is defective under Lessard in other areas as
well. Lessard permits only 14 days of confinement without a full hearing
on the merits; whereas, compliance with Missouri law could result in con-
finement 25 days prior to such a hearing.89 Lessard requires that proof of
need for confinement be beyond a reasonable doubt; Missouri statutes ap-
33. § 202.803, RSMo 1969.
34. § 202.805, RSMo 1969.
35. §,202.807, RSMo 1969. See also Comment, Involuntary Commitment in
Missouri, 37 U.M.K.C.L. REV. 319 (1969).
36. § 202.800, RSMo 1969.
37. 349 F. Supp. at 1091.
38. § 202.803, RSMo 1969.
39. § 202.803, RSMo 1969. Twenty-five days is the maximum time, and the
hearing could occur sooner. But see Dix, Acute Psychiatric Hospitalization of the
Mentally Ill in the Metropolis: An Empirical Study, 1968 WAsH. U.L.Q. 485, indi-
cating that one-half of the involuntary patients admitted to one facility in Missouri
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parently require only a reasonable belief.40 Lessard forbade the use of hear-
say testimony that does not come within an exception to the hearsay rule;
a Missouri statute specifically provides that the court in commitment pro-
ceedings is not bound by the rules of evidence.41 Lessard requires that
alternatives to commitment be considered; 42 the Missouri statute requires
that the subject be hospitalized for an indefinite period, or unconditionally
released.43 Lessard grants the privilege against self-incrimination to the
subject; an opinion of the Missouri Attorney General states that the probate
court can require the subject to submit to an examination to determine
the question of illness in an involuntary commitment proceeding. 44
One of the few areas in which the Missouri statute is free from attack
under Lessard is the subject's right to counsel. The Lessard court pointed
out that the Wisconsin statutes provided for counsel only by allowing the
court, at its discretion, to appoint a guardian ad litem, who- must be. an
attorney. Not only is this appointment merely discretionary, but Lessard
also stated that a guardian ad litem does not qualify as representative
counsel under the Constitution.45 Missouri requires that "[i]f it is found
that the proposed patient is not represented by an attorney, the court shall
appoint an attorney to represent him .... "46 This provision meets the most
stringent possible interpretation of Lessard.
Lessard represents an extreme view of the extent to which fourteenth
amendment procedural due process applies to commitment proceedings.
40. In re Moynihan, 332 Mo. 1022, 1038, 62 S.W.2d 410, 418 (1933). This is
partially because Missouri treats the hearing as civil in nature.
41. § 202.807 (4), RSMo 1969. In re Delany, 226 S.W.2d 366 (St. L. Mo. App.
1950), stated that the hearsay rules are applicable in an incompetency hearing and
required clear and convincing evidence for a finding of incompetency. It is in-
congruous to require a lighter burden of persuasion in cases involving personal
freedom than cases involving property.
42. 349 F. Supp. at 1095-96.
43. § 202.807 (5), RSMo 1969.
44. 13 Mo. Atty Gen. Op. No. 18 (June 6, 1957). The hearing may be com-
menced by application accompanied by a statement that the patient refused to sub-
mit to an examination. § 202.807 (1), RSMo 1969, But, at least one witness at the
hearing must be a physician who has examined the patient. § 202.807 (3), RSMo
1969.
Recuiting the subject to submit to examination might not violate Lessard if
the patient is extended the privilege at the examination. There are, however,
practical and medical considerations which favor disallowing the privilege, i.e., it
will be hard to determine a patient's mental condition in order to commit him or
to treat him.
45. 849 F. Supp. at 1099. Th court said that a guardian and a representative
attorney in commitment proceedings have separate roles. The court quoted Dix,
Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill in Wisconsin: A Need for a Reexamination, 51
MARQ. L. Rxv. 1, 33 (1967):
In present practice, it seems clear that in almost all cases where a guardian
is appointed he sees his role not as an advocate for the prospective pa-
tient but as a traditional guardian ihose function is to evaluate for him-
self what is in the best interests of his client-ward and then proceed, almost
independent of the will of the client-ward, to accomplish this.
349 F. Supp. at 1099.
46. § 202.807 (4), RSMo 1969.
1973]
7
et al.: Recent Cases
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1973
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
Yet, without rigorous safeguards the process is subject to abuse.47 Accord-
ingly, it is submitted that Lessard should4S and probably will, be af-
firmed at least partially by the Supreme Court. The Missouri legislature
should begin now to study this matter, so that such a decision would not
unduly interrupt the functioning of the commitment process.
ROBERT K. MCDONALD
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-
INCRIMINATION-APPLICATION OF MIRANDA V. ARIZONA
TO MOTOR VEHICLE VIOLATIONS
State v. Neal'
On August 22, 1969, the Missouri State Highway Patrol investigated
a report that an automobile had struck a highway signpost. The investi-
gating officer, Trooper Walter Aytes, following a trail of water and anti-
freeze leading away from the signpost to a point about a mile beyond the
end of the trail, found Martin Van Buren Neal sitting in an automobile
stalled in the middle of the road. Aytes observed that the car was over-
heated and had sustained extensive front-end damage. Further observing
that Neal appeared intoxicated, Aytes arrested him. Aytes then advised
Neal that his answers to any questions could be used against him in a court
of law, but failed to advise him of his right to remain silent and his right
to counsel. Defendant was subsequently charged with driving while intoxi-
cated.2 (hereinafter DWI).
At trial, state's witness Trooper Herndon, who had later arrived on
the scene, testified that Aytes had asked Neal if he had been driving the
vehicle and that Neal had answered affirmatively. Herndon's testimony was
the state's only evidence on the crucial issue of whether Neal had been
driving the car. Defense counsel objected to the admission into evidence
of Neal's statement, contending that Aytes's attempt to apprise Neal of his
constitutional rights had failed to satisfy the requirements of Miranda v.
Arizona.3 The objection was overruled, and the defendant Was convicted.
47. An extreme example is using commitment to silence political dissent, as
in the Soviet Union today. Notes from Soviet Asylums, NATIONAL REVIEW, June 9,
1972, at 633; Crackdown on Dissent, TIME, Dec. 18, 1972, at 31.
48. Hearings, supra, note 4, at 2. Senator Ervin, introducing hearings on con-
stitutional requirements for commitment of the mentally ill, stated:
Although at that time, the courts had dealt with some extreme problems
of illegal hospitalization, on the whole, the testimony we heard in 1961
supported the charge that this was one of the most neglected areas of Amer-
ican law-neglected by most private citizens, by the courts, by State legis-
latures and generally by politicians.Id.
1. 476 S.W.2d 547 (Mo. En Banc 1972).
2. § 564.440, RSMo 1969.
3. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). In Neal, the defendant was told only that anything
he said could be used against him. Although the warning need not consist of the
exact- words stated in Miranda (see note 6 infra), the entire substance of the
warning must be conveyed to be effective. See, e.g., United States v. Fox, 403 F.2d
97, 100 (2d Cir. 1968); Lathers v. United States, 396 F.2d 524, 535 (5th Cir. 1968);
United States v. Vanterpool, 394 F.2d 697, 698-99 (2d Cir. 1968).
[V7ol. 8
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On appeal, the Springfield Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, hold-
ing that the admission of Herndon's testimony was error because the de-
fendant had not been properly informed of his rights. Because the question
involved was one of general interest and importance, the court of appeals
transferred the case to the Missouri Supreme Court for determination pur-
suant to article V, section 10, of the Missouri Constitution. The Missouri
Supreme Court held, two judges dissenting, that the Miranda decision does
not apply to cases involving misdemeanor motor vehicle offenses. 4
The United States Supreme Court formulated the Miranda rule as i
procedural safeguard against infringement of the constitutional privilege
against self-incrimination.5 The rule requires that the police give a person
certain warnings concerning his privilege against self-incrimination6 before
they subject him to "custodial interrogation."7 Evidence obtained as a
result of custodial interrogation is inadmissible unless the prosecution
demonstrates that the police gave the Miranda warning and that the de-
fendant waivedS the rights the warning seeks to protect.9
In traffic violation cases, courts seldom have occasion to determine
whether a Miranda warning is required because the prosecution usually
does not need to introduce the defendant's statements to sustain its burden
of persuasion. The arresting officer has usually witnessed the crime and
has personal knowledge of all elements of the offense, so that his testimony
alone is sufficient to convict. The question whether a Miranda warning is
required becomes paramount, however, when the defendant incriminates
himself without having been properly warned of his rights and the state
needs to introduce the defendant's statement into evidence to complete its
case. In traffic offense cases, this problem arises most often in two situa-
tions: First, where the defendant is stopped for some other traffic violation
and 'the arresting officer suspects but has no firsthand knowledge that the
4. 476 S.W.2d at 553.
5. 384 U.S. at 478.
6. The Court in Miranda set forth the required contents of the warnings
as follows:
[U]nless other fully effective means are adopted to notify the person of
his right of silence and to assure that the exercise of the right will be
scrupulously honored, the following measures are required. He must be
warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent,
that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he
has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford
an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he
so desires.
Id. at 478-79.
7. For a discussion of the custodial interrogation concept generally and its
application to motor vehicle offense situations specifically see text accompanying
notes- 12-15 infra.
8. The Court in Miranda provided for this waiver as follows:
After such warnings have been given, and such opportunity [to exercise
the rights enumerated in the warnings] afforded him, the individual may
knowingly and intelligently waive these rights and agree to answer ques-
tions or make a statement.
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defendant was drinking;10 and, second, where the officer arrives on the
scene after an accident and has no personal knowledge that the defendant
was driving one of the cars involved."
Most courts that have found it necessary to decide whether Miranda
applies to traffic offense cases have held that it does not. Several rationales
have been employed to reach this result. The remainder of this casenote
discusses and criticizes these various lines of reasoning.
Some courts hold Miranda inapplicable based on the guidelines set
out therein regarding the intended scope of the decision. The Supreme
Court said that its decision was intended neither "to hamper the tradi-
tional function of police officers in investigating crime," nor to preclude
"general on-the-scene questioning as to facts surrounding a crime."'12 The
warning must be given, the Court said, "when the individual is first sub.
jected to police interrogation while in custody at the station or otherwise
deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." 13 This decisive
stage is commonly referred to as "custody"; questioning conducted once
this point is reached constitutes "custodial interrogation."
The line between on-the-scene investigatory questioning, where no
Miranda warning is required, and custodial interrogation, where a warning
is required, is often tenuous. Arguably, when a driver is stopped for a
routine traffic violation he is not in custody. The police officer simply
writes a citation and the driver signs it. Thus, some courts reason that be-
cause neither the officer's actions nor the atmosphere are outwardly coer-
cive, the defendant is not really in custody and no Miranda warning is
required.' 4
10. This assumes that the defendant did not submit to a breathalyzer or
similar sobriety test.
11. Often, the driver of an automobile who is stopped for a traffic violation
and given no Miranda warning gives incriminating statements about another
crime or offense, and is later convicted of that second crime or offense. This area
is beyond the scope of this note. For a discussion see Annot., 25 A.L.R.3d 1082
(1969). Also, the question may arise whether a person arrested for DWI is capable
of knowingly and intelligently waiving his rights. For a discussion see Erwin,
Application of Miranda, etc. In Traffic Cases, 158 N.Y.L.J. 35, 36 (1967).
12. 384 U.S. at 477. The routine police practice of checking a driver's license
or vehicle registration is an example of on-the-scene questioning not subject to
the Miranda requirments. See United States v. Chase, 414 F.2d 780 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 920 (1969); Lowe v. United States, 407 F.2d 1391 (9th Cir.
1969).
13. 384 U.S. at 478 (emphasis added).
14. See State v. Dubany, 184 Neb. 337, 342, 167 N.W.2d 556, 559 (1969);
State v. Desjardins, 110 N.H. 511, 514, 272 A.2d 599, 602 (1970); State v. Pyle, 48
Ohio Op. 2d 82, 83, 249 N.E.2d 826, 828 (Sup. Ct.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1007
(1969); State v. Twitty, 47 Ohio Op. 2d 14, 19, 246 N.E.2d 556, 561 (Ct. App.
1969); Higgins v. State, 473 S.W.2d 493, 494-95 (Tex. Grim. App. 1971).
The extent to which the court in Areal used the custody concept as a basis for
its decision is unclear. After noting that "[oin cross-examination counsel was at
some pains to determine when the defendant had been 'arrested' in the sense that
he was, placed under restraint" (476 S.W.2d at 552) (emphasis added), the court
held that Miranda was inapplicable "regardless of whether the questions are asked
before or after arrest." Id. at 553. As one of the reasons for its holding, however,
the court stated that "[nlearly all of the interrogation occurs, as in the case at
bar, at or near the scene of the violation and not in a coercive atmosphere created
by law enforcement officials." Id.
[Vol. 38
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This reasoning strains the custody concept. Although a defendant is
arguably not in custody where the arresting officer intends to release him
after issuing a ticket (as opposed to taking him to the station), the better
view is that the defendant is in custody in both situations. The procedure
is inherently coercive because the driver is often being questioned and is
not free to leave until the procedure is completed. One approach to the
problem, followed in Minnesota, requires that a Miranda warning be given
when the officer has reasonable grounds to believe that the interviewee has
committed a crime.15
Some courts have distinguished serious and minor crimes in holding
Miranda inapplicable to motor vehicles offenses. These decisions fall into
three categories.
The first category consists of cases holding Miranda inapplicable to
misdemeanors. 16 In State v. Pyle,17 a misdemeanor DWI case, the Ohio
Supreme Court followed what it termed the "accepted principle that any
court made rule of law must be read in relation to the facts which precipi-
tated it."'' Since Miranda involved four felony cases,1 9 the Ohio court
concluded no warning was required. In Neal, the Missouri Supreme Court
used a narrower version of this distinction, restricting its holding to "only
those misdemeanor offenses arising from the operation of a motor ye-
hide."20
Such a distinction, whether narrow or broad, exposes more problems
than it solves. An officer does not always know that the driver has com-
mitted only a misdemeanor when he first stops him for questioning.2 ' For
example, Missouri's DWI statute is "hybrid" in that the first two offenses
are misdemeanors and subsequent violations are felonies.22 Yet, when a
DWI suspect is stopped, the Missouri officer has no immediate way to
15. State v. Kinn, 288 Minn. 31, 35, 178 N.W.2d 888, 891 (1970).
16. State v. Angelo, 251 La. 250, 203 So. 2d 710 (1967); City of Dayton v.
Nugent, 54 Ohio Op. 2d, 31, 265 N.E.2d 826 (Dayton Mun. Ct. 1970); State v.
Pyle, 48 Ohio Op. 2d 82, 249 N.E.2d 826, (Sup. Ct.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1007
(1969); cf. State v. Gabrielson, 192 N.W.2d 792 (Iowa 1971) (holding Miranda
inapplicable to simple misdemeanors, as opposed to indictable misdemeanors).
Contra, Commonwealth v. Bonser, 215 Pa. Super. 452, 258 A.2d 675 (1969); cf.
Harvey v. Mississippi, 340 F.2d 263 (5th Cir. 1965) (rejecting the misdemeanor-
felony distinction regarding assistance of counsel at entry of plea).
17. 48 Ohio Op. 2d 82, 249 N.E.2d 826 (Sup. Ct.), cert. denied, 396 U.S.
1007 (1969).
18. Id. at 83, 249 N.E.2d at 827.
19. Four cases were decided in the Miranda decision. One was a kidnapping
and rape case, one involved robbery and murder, and two were robbery cases.
20. 476 S.W.2d at 553.
21. As the Neal dissent points out:
This risk [that the defendant's statement will be inadmissible] is inevitable
where the criterion for determining the applicability of Miranda warn-
ings is not, has the person been taken into custody as set forth in Miranda,
but whether the police can divine at the time the person is first taken into
custody if he is to be prosecuted for only a motor vehicle misdemeanor
or something more serious.
Id. at 555 (emphasis added).
22. § 564.440, RSMo 1969.
1973]
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ascertain whether it is a first, second, or third offense. It is illogical to say
that the defendant should be given a Miranda warning when stopped for
his third DWI offense, but not his first two. Moreover, no logical connec-
tion exists between the constitutional rights protected by Miranda and the
place of possible confinement.23
The second category of courts hold, as did the Missouri Supreme
Court in Neal, that Miranda is inapplicable to traffic offenses. 24 In Neal,
the court based its decision on four grounds. First, the court noted that
nothing in the Miranda decision states that it applies to minor offenses in-
volving motor vehicles. To hold Miranda applicable, the court thought,
would stretch the decision beyond its logical limits. 25 Miranda clearly
states, however, that the warning is necessary whenever the privilege against
self-incrimination is jeopardized.2 6 Second, the court stated that its position
was supported by the current weight of authority elsewhere.27 Third, the
court believed that the penalties for motor vehicle violations were not seri-
ous enough to warrant the interference with law enforcement that would
be occasioned by requiring the police to recite a warning and possibly wait
until a defendant obtains or is provided counsel before questioring him.28
This conclusion does not comport with reality. The defendant stood to lose
his dfiving privilege29 and was subject to a $100 fine and a six-month jail
sentence.8 0 Fourth, the supreme court believed it would be impossible* to
provide enough lawyers to advise all the motor vehicle operators likely to
request legal advice.31 Two recent studies show, however, that felony sus-
pects rarely request lawyers after receiving a Miranda warning.8 2 If felons
23. In Missouri, a felony is defined in § 556.020, RSMo 1969, as an offense
punishable by imprisonment in the state penitentiary. A misdemeanor is defined
in § 556.040, RSMo 1969, as an offense punishable by fine or imprisonment in
a county jail.
24. State v. Bliss, 238 A.2d 848 (Del. 1968); State v. Macuk, 57 N.J. 1, 268
A.2d 1 (1970); State v. Zucconi, 93 N.J. Super 380, 226 A.2d 16 (1967) ?dictum).
Contra, People v. McLaren, 55 Misc. 2d 676, 285 N.Y.S.2d 991 (1967); Common-
wealth v. Bonser, 215 Pa. Super. 452, 258 A.2d 675 (1969).
25. 476 S.W.2d at 553.
26. 884 U.S. at 478.
27. 476 S.W.2d at 552.
-28. Id. at 553.
29. Section 802.302(1) (7), RSMo 1969, states that 12 points are to be as-
s ssed against a driver's license for a DWI conviction. Section 302.304 (8), RSMo
1969,.states that a driver's license shall be revoked when a driver accumulates 12
points within a 12-month period.8 .0. § 564.440, RSMo 1969. The admission of Neal's statement could also
lead to a charge of leaving the scene of an accident, an aspect the court does not
mention.
31. 476 S.W.2d at 558.
S2. Medalie, Zeitz, & Alexander, Custodial Police Interrogation in Our Na-
tion's Capital: The Attempt to Implement Miranda, 66 MxcH. L. Rxv. 1847 (1968);
Interrogations in New Haven: The Impact of Miranda, 76 YALE; L.J. 1519 (1967).
In the New Haven study, only 7.2 percent of the felony suspects given the Miranda
warning called for a lawyer. Interrogations in New Haven, supra at 1600 n.222.
In the District of Columbia study, only 7 percent of the 15,430 persons arrested
for serious misdemeanors and felonies in 1967 sought legal advice after having
been given the proper warning. Medalie, Zeitz, ,- Alexander, supra at 1851-52.
In the latter study the authors concluded that "defendants were loathe to use
attorneys and frequently gave statements to the police because of their inability
to apply Miranda to their own circumstances." Id. at 1395.
[Vol. 8
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rarely request counsel, traffic violation suspects would probably seek im-
mediate legal advice even less often.
Other cases that restrict Miranda to non-traffic offenses use arguments-
similar to those in Neal.33 As the Neal dissent points out,3 4 this-reasoning
would equate a speeding ticket with manslaughter by culpable negligence
in the operation of a motor vehicle,35 although the latter's consequences
are far more severe.36
In a third limitation on Miranda, two state courts have held it inappli-
cable to minor or petty violations.3 7 They relied, in part, on the United
States Supreme Court decision in Duncan v. Louisiana,38 which delineated a
category of petty crimes or offenses that are not subject to the sixth and
fourteenth amendment jury trial provisions.3 9 In both cases, however, the
defendant was charged with DWI. In view of the consequences of convic-
tion, it is unrealistic to classify DWI as a minor or petty offense.
Texas courts have admitted a driver's incriminating statement, even
though he was not given a Miranda warning, as part of the "res gestae" of
the offense.40 These courts hold that Miranda does not apply to a state-
menthat is admissible under the res gestae exception to the hearsay
rule, 41 even though Miranda applies to the same statement if it is offered
as an admission.4 2 This approach completely skirts the driver's constitu-
tional privilege against self-incrimination.
The New York legislature has declared that traffic infractions are not
crifiies 4'3 On theA.lasis of this, the New York Court of Appeals has held
that a driver's statement cannot incriminate, and is therefore admissible
at trial despite the absence of a valid Miranda warning.4 4 This rationale
might also encompass violations of municipal traffic ordiriances that by
definition are not crimes.48 Further, it is arguable that a motor vehicle
33. See State v. Bliss, 238 A.2d 848 (Del. 1968); State v. Macuk, 57 N.J. 1,
268 A.2d 1 (1970).
34. 476 S.W.2d at 556.
35. § 559.070, RSMo 1969. Note that in Neal this statute is misprinted as
§ 599.070. 476 S.W.2d at 556.
36. The Neal decision itself is arguably not subject to this particular criticism,
because it applies "in only those misdemeanor offenses involving motor vehicles,"
Id. at 553 (emphasis added). In Missouri, manslaughter is a felony. § 559.140,
RSMo 1969.
37. County of Dade v. Callahan, 259 So. 2d 504 (Fla. 1971); State v. Des-jardins, 110 N.H. 511, 272 A.2d 599 (1970).
38. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
39. U.S, CONST. amends. VI L= XIV.
40. Higgins v. State, 473 S.W.2d 493 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971); Tilley v. State,
462 S.W.2d 594 (rex. Crim. App. 1971); Parsley v. State, 453 S.W.2d 475 (rex.
Crim. App. 1970).
41. Under this exception, the driver's out-of-court statement is admissible
where it was made contemporaneous to an act that it tends to explain. Staley v.
Royal Pinei Park, Inc., 202 N.C. 155, 157, 162 S.E. 202, 203 (1932).
42. Parsley v. State, 453 S.W.2d 475, 476 (rex. Crim. App. 1970); Moore v.
State, 440 S.W.2d 643, 645 (rex. Crim. App. 1969).
43, N.Y. VE-l. & TR.AF. LAW § 155 (McKinney 1970).
44. People'v. Bliss, 53 Misc. 2d 472, 278 N.Y.S.2d 732 (1967).
45. Individual municipal ordinances should be consulted.
19731 ,657
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code is basically a public welfare standard, violation of which is not a true
crime.46
The United States Supreme Court has not accepted a case involving
the applicability of Miranda to misdemeanors, minor offenses, and traffic
violations. The Court denied certiorari in State v. Pyle,47 an Ohio case that
held Miranda inapplicable in misdemeanors. Although denial of certiorari
has no conclusive legal effect, it might indicate an attitude on the part of
the Court not to interfere with state limitations on Miranda. Recent Su-
preme Court decisions also indicate a narrower view of the self-incrimina-
tion clause.48
It is questionable whether the state courts have shown a valid reason
why the requirement of warnings of constitutional rights set out in Miranda
should be restricted. Although the Supreme Court has remained silent on
the matter, it is judicial precedent that should be applied to all crimes.4 9
Any time a defendant is in custody a Miranda warning should precede
interrogation. Defendant Neal made an incriminating statement without
first being fully advised of his constitutional rights. Evidence of this state-
ment should have been excluded at trial.
STEPHEN B. MACDONALD
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW-JUDICIAL REVIEW UNDER THE
NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT
Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers' (Gilham Dam)
Construction of the Gilham Dam on the Cossatot River in Arkansas
was part of a larger plan known as the Millwood Project. The Project
called for the construction of five other dams on other rivers, the com-
pletion of which would make the Cossatot the last major free-flowing stream
in the Ouachita Mountains of Southeast Oklahoma and Southwest Arkan-
sas, providing natural beauty and a variety of water flow to outdoorsmen.
At the time relevant here, the Gilham portion of the project was two-
46. In Missouri, violation of the motor vehicle code is a crime. § 302.340,
RSMo 1969. Even if it were not it is unreasonable to classify DWI as noncriminal
because the penalty includes possible imprisonment. See statute cited note 30 supra.
47. 48 Ohio Op. 2d 82, 249 N.E.2d 826 (Sup. Ct.), cert. denied, 896 U.S. 1007
(1969).
48. See California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424 (1971); Harris v. New York, 401
U.S. 222 (1971). In Byers, the Court upheld a California ruling on the validity of a
hit-and-run statute, implying it is permissible to compel an incriminating state-
ment, if done in the name of public policy. California v. Byers, supra at 427. In
Harris, the Court said that a statement, otherwise inadmissible under Miranda,
was admissible to impeach the credibility of the defendant. Harris v. New York,
supra at 226.
49. The Arizona courts appear to have reached the conclusion that a
Miranda warning should be given when the arresting officer lacks personal
knowledge of all the elements of the offense. Campbell v. Superior Court, 106
Ariz. 542, 552, 479 P.2d 685, 695 (1971) (dictum); State v. Tellez, 6 Ariz. App.
251, 255, 431 P.2d 691, 695 (1967). This implies, however, that it is permissible
to violate the Constitution and not give a warning when the officer has observed
all the elements of the offense.
1. 470 F.2d 289 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1072 (1972). aff'g 325
F. Supp. 728 (E.D. Ark. 1971), 325 F. Supp. 749 (E.D. Ark. 1971), 342 F. Supp.
1211 (E.D. Ark. 1972).
[Vol. 8
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thirds completed and had cost 9.5 million dolars, although work on the
dam had not begun.
The Environmental Defense Fund sought to halt construction of the
Gilham Dam in a series of actions before the Federal District Court for the
Eastern District of Arkansas. It succeeded when the district court issued a
temporary injunction halting construction in its fifth memorandum opin-
ion.2 The court provided that the injunction would be vacated when the
defendants, the Corps of Engineers, complied fully with the provisions of
the National Environmental Policy Act 3 (hereinafter NEPA) by preparing
an Environmental Impact Statement (hereinafter EIS) detailing the en-
vironmental consequences of the project and the possible alternatives to
the proposed course of action.4 The court also found that, although con-
struction of the dam would deprive the area of the unique qualities of a
free-flowing stream and an abundance of recreational waters were already
provided by other dams, the dam would provide needed flood control and
water supply benefits. 5 This balancing of interests was irrelevant, however,
because the court held that there could be no judicial review of the merits
of an agency decision to continue construction of the dam.6 The defend-
ants thereafter submitted an EIS which complied with the requirements
of NEPA and the injunction was vacated.7 The Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed, but modified the decision to allow limited review of the
merits of agency decisions. Looking at the merits, the court found that the
agency decision to complete the dam was not arbitrary or capricious in
view of the water supply and flood control benefits. Thus, judicial inter-
vention was unwarranted.8
In the National Environmental Policy Act Congress expressed its con-
cern over the federal government's mismanagement of the environment.
Section 101 of NEPA9 provides federal agencies with statutory authority
2. Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers, 325 F. Supp. 749
(E.D. Ark. 1971).
3. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 § 101 (b), 42 U.S.C. § 4331(1970).
4. Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers, 325 F. Supp. 749, 753
(E.D. Ark. 1971).
5. 325 F. Supp. at 745.
6. The court stated:
Plaintiffs contend that NEPA creates some "substantive" rights in addi-
tion to its procedural requirements. . . . [They] claim that [§ 101 of
NEPA] creates rights in the plaintiffs and others to "safe, healthful, pro-
ductive, and aesthetically and culturally pleasing surroundings;" and to
an environment which supports diversity and variety of individual
choice ..... The court disagrees.
325 F. Supp. at 755.
7. Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers, 342 F. Supp. 1211
(E.D. Ark. 1972).
8. Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers, 470 F.2d 289, 300-01
(8th Cir. 1972).
9. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 § 101 (b), 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (b)
(1970) provides:
In order to carry out the policy set forth in this chapter, it is the con-
tinuing responsibility of the Federal Government to use all practicable
means, consistent with other essential considerations of national policy,
to improve and coordinate Federal plans, functions, programs, and re-
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to consider environmental factors in decisions on programs affecting the
environment' o and a national environmental policy to guide their actions.11
Congress, in section 101, did not establish protection of the environment
as an exclusive goal, but instead intended "a reordering of priorities, so
that environmental costs and benefits [would] assume their proper place
along with other considerations."' 2 Thus, section 101 allows agencies dis-
cretion in weighing environmental against nonenvironmental factors.13
Indeed, some courts have found the section so flexible as to preclude judi-
cial review of the merits of agency decisions.' 4
'Section 102 of NEPA' 5 establishes procedural guidelines for agencies to
follow to insure that they consider environmental factors in their decision-
making process. Section 102 (2) (G) requires the preparation of an EIS for all
10. See Udall v. FPC, 387 U.S. 428 (1967). See also Sierra Club v. FPC, 407
'U.S. 926, 927 (1972,) denying cert. to 453 F.2d 463 (2d Cir. 1971); New Hamp-
shire v. AEC, 406 F.2d 170 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 962 (1969).
.See also S. Rep. No. 296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1969).
* 11. S. Rep. No. 296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1969) states:
As a result of this failure to formulate a comprehensive national policy,
environmental decision making largely continues ... as it has in the past.
Policy is established by default and inaction. Environmental problems are
only dealt with when they reach crisis proportions . .. Important de-
cisions concerning the use and shape of man's future environment con-
tinue to be made in small but steady increments which perpetuate rather
than avoid the recognized mistakes of previous decades.
12. Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1112 (D.C.
Cir. 1971).
13. Id.
14. National Helium Corp. v. Morton, 455 F.2d 650 (10th Cir. 1971); Con.
servation Council of North Carolina v. Froehlke, 340 F. Supp. 222 (M.D.N.C.
1972), rev'd per curiam, 473 F.2d 664 (4th Cir. 1973); Environmental Defense
Fund v. Corps of Engineers, 325 F. Supp. 749 (E.D. Ark. 1971), rev'd, 470 F.2d
289 (8th Cir. 1972).
. 15. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 § 102, 42 U.S.C. § 4332
'(1970) (emphasis added) provides:
The Congress authorizes and directs that, to the fullest extent possible:
(1) the policies, regulations, and public laws of the United States shall
be intrepreted and administered in accordance with the policies set forth
in this chapter, and (2) all agencies of the Federal Government shall-
(A) utilize a systematic, interdisciplinary approach which will insure the
integrated use of the natural and social sciences and the environmental
design arts in planning and in decisionmaking which may have an im-
pact on man's environment;(B) identify and develop methods and procedures ... which will insure
that presently unquantified environmental amenities and values may be
given appropriate consideration in decision making along with economic
and technical considerations;
(C) include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation
and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the
human environment, a detailed statement by the responsible official on-
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action, (ii) any adverse
environmental effects... (iii) alternatives to the proposed action ....
Prior to making any detailed statement, the responsible Federal official
shall consult with and obtain the comments of any Federal agency which
has jurisdiction by law or special expertise with respect to any environ-
mental impact involved....
(D) study, develop, and describe appropriate alternatives to recommended
courses of action ....
(Vol. 38
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programs significantly affecting the quality of the human environment.16
Unlike the discretionary provisions of section 101, the guidelines of section
102 require strict compliance.'-
A threshold question is whether NEPA applies retroactively to agency
programs begun before its enactment.1 s Courts have taken four approaches
to this issue. Some courts, applying a presumption against retroactive legis-
lation, have found no explicit Congressional intent to apply NEPA retro-
actively and hence have not required that pre-existing programs comply
with NEPA.10 Other courts have refused to apply NEPA to pre-existing
programs if private contracts had been let before the effective date of the
act.20 A third approach is to apply NEPA to pre-existing projects only if
"practicable." 21 The district court in Gilham Dam illustrates the fourth
approach, holding that Congress intended not only that new programs be
required to comply with NEPA, but that all existing programs be im-
proved and upgraded "regardless of how much money has already been
spent thereon and regardless of the degree of the completion of the work." 22
The court of appeals denied the Corps of Engineers' contention that the
Gilham Dam project should be exempt from NEPA.28
The substantive issue that Gilham Dam dealt with is the scope of judi-
cial review of agency action to determine if it complied with NEPA. Judi-
cial review is relevant in three contexts: 1) whether the procedures adopted
by the agency for preparation of the EIS comply with NEPA; 2) whether
the agency's procedure in reaching a decision assures either the full, good
faith c6nsideration of environmental factors or an opportunity for such
consideration as required by NEPA; and 3) whether the agency's substantive
decision is clearly erroneous in view of the environmental goals of the act.
The procedural requirements relating to the EIS contained in section
102 (2) (C) of NEPA have been strictly enforced2 4 and noncomplying pro-
16. See statute quoted note 15 supra.
17. Calvert Cliff's Coordinating Comm. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1114 (D.C.
Cir. 1971). Congress recognized that enforcement in specific situations would be
difficult. Nevertheless
[NEPA] incorporates certain "action-forcing" provisions and procedures
which are designed to assure that all Federal agencies plan and work to-
ward the challenge of a better environment.
S, Rep. No. 296, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. 9 (1969).
18. In Gilham Dam the Corps of Engineers contended that NEPA should
not be retroactively applied to the Millwood Project. Environmental Defense
Fund v. Corps of Engineers, 325 F. Supp. 749, 756-57 (E.D. Ark. 1971).
19. Elliot v. Volpe, 328 F. Supp. 831 (D. Mass. 1971); Brooks v. Volpe, 319
F. Supp. 90 (W.D. Wash. 1970), rev'd, 460 F.2d 1193 (9th Cir. 1972); Investment
Syndicates, Inc. v. Richmond, 318 F. Supp. 1038 (D. Ore. 1970).
20. See Pennsylvania Environmental Council, Inc. v. Bartlett, 454 F.2d 613
(3rd Cir. 1971); cf. Greene County Planning Bd. v. FPC, 455 F.2d 412 (2d Cir.
1972). These courts reason that federal action was substantially complete before
the effective date.
21. Environmental Law Fund v. Volpe, 340 F. Supp. 1328 (N.D. Calif. 1972).
The court did not define the term "practicable."
22. 325 F. Supp. at 746.
23. 470 F.2d at 296.
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grams halted by injunction.25 Although NEPA requires the agency to seek
the advice of other federal authorities with jurisdiction or particular ex-
pertise,26 the agency must issue its own EIS.27 The statement must be pre-
pared prior to any formal hearings, 28 and it must disclose all possible en-
vironmental consequences, even those that the agency believes insignificant
or improbable.2 9
A second aspect of judicial review under NEPA is whether, assuming
it adequately prepares an EIS, the agency actually considers its contents
in reaching a decision.30 Some courts have construed the procedural re-
quirements of NEPA as compelling actual consideration of environmental
factors in the agency's decision-making process apart from the preparation
of the EIS. In Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Commission v. AEC, s1 the
court held that section 102 (2) (C)3 2 indicated "a congressional intent that
environmental factors . . .be considered through the agency process." 8
The court also held that sections 102 (2) (A) and (B) required a balancing
of environmental costs against economic and technical benefits in every
instance, indicating that agency decisions reached without consideration
and balancing of environmental factors would be reversed.8 4 The Gilham
Dam court cited Calvert Cliffs with approval, stating that "[t]he unequivo-
cal intent of NEPA is to require agencies to consider . . . environmental
goals ... not just to file detailed impact studies which will fill governmental
25. Environmental Defense Fund v. Froehlke, 477 F.2d 1033, 1037 (8th Cir.
1973); Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1112 (D.C. Cir.
1971); Administrative Procedure Act § 10 (e), 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2) (D) (1970).
26. See National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 § 102 (2) (C) (iii) 42 U.S.c.
§ 4332 (2) (C) (1970), quoted in note 15 supra.
27. Greene County Planning Bd. v. FPC, 455 F.2d 412 (2d Cir. 1972). In a
proceeding considering an application for construction of a high voltage power-
line, the FPC substituted the EIS of the applicant for its own. The court said:
The danger of this procedure, and one obvious shortcoming, is the po-
tential, if not likelihood, that the applicant's statement will be based on
self-serving assumptions.... [while] intervenors generally have limited re-
sourses, both in terms of money and technical expertise, and thus may not
be able to provide an effective analysis of environmental factors.
Id. at 420.
28. Id. at 419.
29. 325 F. Supp. at 759. The EIS should not be limited to consideration of
traditional areas of consideration involving tangible, measurable factors, but
should also consider such intangible, immeasurable factors as aesthetics and psy-
chological impact. Hanly v. Mitchell, 460 F.2d 640 (2d Cir. 1972). In addition to
considering environmental impact and alternatives in the light of present cir-
cumstances, the EIS should consider likely future developments. Greene County
Planning Bd. v. FPC, 455 F.2d 412, 424 (2d Cir. 1972).
30. An agency may have a longstanding practice of excluding environmental
factors from consideration and of dealing with particular situations in particular
ways. See Liroff, Administrative, Judicial, and Natural Systems: Agency Response
to the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 3 LOYOLA U.L.J. 19, 27 (1972).
Good faith consideration of environmental factors may be avoided in cases where
it could result in project abandonment or threaten the job security of agency
employees and decisionmakers.
31. 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
32. See statute quoted note 15 supra.
33. Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1117-18 (D.C.
Cir. 1971).
34. Id. at 1115.
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archives."' 35 Other courts, however, have held that NEPA requires only that
the agency procedures provide an adequate opportunity to consider en-
vironmental factors.3 6
Where the agency's prescribed procedures make the lack of opportunity
for consideration of environmental factors apparent,37 the courts have re-
versed agency decisions or have required substitute procedures.3 8 But where
the prescribed procedure is adequate the courts are reluctant to look at the
agency's actual practice to determine if there was in fact good faith con-
sideration of environmental factors. For example, courts have been re-
luctant to undertake evidentiary hearings to determine such matters of
compliance as whether the EIS was read fully or the environmental con-
sequences discussed adequately. Thus, formal administrative findings that
purport to give full consideration to environmental factors will probably
preclude further judicial inquiry.3 9 Affidavits prepared for litigation after
the project commences will not, however.4 0 Where there is strong evidence
of bad faith4 or improper behavior, effective judicial review may require
an evidentiary hearing and cross-examination of the decision-makers them-
selves.42
Some courts have gone beyond review of the agency's decision-making
process and procedures and have reviewed the merits of the agency's deci-
sion.43 Gilham Dam held that Congress intended NEPA to be more than
35. 470 F.2d at 298.
36. See National Helium Corp. v. Morton, 455 F.2d 650 (10th Cir. 1971);
Conservation Council of North Carolina v. Froehlke, 340 F. Supp. 222 (M.D.N.C.
1972), rev'd per curiam, 473 F.2d 665 (4th Cir. 1973).
37. See Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C.
Cir. 1971) (agency rules precluded review of certain environmental factors unless
specifically raised). Courts have also considered whether the actual operation of
agency procedure fails to provide adequate opportunity for consideration of en-
vironmental factors. See Id. at 1128, noting that if agency procedure forstalled
consideration of environmental factors until after construction, alteration costs
would be high and consideration of the ecological factors would become a "hollow
exercise." See also Sierra Club v. FPC, 407 U.S. 926 (1972) (dissenting opinion);
Greene County Planning Bd. v. FPC, 455 F.2d 412 (2d Cir. 1972).
38. Greene County Planning Bd. v. FPC, 455 F.2d 412 (2d Cir. 1972) (chal-
lengers of contemplated agency action must be given an opportunity to cross-
examine agency witnesses as to the EIS). See Administrative Procedure Act § 10 (e),
5 U.S.C. § 706 (1970).
39. See United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409 (1941).
40. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
41. In a subsequent opinion, the Gilham Dam court rejected plaintiff's
claim that the institutional bias alone of the Corps of Engineers made the EIS
defective and held that NEPA required only good faith objectivity, not subjective
impartiality. 342 F. Supp. at 1222-23.
42. See Citizens to Perserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420
(1971) (dictum) & case cited note 38 supra.
43. See cases cited note 37 supra. Other courts have held that the substantive
merits of agency decisions are not judicially reviewable. See National Helium
Corp. v. Morton, 455 F.2d 650 (10th Cir. 1971); Conservation Council of North
Carolina v. Froehlke, 340 F. Supp. 222 (M.D.N.C. 1972), rev'd per curiam, 473
F.2d 665 (4th Cir. 1973); Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers, 325
F. Supp. 749 (1971), rev'd, 470 F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1972). These courts read § 101 (b)
(quoted note 9 supra) as a statement of Congressional policy and not an intention
to limit the authority of any agency or to create any judicially enforceable rights.
1973]
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an environmental full-disclosure law; the act was intended to effect sub-
stantive changes in decision-making and require agencies to implement its
environmental goals. 44 The court concluded that agency decisions' were
subject to a limited substantive review and would be overturned if arbitrary,
capricious, or clearly inolving an error in judgment.45
Each of the three aspects of judicial review discussed above seeks to
effect the goal of NEPA-federal agency consideration of environmental
factors in-decision-making. Whether the courts view that goal as mandatory
or discretionary will affect the type of review exercised. Procedural review
can only assure that environmental factors will be brought to the agency's
attention. Substantive review of agency decisions is the only practical means
of assuring actual consideration and therefore best promotes the goal of
NEPA. Gilham Dam furthers that goal by recognizing the need for sub-
stantive review, albeit a limited one.
JOHN HOLTMANN
EVIDENCE-INADMISSIBILITY OF VICTIM'S PRIOR
VIOLENT ACTS TO SHOW DEFENDANT'S APPREHENSION-
A RULE WITHOUT REASON
State v. Nelson'
"'On .July 20, 1970, defendant, Richard Nelson, struck his former em-
ployer, Mr. Elmer Howe, on the head with a ballpeen hammer. Subse-
quently, defendant was convicted of assault with intent to kill without
malice aforethought. At trial, defendant contended that he had struck
Mr.'Howe in self-defense. In support of this contention, defendant offered
testimony of a third party that Mr. Howe had previously "used a knife"
on him (the third party), and that the defendant was informed of this fact.
From this testimony, defendant sought to show that he struck Mr. Howe
out of fear of danger to his life or of great bodily harm. The trial court
refused this offer of evidence. On appeal, the Missouri Supreme Court af-
firmed, holding as follows:
[T]he general rule, and the rule recognized in this State, is that
"the reputation or character of the person killed [or assaulted]
The compromise between the House and Senate versions rejected language argu.
ably more consistent with the creation of substantive rights. See H. Rep. No.
765, 91st Cong., 1st'Sess. 8 (1969).
44. 470 F.2d at 298-300.
45. Id. The court noted that agency action is subject to review under the
Administrative Procedure Act except where there is a statutory prohibition on
review or where agency action has been committed to agency discretion by law,
the latter exception being narrowly construed. Id. at 298-99 n.14. Although
NEPA does not mention judicial review, the court said that "the prospect of sub-
stantive review should improve the quality of agency decisions and should make
it more likely that the broad purposes of the NEPA will be realized." Id. at 299.
Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Froehlke, 473 F.2d 346 (8th Cir. 1972).
. 1. 484 S.W.2d 306 (Mo. 1972).
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for tuibulence and violence cannot be established by proof of
specific acts of violence on his part against persons other than the
defendant." 2
The court did not elaborate on this statement.
A defendant might offer evidence of a victim's prior violent acts
for two different purposes in support of his claim of self-defense.3 One pur-
pose would be to show that the victim had a violent character and hence
is more likely to have been the aggressor,4 a fact essential to a successful
claim of self-defense. 5 A majority of jurisdictions refuse to admit evidence
of prior violent acts on persons other than the defendant when offered
for this purpose, reasoning that the probative value of such evidence is
outweighed by other considerations.6 It has been thought that admission
of the evidence is unduly time consuming and confuses the jury by focusing
their attention on collateral issues.7 To be relevant to show character, each
of the prior acts must be true. The jury, therefore, could be required to de-
cide the facts of several different episodes in addition to the one on trial.
Balanced against these considerations is the relatively weak inference that
one who has been violent in the past was the aggressor in a particular case.
Thus most courts, including Missouri, refuse to admit evidence of prior
violent acts to show that the victim was the aggressor; they do, however
admit general character evidence for this purpose.8
In addition to showing who was the probable aggressor, evidence of
the victim's past violent acts, known to the defendant, as in Nelson,9 is
relevant in determining the reasonableness of the defendant's apprehension
of danger.10 A majority of jurisdictions admit the evidence when offered
2. Id. at 308, quoting State v. Hicks, 488 S.W.2d 215, 219 (Mo. 1969).
3. The principles of relevancy discussed in this note apply with equal force
whether the defendant is charged with homicide or assault. See 2 J. WIGMORE,
EvmENcan § 248, at 65 (Sd ed. 1940).
4. The evidence is relevant when offered for this purpose. 1 J. WiGMoRE,
supra note 3, §§ 63, 198.
5. See 40 AM. JUR. 2D Homicide § 145, at 433 n.13 (1968).
6. State v. Cavenor, 856 Mo. 602, 611, 202 S.W.2d 869, 874 (1947); 40 Am.
JUR. 2D Homicide § 306, at 574, n.14 (1968). But cf. State v. Creighton, 80 Mo.
1176, 1198, 52 S.W.2d 556, 564 (1932), holding admissible evidence of the victim's
previous hostile acts where they were so close in time to the main incident that
it was likely they continued until that time.
7. 40 Am. JR. 2D Homicide § 806, at 574 n.13 (1968).
8. This is an exception to the general rule that character evidence is inad-
missible to show conduct consistent with that character. Witnesses can testify only
as to their knowledge of the victim's reputation in the community, not as to their
own dpinion of the victim or as .to any specific acts. 40 Am. JuR. 2D Homicide
3 806, at 574 n.ll (1968).
9. 484 S.W.2d at 808.
10. Use of deadly force in self-defense is generally justified if it is actually
or apparently necessary to save the defendant from imminent death or great
bodily harm. See 40 Am. Ju,. 2D Homicide § 151, at 489 n.ll (1968).
Admission of such evidence is not inconsistent with the general rule that
character evidence is inadmissible to show conduct consistent with that character
because the evidence is not offered to prove anything about the victim's conduct;
it is offered only to prove the effect on the defendant of his belief that the vic-
tim has been violent in the past.
19731
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for this purpose." In this situation, the probative value of the evidence
is greater because the inference it permits is stronger. Thus, it is more
persuasive to reason that prior violent acts of the victim, known to the de-
fendant, in fact made the defendant apprehensive of danger than it is to
suggest that simply because the victim has been violent in the past, he was
in fact the aggressor in the instant case. Also, the evidence is less con-
fusing to the jury. The jury need only consider how belief of a victim's
prior violent acts affects the defendant's state of mind 12 (by considering
how it Would affect their own), as opposed to speculating on how such
acts reflect the victim's character and whether one with such a' character
is more likely than another to be an aggressor.13 Further, the jury need
not decide if the evidence is true;' 4 the mere fact that the defendant be-
lieved it makes it relevant.
State v. Hicks'5 (hereinafter Hicks 1) was the first Missouri case to
consider the relevance and materiality of evidence of a victim's violent
character to show defendant's apprehension of danger. In that case there
was evidence of the decedent's violent character in the trial record, but
the case report does not disclose whether it was of general reputation or
prior specific acts. An issue was whether the trial court erred in refusing t6
instruct the jury that they should consider the defendant's knowledge of
the decedent's violent character in appraising the reasonableness of the de-
fendant's act.' 6 The Missouri Supreme Court reasoned as follows:
The menacing attitude of a person generally peaceable and law-
abiding would often excite no just apprehension of danger, whilst
similar conduct of a fierce, vindictive and passionate man would
naturally alarm our fears and make us prompt in anticipating his.
purpose. When danger is threatened and impending we are not
compelled to stand with our arms folded until it is too late to
strike, but the law permits us to act on reasonable fear; and there-
fore when the killing has been under circumstances that create a
11. See, e.g., Holt v. State, 170 Tenn. 76, 88-90, 92 S.W.2d 397, 400-01 (1936);
Dempsey v. State, 159 Tex. Grim. 602, 606-07, 266 S.W.2d 875, 877 (1954) .40
Am. JuR. 2D Homicide § 306, at 575 n.17, 18 (1968). According to Wigmore, '[t~he
state of the law as a whole has come to favor the admissibility of such facts." 2
J. WIGMORE, supra note 3, § 248, at 62.
In some jurisdictions a foundation must be laid before evidence of the vic-
tim's prior hostile acts is admissible to show defendant's reasonable apprehension.
This foundation consists of some evidence of an initial overt hostile act by the
victim. The justification for this requirement is that if there is no such evidence
of an overt hostile act by the victim, then self-defense cannot be submitted to
the jury anyway. See 2 J. WIGMoRE, supra note 3, § 246 (1)a, at 46, 47; 40 Am.
JUR. 2D Homicide §§ 303-04, at 571,72.
12. See, e.g.; State v. Jackson, 94 Ariz. 117, 121, 382 P.2d 229, 231 (1963).
13. 2 J. WIGMORE, supra note 3, § 248, at 63-64.
14. See, e.g., State v. Jackson, 94 Ariz. 117, 382 P.2d 229 (1963).
15. 27 Mo. 588 (1859).
16. Id. at 590. The instruction in question read as follows:
If the jury believe from the evidence that the deceased was of rash, turbu-
leht and violent disposition, and that the defendant had knowledge of
such disposition, then it is a circumstance for the consideration of the
jury in considering the reasonable cause for defendant's apprehension of
great personal injury to himself.
[VoL 38
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, doubt as to whether the act was committed in malice, or from a
sense of real danger, the jury have the right to consider any testi-
mony that will explain the motive that prompted the accused.1i
Thus, the court recognized that the defendant's knowledge of the
victim's violent character is material in determining the reasonableness
of defendant's apprehension of danger.1 s Further, the use of "any testi-
mony" to prove the victim's violent character could include prior specific
acts of violence. Yet, no Missouri court has since used Hicks I as authority
for admitting evidence of a victim's prior violent acts (against a third
person) to show that defendant's apprehension was reasonable.
In State v. Elkins,' the court held that the victim's prior threats to
kill the defendant, unknown to the defendant, were admissible to show
the victim was the aggressor. 20 But the court refused to allow evidence of
particular character traits of the victim to prove the defendant's reasonable
apprehension, saying that such proof is limited to general character evi-
dence. 2 ' The court gave no reason or authority for this statement. The
Missouri cases between Elkins and Nelson dealing with prior violent acts
of an assaulted victim are similarly unrevealing.22
One reason Missouri does not recognize the majority rule may be that
our courts have not distinguished the two purposes for which evidence of
prior violent acts may be offered.2 3 As noted above, most jurisdictions admit
such evidence to show the reasonableness of the defendant's apprehension; 24
but not to show that the victim was the aggressor.25 In Nelson, the evidence
was offered for the former purpose. The court, however, cited two cases
in support of its holding without considering the purpose for which the
evidence was offered in either case. In one, State v. Hicks26 (hereinafter
Hicks II),, that purpose is unclear. The defendant, charged with murder,
offered evidence that the decedent had been arrested 47 times. The court
upheld the trial court's refusal of this offer, stating simply that it was fol-
17. Id. at 590-91 (emphasis added). Quesenberry v. State, 3 Stew. 8 Port. 308,
316 (Ala. 1833), cited as authority for the holding in Hicks I, supports the prop-
osition that the victim's specific acts of violence are admissible to show the reason-
ableness of defendant's apprehension.
18. It is unclear whether the defendant in Hicks I asserted a claim of self-
defense, or wanted the evidence of the victim's violent character considered to
negative the element of malice. For purposes of the present discussion it makes no
difference; in both cases the evidence is relevant (or not relevant) for the same
reason, i.e., it shows how defendant's knowledge affected his state of mind.
19. 63 Mo.: 159 (1876).
20. Id. at 164-65.
21. Id. at 165.
22. An early line of Missouri cases held that even general character evidence
is inadmissible to show that decedent was the likely aggressor, unless such char-
acter was known to the defendant. The defendant's knowledge is totally irrelevant
for this purpose. Wigmore states, "it is strange that the Missouri Court is unable
to-see the point." 1 J. WIGMORE, supra note 3, § 63, at 469 n.1.
. 23. State v. Wilson, 250 Mo. 323, 329-30, 157 S.W. 313, 315-16 (1913) is one
of the few Missouri cases which discusses the two ways such evidence is relevant.
The case is well reasoned, but deals with prior violent acts of a deceased against
defendant himself.
24. See authorities cited note 11 supra.
25. See authorities cited note 6 supra.
26. 438 S.W.2d 215 (Mo. 1969).
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lowing the general rule. Although the defendant did know of the victim's
general reputation for violence, the opinion is unclear whether he knew of
his victim's previous arrests. 2 7 Therefore, the defendant's knowledge was
probably not an important fact.28 Because the defendant's knowledge of
the arrests is important only if the evidence is offered to show his state of
mind, it is likely that the evidence was offered to prove that the victim
was the aggressor.29 Hicks II probably supports Nelson only if the distinc-
tion between the purposes for which the evidence is offered is ignored.
In the other case cited in Nelson, State v. Duncan,8 0 the defendant did
not know of the victim's prior violent acts at the time of the homicide. 1
Thus, evidence of them could not have been offered to prove the reason-
ableness of the defendant's apprehension. 2
It is submitted that the different purposes for which evidence of a
victim's prior violent acts may be offered require different rules of admis-
sibility. The rule that such specific acts are inadmissible regardless has
never been carefully examined or justified in a Missouri opinion. When
the evidence is offered to show the defendant's apprehension of danger,
its probative value is greater and the counterveiling considerations weaker
than when offered to show the victim is the aggressor.33 Missouri decisions
have not recognized this, and have assumed that the general rule is the
same regardless of the purpose for which the evidence is offered. Missouri
should align itself with the majority position. 4 To quote from Hicks I,
"When danger is threatened and impending we are not compelled to
stand with our arms folded until it is too late to strike, but the law per-
mits us to act on reasonable fear... ." 8 5-or does it?
THEODoRE H. HELLMUTH
27. Id. at 218.
28. That the defendant had known the victim only two days increases the
probability that the defendant did not know of the arrests.
29. The mere fact that one has to guess at such a vital fact may indicate
the court was not aware that such evidence can be offered for two separate pur-
poses.
50. 467 S.W.2d 866 (Mo. 1971).
31. Id. at 868.
82. The court in Nelson cited a third case, State v. Smart, 828 S.W.2d 569
(Mo. 1959), in which the court stated that prior violent acts of a decedent are
inadmissible to show that he had a violent disposition. The statement is dicta,
however, because at trial the defendant offered no evidence of the victim's violent
character.
33. See p. - supra.
34. See authorities cited note 11 supra.
35. 27 Mo. 590, 591 (1859).
[Vol. 8
24
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 4 [1973], Art. 6
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol38/iss4/6
1973] RECENT CASES '669
INCOME TAXATION-TREATMENT OF PAYMENTS BY
EMPLOYER TO EMPLOYEE'S WIDOW
Estate of Carter v. Commissioner1
Sydney Carter was employed for 88 years by Salomon Bros. & Hutzler
[hereinafter Salomon Bros.], a partnership engaged in the brokerage busi-
ness. At the time of his death on March 1, 1960, Carter was working
under a yearly employment contract entitling him to a $15,000 annual
salary- plus a percentage of the firm's net profits provided he was still
employed by the firm on September 80, 1960. Salomon Bros. had no
policy or practice of making payments to survivors of valued employees,
nor was it obligated to make such payments. Nevertheless, the firm, pur-
suant to a decision of its administrative committee, made payments to Mrs.
Carter of $60,130.84, the amount her husband would have earned under
the contract had he lived until September 30. Payment was made even
though Carter had been fully compensated for his services at his death.
Minutes of the committee meeting at which the payments were
authorized were not kept. Two committee members testified, however,
that they felt sympathy for the widow and that the payments would not
have been made if Carter had not been survived by a wife and son. Al-
though the committee made no investigation or inquiry into the widow's
financial condition before deciding to make the payments, several of
the committee members knew that Carter had been hospitalized 20 times
during his employment. In fact, on several of those occasions they had
offered financial assistance to Mrs. Carter.2
Salomon Bros. did not withhold any income or social security taxes
from the payments to Mrs. Carter, nor did it deduct the payments on
its tax return as compensation. 3 On her 1960 joint tax return, Mrs. Carter
did not report as income the $60,180.84 received from the firm. The
Commissioner of Internal Revenue assessed a deficiency, contending the
payments were compensation. 4 On the basis of all the surrounding facts
and circumstances, the Tax Court held that Salomon Bros. intended the
payments to be compensation under section 61 (a) of the Internal Revenue
1. 453 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1971).
2. Id. at 62-63. Thus, the committee's failure to inquire further into the
widow's financial condition (see text accompanying notes 40 and 48 infra) is insig-
nificant.
3. The Tax Court in Carter found that the payments were deducted by
Salomon Bros. in the partnership tax return for its 1960 fiscal year; the Internal
Revenue Service, however, had disallowed the deduction. At the time Carter was
decided, Salomon Bros. had filed a refund suit in the United States Court of
Claims. Estate of Carter, 29 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1407, 1408 (1970), rev'd, 453
F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1971). The court of appeals noted that the partnership had filed
"an information return (Form 1099) describing the payments representing what
would have been Carter's percentage share of the profits as 'salaries, fees, com-
missions or other compensation.'" But, because there was testimony that the
firm would not deduct the payments as wages, the information return was not in
the record, and the Commissioner did not claim that the payments were deducted
as compensation. The court assumed, for purposes of the appeal, that the pay-
ments were not deducted by Salomon Bros. as wages. 453 F.2d at 63-64.
4. Id.
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Code of 1954. 5 On appeal, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed,
holding that the payments were gifts and thus were excludible under sec-
tion 102 (a).6
Section 61 (a) provides that gross income shall include all income
from whatever source derived, including compensation for services. Sec-
tion 102 (a) provides that gross income shall not include the value of
property acquired by gift.7 Thus, the issue in Carter was whether an, em-
ployer's payment to the employee's widow constituted a gift or compen-
sation for the deceased employee's services. The resolution of this issue
depends on the interpretation and application of section 102. The legis-
lative history of section 102 is not helpful in that regard.8
Courts agree that the transferor's intent determines whether a pay-
ment constitutes compensation or a gift.9 But because this test is purely
subjective, it provides an unworkable standard. 10 Thus, the courts have
had to establish objective criteria for ascertaining the transferor's intent.
Further, they have had to determine the extent to which an appellate
court may substitute its judgment for that of the trier of fact on the
question of the transferor's intent.
Between 1924 and 1937,1 the Board of Tax Appeals and the lower
federal courts developed various guidelines for determining whether pay-
ments made by corporations to employees or former employees were com-
pensation or gifts. Although there was considerable disagreements among
'the courts as to what standards or principles were to be used and what
factors were relevant, the popular position seemed to be that gifts could
not be made in a business context. 12 In Noel v. Parrott,13 the court noted
that the directors were without authority to give away the corporate as-
sets and thus held that they could not have intended the payment as a
5. Estate of Carter, 29 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1407 (1970), rev'd, 453 F.2d
61 (2d Cir. 1971). Unless otherwise indicated, all textual references to sections are
to the INT. Rxv. CODE of 1954.
6. 453 F.2d at 70.
7. Section 101 (b) excludes from gross income amounts, not exceeding
$5,000, received by the beneficiaries or the estate of an employee if such amounts
are paid by reason of the death of the employee. Section 101 (b) does not apply to
gifts, the entire value of which is excluded from gross income by §102. See Duber-
stein v. Commissioner, 363 U.S. 278 (1960); Bogardus v. Commissioner, 302 U.S.
34 (1937); United States v. Frankel, 302 F.2d 666 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 371
U.S. 903 (1962); Wilner v. United States, 195 F. Supp. 786, 787-90 (S.D.N.Y.
1961); Cowan v. United States, 191 F. Supp. 703, 705 (N.D. Ga. 1960); Reed v.
United States, 177 F. Supp. 205 (W.D. Ky. 1959), aff'd per curiam, 277 F.2d 456
(6th Cir. 1960).
8. Duberstein v. Commissioner, 363 U.S. 278, 284 (1960). For a- further
discussion of the legislative history, see Klein, An Enigma in the Federal Income
-Tax: The Meaning of the Word "Gift", 48 MINN. L. REv. 215 (1963).
9. Duberstein v. Commissioner, 363 U.S. 278, 284 (1960); Bogardus V. Com-
missioner, 302 U.S. 34, 43 (1937).
10. Crown, Payments to Corporate Executives' Widow, N.Y.U. 19th INST. oN
FED. TAx 815 (1961); Yohlin, Payments to Widows of Employees, 40 TAxEs 208
(1962).
.911. The first reported case dealing with the definition of "gift" was John
H. Parrott, 1 B.T.A. 1 (1924), aff'd, 15 F.2d 669 (4th Cir. 1926).
12. But see Blair v. Rosseter, 33 F.2d 286 (9th Cir. 1929).
13. 15 F.2d 669 (4th Cir. 1926).
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gift. In Ira A. Kip, 4 the Board of Tax Appeals relied on the assumption
that corporations normally expect some benefit or return from any pay-
ment and said that corporations do not make gifts in the ordinary sense.
Other cases relied heavily on, contemporaneous statements or resolutions
to determine the transferor's state of mind. Thus, courts frequently held
a payment to be compensation where the employer had declared that it
was in recognition of past services, even though the employer was under
no obligation to make the payment.15
In 1937, the Supreme Court partially resolved the conflict among the
lower courts in Bogardus v. Commissioner.16 Although the Court failed to
clarify the meaning of the term "gift," it did reject the restrictive approach,
described above, by recognizing that a gift could be made in a business
context. The Court stated that "a gift is none the less a gift because inspired
by a gratitude for the past faithful service of the recipient."' 7
I The Court also established basic criteria that a payment must meet
in order to qualify as a gift: (1) The transfer must not be motivated by
a legal or moral obligation; (2) it must not be a payment for services,
past or future; and (3) there must be no expectation that gain will be de-
rived from the payment.' 8 However, the Court also said that a payment
merely in recognition of past services was not compensation for those
past services, thus establishing that the employer's characterization of
the payment is not controlling. The Court's approach was to determine
the underlying motives for making the payments. 19
More significantly, the Court concluded that the determination of
the employer's intent was "a conclusion of law or at least a determina-
tion of a mixed question of law and fact. ... It is subject to judicial re-
view and, on such review, the court may substitute its judgment for that
of the board." 20 A strong dissent argued that the determination of intent
was for the trier of fact, and "[i]f there was opportunity for opposing in-
ferences, the judgment of the [trier of fact] controls." 21
Following the Bogardus approach, the lower federal courts established
objective criteria for the classification of payments to widows of corporate
employees. The Tax Court in Estate of Arthur W. Hellstrom22 held that
the intent to make a gift was established upon proof that: (1) The pay-
ment was made directly to the widow rather than to the estate; (2) the
decedent had been fully compensated at his death; (3) the company making
the payment realized no economic benefit as a result of making the
payment; and (4) the widow performed no services for the corporation. 23
14. 3 B.T.A. 50 (1925).
15. Hall v. Commissioner, 89 F.2d 441 (4th Cir. 1937); Simpkinson v. Com-
missioner, 89 F.2d 397 (5th Cir. 1937); Bogardus v. Helvering, 88 F.2d 646 (2d
Cir.), revld sub nom. Bogardus v. Commissioner, 302 U.S. 34 (1937).
16. 302 U.S. 34 (1937).
17. Id. at 44.
18. Id. at 4L
19. See id. at 43.
20. Id. at 39, quoting from Helvering v. Tex-Penn Oil Co., 300 U.S. 481,
491 (1937).
21. Id. at 45.
22. 24 T.C. 916 (1955).
23. Id. at 920.
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Except for the requirement that the payment be made directly to
the widow,2 4 both the federal district courts and the Tax Court employed
this same basic approach. Under the watchful eye of appellate courts
employing the Bogardus scope of review, some consistency in the inter-
pretation and application of section 102 existed for the first time.
The Supreme Court's decision in Duberstein v. Commissioner26
brought and end to this consistency. The Court in Duberstein considered
whether a corporate payment to a business associate constituted a gift.20
The Commissioner advocated a new test that would have disallowed gift
treatment for payments made in a business context. Although the Supreme
Court rejected this test,2 7 it did review the law in this area. First, the
Court restated the basic criteria set forth in Bogardus for determining
whether a payment made in a business setting is a gift.28 Second, the
Court reaffirmed the Bogardus rule that the dominant intent of the trans-
feror is controlling, but further qualified this rule by requiring that in
order for the payment to be a gift "the dominant reason that explains
[the transferor's] action in making the transfer" must be a "detached and
disinterested generosity, out of affection, respect, admiration, charity or
like impulses." 20 Third, the Court said that Congress did not use the
word "gift" in section 102 in the common law sense.8 0 Instead, Congress
used the term in a more "colloquial" sense, such that the meaning must
be determined by the image the word evokes in the mind of he average
man. In other words, the standard is established by examining one's
own reaction and experiences.8 1 Finally, adopting the approach espoused
by the dissenting opinion in Bogardus, the Duberstein Court held that the
determination of whether a gift had been made was primarily one of fact.
The Court reasoned that the non-technical nature of the applicable stand-
ard and the differing factual situations of each case demand that primary
weight be given to findings of the trier of fact.82
24. The Tax Court later said that the fact that the employer made the pay-
ment to the estate was not, by itself, sufficient to compel the conclusion that the
payment was compensation rather than a gift. See Estate of Frank J. Foote, 28
T.C. 547 (1957).
25. 363 U.S. 278 (1960).
26. Id. In Duberstein, the taxpayer agreed to provide the names of poten-
tial customers to a business corporation. The corporation reciprocated by giving
the taxpayer a Cadillac, the value of which the taxpayer did not include in
his gross income for 1951. The Court, in an 8-1 decision, held that the value of
the automobile was taxable income. Although the case did not involve payments
to an employee's widow, it applies to that situation because it establishes the
guiding principles for determining what constitutes a gift under § 102.
27. Id. at 287-89.
28. See text accompanying note 18 supra.
29. 363 U.S. at 285 (citations omitted).
30. Id. Although it has been argued that in saying this the Court made a
considerable departure from the previous law, it is clear that the Court intended
no drastic change, because (1) the Court refused to adopt a new test and (2) the
Court stated that the governing principles "are necessarily general and have
alieady been spelled out in the opinions of this Court." Id. at 284.
31. Klein, An Enigma in the Federal Income Tax: The Meaning of the
Word "Gift", 48 MINN. L. REv. 215 (1963).
32. Duberstein v. Commissioner, 363 U.S. 278, 289-90 (1960). § 7482 (a) pro-
vides: 28
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Justice Frankfurter, in a concurring opinion, criticized the limited
appellate review approach adopted by the majority. He warned that this ap-
proach would result in inconsistent decisions among the courts under sec-
tion 102. 33
As the cases in the Tax Court and federal district courts subsequent
to Duberstein indicate, Justice Frankfurter's fears were justified. The Tax
Court, conscious of the limited appellate review and apparently relying
on the Supreme Court's presumably narrower "colloquial" meaning of
"gift," viewed Duberstein as a substantial change in the gift-income law.3 4
As a result, the Tax Court, which had previously held gratuitious em-
ployee death benefits to be tax-free under Hellstrom, began treating such
payments as taxable compensation for the services of the decedent. 35
The United States Courts of Appeals shall have exclusive jurisdiction to
review the decisions of the Tax Court... in the same manner and to the
same extent as decisions of the district courts in civil actions without ajury ....
The purpose of this legislation was to remove the favored position of the Tax
Court in terms of scope of appellate review created by the Court's ruling in
Dobson v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 489 (1943). Under the restricted appellate
review approach of Duberstein, a determination by the Tax Court or a judge
without a jury must stand unless "clearly erroneous." See FED. R. Civ. P. 52 (a).
Commenting on rule 52, the Supreme Court said:
A finding is "clearly erroneous" when although there is evidence to sup-
port it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite
and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.
Duberstein v. Commissioner, 363 U.S. 278, 291 (1960), quoted from United States
v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948). A jury's finding made
upon correct instructions must stand if there is reasonable evidence to support
that finding. Thus, when an inference drawn from the basic facts is reasonable,
the determination of the jury must be upheld. United States v. Kasynski, 284
F.2d 143 (10th Cir. 1960).
33. 363 U.S. at 297. In referring to the general governing principles adopted
by the court, Frankfurter also criticized the Court's failure to clear up the am-
biguities inherent in the "intent" test. Indeed, because certain basic fact situa-
tions recur so frequently under § 102, the Court should have been able to develop
more specific guidelines for determining when a gift was intended.
34. Yohlin, Payments to Widows of Employees, 40 TAXES 208 (1962). In this
article, the author questions the appropriateness of the Tax Court's reliance on
the language of Duberstein because of the factual distinction between Duberstein
and the cases involving employee death benefits. In Duberstein, the payment was
made directly to the person who rendered the services. This is persuasive evidence
that the payment was intended to be compensation, especially where the recipient
had not been otherwise rewarded. In the Tax Court cases, the payments were not
made to the employee, who had already been fully compensated, but rather to
the widow. Yohlin contends that this circumstance is more consistent with "gener-
osity," "charity," or "like impulses." Id. at 214.
35. See Estate of Julius B. Cronheim, 20 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1144 (1961),
aff'd, 323 F.2d 706 (8th Cir. 1963); Estate of W. R. Olsen, 20 CCH Tax Ct. Mem.
807 (1961), rev'd, 302 F.2d 671 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 903 (1962);
Mildred W. Smith, 20 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 775 (1961), aff'd, 305 F.2d 778 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 371 U.S. 904 (1962); Estate of Irving B. Cooper, 20 CCH Tax Ct.
Mem. 774 (1961); Mary Fischer, 20 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 318 (1961); Estate of
Rose A. Russek, 20 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 123 (1961); Estate of Martin Kuntz, Sr.,
19 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1379 (1960), rev'd, 300 F.2d 849 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 371
U.S. 903 (1962); Estate of Mervin G. Pierpont, 35 T.C. 65 (1960), rev'd sub nor.
Poyner v. Commissioner, 301 F.2d 287 (4th Cir. 1962).
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The Tax Court delineated its new approach in Estate of Mervin G.
Pierpoint,36 Estate of Marvin Kuntz, Jr.,8 7 and Estate of W. R. Olsen.88
In Pierpoint, even though the Helistrom factors were present, the Tax
Court cited Duberstein to justify a determination that payments to the.
widow were additional compensation for the decedent's services. The
court stated that the controlling factors were (1) language in the resolu-
tion characterizing the payments as a "continuation of his salary"8 9 and
(2) the corporation's failure to consider the widow's financial condition
in determining to make the payments. 4° In Kuntz and Olsen, the Hell-
strom factors were again present, but the Tax Court found that language
in the resolution to the effect that the payments were in recognition of
services rendered conclusively established that the employer's intent was to
compensate the decedent. 4 '
Although these decisions were all reversed on appeal,42 the Tax
Court continued to hold that such payments were income.48 While rec-
36. 35 T.C. 65 (1960).
37. 19 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1379 (1960).
38. 20 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 807 (1961).
39. But see Duberstein v. Commissioner, 363 U.S. 278, 286 (1960); Bogardus
v. Commissioner, 302 U.S. 34 (1937). In both cases the donor's characterization was
considered relevant but not controlling.
40. 35 T.C. at 68-69.
41. 19 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. at 1380; 20 CCII Tax Ct. Mem. at 807.
42. In reversing the Tax Court's decision in Pierpont, the court of appeals
stressed that Duberstein did not destroy the authority of the earlier Tax Court
cases. The court stated that under those cases, "essentially identical facts were
held sufficient to support the conclusion that the dominant motive was sympathy
for the taxpayer's widowed position. Poyner v. Commissioner, 301 F.2d 287, 291
(4th Cir. 1962), revg Estate of Mervin G. Pierpoint, 35 T.C. 65 (1960). Likewise,
the Tax Court's decision in Kuntz was reversed on the ground that the language
of the resolution was not controlling. The Sixth Circuit stated that, in view of
the evidence, it was left with the firm conviction that the Tax Court had been
mistaken as to the factual inferences to be drawn from the language of the
resolution characterizing the nature of the payment. Estate of Kuntz v. Com-
missioner, 300 F.2d 849, 852 (6th Cir. 1962), rev'g 19 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1379
(1960). The Tax Court's determination was also upset in Olsen. Estate of Olsen
v. Commissioner, 302 F.2d 671 (8th Cir. 1962), rev'g 20 CCH Tax Ct. Mer. 807
(1961).
43. See Estate of Harry Schwartz, 26 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 957 (1967); Edith
L. Joyce, 25 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 914 (1966) (payments were made pursuant to an
established plan and without consideration of widow's needs); Estate of William
Enyart, 24 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1447 (1965) ($10,000 lump sum payment au-
thorized at a special directors' meeting following the funeral was held to be a
gift; but, additional $1,000 monthly payments authorized later were held taxable);
Estate of Frances C. Cross, 23 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1542 (1964) (widow inde-
pendently wealthy; closely held family corporation; payments also being made
to other former employees); Katharine Shaw Dickson, 23 CCH Tax Ct. Meni. 1161
(1964) (widow financially secure; decedent served for two years without com-
pensation; payments also had been made to other parting employees); Ida Maltz-
man, 23 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 829 (1964) (corporation family-owned and -con-
trolled; widow financially secure); Estate of James J. Doumakes, 22 CCH Tax Ct.
Mem. 1247 (1963) (family-held corporation; widow served on board of directors;
but, directors aware of critical financial position of widow; resolution said pay-
ment was gratuitous; Hellstrom factors present); Lucille McCrea Evans, 39 T.C.
570 (1962), afrd, 330 F.2d 518 (6th Cir. 1964) (directors had knowledge of widow's
financial condition, but widow served as president and chairman of the board of
directors following her husband's death).
30
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ognizing that it was not free to eliminate the gift exclusion of section 102,
the Tax Court applied the exclusion as narrowly as the language of the'
statute permitted. The decisions also indicated that, if possible, the Tax.
Court would not find section 102 applicable to transfers made in a business
context, in spite of the Duberstein Court's explicit rejection of such a test.'
While the Tax Court has consistently relied on Duberstein to justify
the determination that payments to an executive's widow constituted com-
pensation, the federal district courts have used the language of Duberstein
to justify contrary results. The district courts generally have viewed Duber-
stein as reaffirming the authority of Bogardus and such subsequent cases
as Rellstrom. This position was articulated in Poyner v. Commissioner,44
where the court said:
The Supreme Court in Duberstein did not destroy the authority
of the earlier Tax Court cases and the guides enunciated in them
for discovering motivation.
On the other hand, Duberstein can not be read as limiting
inquiry by the trier of fact solely to the factors recognized by the
earlier decisions. The objective is to discover which motive is
dominant in a field of co-existing motives. In the task of sorting
out the varying motives, the development of more reliable cri-
teria by the triers of fact should not be curtailed.45
Thus, the district courts have been concerned primarily with sophis-
tication of the basic Hellstrom criteria and development of additional
relevant criteria. As a result, they have tended to treat such payments as
income only where they were made pursuant to an established plan or
practice, 40 where the decedent's family controlled the corporation, 47 or
44. 301 F.2d 287 (4th Cir. 1962).
45. Id. at 291-92.
46. Payments made pursuant to an established plan or practice are usually
considered taxable, because the employee, if he knows of the plan, normally
regards these fringe benefits as additional compensation. Moreover, in establishing
such a plan, the corporation is usually motivated by the anticipation of resulting
economic benefit, such as improved employee relations and inducement of new
employees. Tomlinson v. Hine, 329 F.2d 462, 465-66 (5th Cir. 1964); Cronheim's
Lstate v. Commissioner, 323 F.2d 706, 711 (8th Cir. 1963); Gaugler v. United
Stae., 312 F.2d 681 (2d Cir. 1963); Spear v. Vinal, 240 F. Supp. 33, 34 (D. Neb.
1965); Froehlinger v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 13 (D. Md. 1963), aff'd, 331
F.2d 849 (4th Cir. 1964). But the practice of making payments on a consideration
of each individual case with no uniform method for determining their amount or
duration would be of little incentive to employees and therefore of little economic
benefit to the company. Thus, the existence of such a plan or practice does not
indicate that the payment was intended to be compensation. Harper v. United
States, 454 F.2d 222 (9th Cir. 1971); Schleyer v. United States, 63-2 U.S. Tax Cas.
89,223 (E.D. Mo. 1963).
47. The relationship between the decedent and those controlling the com-
pany at the time the resolution authorizing the payments was made is relevant
in determining whether the payment was intended to be income. Where the
company is controlled by the decedent's immediate family, the obvious motive
for such payments is to get money out of the corporation tax free. Prather v.
United States, 296 F. Supp. 1323, 1327 (N.D. Tex. 1969); Corasaniti v. United
States, 212 F. Supp. 229, 231-32 (D. Md. 1962); Carson v. United States, 317 F.2d
1973]
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where the employer failed to consider the widow's financial needs. 48 In
the absence of these factors, the district courts have consistently held such
payments to be gifts, even in the presence of factors that the Tax Court
would have considered strong evidence of intent to compensate, such as'
the corporation's characterization of the payment as a salary continuation
or its computation of the amount of the payment on the basis of decedent's
salary.4 9 Thus, the district courts have recognized that nontaxable gifts
may be made in a commercial setting and may serve some legitimate busi-
ness purpose, as long as that purpose is not the principal motivation for
the payment. 50
Because of the divergent views of the Tax Court and the district
courts at the time of Carter, the crucial element in these cases was the
choice of forum. If Mrs. Carter had paid the deficiency and sued for a
refund in district court, precedent indicates that the court would have
held the payment to be a gift. Moreover, because of the limited scope of
appellate review, this decision probably would have been upheld on ap-
peal. Thus, the outcome in many cases depended on whether the widow
could afford to pay the alleged deficiency and sue for a refund, or whether
she had to resort to a determination in the Tax Court before payment.
Although this discrepancy between the Tax Court and the district
courts seems quite obvious, both the Supreme Court and Congress have
370 (Ct. Cl. 1963). But see Childers v. United States, 69-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 85,889,
at 85,898 (M.D. Tenn. 1969), where the court stated:
The very nature of the close-corporation structure in the instant case
militates in favor of the conclusion that the payments... were made out
of a feeling of sympathy which one would normally expect to arise in a
family enterprise, when one member of the family has suffered a loss.
48. See Tomlinson v. Hine, 829 F.2d 462 (5th Cir. 1964); Poyner v. Com-
missioner, 301 F.2d 287 (4th Cir. 1962); Simpson v. United States, 261 F.2d 497
(7th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 859 U.S. 944 (1959); Prather v. United States, 296
F. Supp. 1323 (N.D. Tex. 1969). But cf. Fanning v. Conley, 857 F.2d 87, 41 (2d
Cir. 1966) (fact that widow is not financially needy is not controlling if the trans-
feror mistakenly believed she was financially needy).1 49. See Fanning v. Conley, 857 F.2d 87 (2d Cir. 1966), aff'g 248 F. Supp 683
(D. Conn. 1965) (payment equal to one-half of decedent's salary and characterized
as "salary continuation"); United States v. Frankel, 302 F.2d 666 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 871 U.S. 908 (1962), aff'g 192 F. Supp. 776 (D. Minn. 1961) (amount of
payment was equivalent to decedent's salary plus normal bonus); United States v.
Kasynski, 284 F.2d 148 (10th Cir. 1960) (affirming district court finding of gift;
payment equivalent to two years' salary); Biedenharn v. United States, 800 F. Supp.
1018 (W.D. La. 1969) (Hellstrom factors present; directors testified that a gift was
intended; payment not made pursuant to established retirement plan; payment
was a salary continuation for one year); Falk v. United States, 277 F. Supp. 129
(C.D. Cal. 1967) (Hellstrom factors present; no established plan or practice; but:
payment was the equivalent of decedent's annual salary; & corporation deducted
the payments as an expense); Corasaniti v. United States, 212 F. Supp. 229, (D. Md.
1962) (Hellstrom factors present; payments were in response to widow's needs;
but: corporation was family-held; & payments were the equivalent of decedent's
salary); Cowan v. United States, 191 F. Supp. 708 (N.D. Ga. 1960) (Hellstrom
factors present; no plan or policy; but widow's needs not considered); Vaughn v.
United States, 62-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 85,800 (S.D. Ga. 1962) (Hellstroin factors pres-
ent; no plan or practice; but widow's needs not considered); Schwartz v. United
States, 62-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 85,719 (N.D. Tex. 1962) (Hellstrom factors present;
no established plan or practice; but widow's needs not considered).
50. Fanning v. Conley, 857 F.2d 87, 89 (2d Cir. 1966).
[Vol, 38
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refused to reexamine the problem. As a result, the courts of appeals, even
though hampered by their limited scope of review, are in the best position
to remedy the situation by insisting on uniform application of the law in
the Tax Court and district courts. This was the approach that the Sec-
ond Circuit took in Carter.
In Carter, the Duberstein "clearly erroneous" rule seemingly required
affirmance of the Tax Court's decision. 5' The Second Circuit, however,
deviated from the Duberstein teaching that "primary weight in this area
must be given to the conclusions of the trier of fact ' 52 because of its be-
lief that similar fact patterns tend to recur so often that the appellate
courts must have a broader scope of review in order to develop reliable,
uniform guidelines for the trial courts to follow in determining the gift-
income question.53 The court insisted that the Tax Court, as well as the
district courts, follow the guidelines set out in the Second Circuit case
of Fanning v. Conley.54 Specifically, the court stated that the factors the
Commissioner relied on to negate the inference of gift-Salomon Bros.'
references to the payment as a salary continuation, the claim of a tax
deduction by Salomon Bros.,55 and the failure to investigate Mrs. Carter's
financial circumstances-were not controlling.56 Instead, the Court stated
51. While the court of appeals in Carter said that the Tax Court was in clear
error, Judge Davis, in his dissenting opinion, seems to be correct in his contention
that strict adherence to the Duberstein scheme of appellate review would require
affirmance of the Tax Court's decision. While acknowledging the problems
created by Duberstein, Judge Davis concluded that the Supreme Court deliberately
left the resolution of the matter to Congress rather than to the courts. 453 F.2d
at 70.
52. 363 U.S. at 289.
53. 453 F.2d at 69. In this respect, the Carter decision recognized the validity
of Griswold's criticism of Duberstein as an unfortunate enlargement of the func-
tion of the trial court. Griswold contended that:
To overrate the function of the jury ... is to shirk the function of the
court, and to fail to administer justice rationally, consistently, and
soundly.... Is this not an example of an undue and unfortunate yield-
ding of responsibility to juries and other triers of facts, when what was
called for was some clarification of the law applicable in cases of this
sort?
Griswold, Forward: Of Time and Attitudes-Professor Hart and Judge Arnold, The
Supreme Court, 1959 Term, 74 H.Atv. L. REv. 81, 88-90 (1960).
54. 357 F.2d 37 (2d Cir. 1966).
55. See note 3 and accompanying text supra.
56. Citing Duberstein, Fanning, and Kasynski, the court said that "the claim
of a tax deduction by the payor... [has been] held to be without material proba-
tive significance." 453 F.2d at 69. The Supreme Court in Duberstein said that the
courts should give little or no weight to "the peripheral deductibility of payments
as business expenses," since such an inquiry "would summon one difficult and
delicate problem of federal tax law as an aid to the solution of another." 363
U.S. at 288. With the enactment of § 274 in 1962, however, the employer's treat-
ment of the payment to the widow provides an even stronger indication of the
employer's intent. Prior to § 274, the employer could intend to make a gift to
the widow and still validly claim the payment as an ordinary and necessary ex-
pense under section 162. Under § 274, however, no deduction is allowed for busi-
ness gifts exceeding $25 per donee for the taxable year made directly or indirectly
to any individual. "Gift' in § 274 is defined as any item excludable from the
recipient's income solely by reason of § 102. Section 274 does not affect a payment
that could be excluded both under § 102 and another section. Therefore, because
payments to an employee's widow may be excluded by the widow to the extent
1978]
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that the Tax Court should utilize the Hellstrom factors and other factors
"as experience should prove relevant ' 57 in determining the employer's
intent in making the transfer. Specifically, the court stressed the managing
partner's testimony and other statements made by Salomon Bros. that a
gift was intended. The Tax Court had considered such statements to
be of slight probative value in establishing the intent of the firm. The
Second Circuit concluded that such statements are reliable and should
be given considerable weight, because they are contrary to the firm's in-
terest in protecting its deduction of the payment as a business expense.5 8
Carter may be viewed as an attempt by the Second Circuit to obtain
uniform results in cases involving payments to an employee's widow, re-
gardless of whether the case was tried in the Tax Court or in a district
court. In doing so, the court indicated that it will disregard the limited
scope of review rule enunciated in Duberstein when necessary to reverse an
inconsistent case. Thus, the Second Circuit will be more sympathetic to the
taxpayer on appeal of a Tax Court decision if the factors involved in the
particular case would likely have led to a taxpayer's verdict had the
case been initially decided in a district court.
THomAS J. KEEDY
JUDICIAL NOTICE-DISPUTABILITY AND APPELLATE
PRACTICE REGARDING JUDICIAL NOTICE OF
STOPPING DISTANCES
Morrison v. Thomas1
This was a suit for damages resulting from an intersection collision.
Plaintiff testified that he was traveling at the speed limit, 30 miles per hour.
Based on plaintiff's skid marks, however, which exceeded 104 feet in length,
defendant's expert witness testified that plaintiff's minimum speed was
41.25 miles per hour. He also stated that at 30 miles per hour the total
stopping distance under normal conditions would be 88 feet. On the basis
of this testimony and that of an eye witness, the defendant alleged that the
plaintiff was contributorily negligent as a matter of law. The trial court
of $5,000 under § 101 regardless of whether they are a gift under § 102, the em-
ployer may claim a deduction up to $5,000, irrespective of whether the payment
is a gift from the standpoint of the recipient. But when the payment exceeds$5,000, the amount over $5,000 can be excluded from the recipient's income
only if § 102 applies. Thus, when making a payment to an employee's widow,
the employer will be entitled to deduct the amount in excess of $5,000 only if
the payment is not a gift under § 102. Thus, when the employer claims a deduc-
tion under § 162 for the payments made to a widow, the inference that the pay-
ment was intended to be compensation and not a gift will be very strong. As a
consequence, the enactment of § 274 will probably result in fewer cases involving
the problem under discussion, because many employers will not be willing to
forego the deduction and will therefore classify the payment as compensation.
57. 453 F.2d at 69.
58. Id. at 70.
1. 481 S.W.2d 605 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1972).
[Vol. 38
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overruled defendant's motion for a directed verdict, and the jury found for
the plaintiff.
On appeal, defendant requested that the court judicially notice that
plaintiff should have been able to stop his automobile well within the dis-
tance available (at least 150 feet), if his speed was in fact 30 miles per hour.
Defendant, however, had failed to request judicial notice of this fact at
trial. The Kansas City District of the Missouri Court of Appeals refused
to judicially notice the distance within which plaintiff should have been
able to stop. The court held that judicial notice does not have the con-
clusive effect the defendant demanded (i.e., converting a question of fact into
a pure question of law).2 Also, the court said that an appellate court should
not judicially notice a fact where judicial notice was sought in the first
instance on appeal.3
Judicial notice4 can be taken of facts that are common knowledge to
the community, 5 verifiable to a certainty by reference to competent, au-
thoritative sources, 6 or matters of science generally accepted by the scien-
tific community.7 Beyond this, courts disagree on the proper subject matter,
purpose, and effect of judicial notice.
The first problem that Morrison deals with is whether a fact judicially
noticed is conclusive or disputable. Courts, influenced by differing notions
of the purpose behind judicial notice, differ on this question. Those courts
that favor giving conclusive effect to judicial notices exercise it in a narrow
spectrum of truly indisputable facts;9 whereas, courts that permit contra-
dictory evidence apply judicial notice to a wide range of factual situations.1 0
2. Id. at 607-08.
3. Id. at 607.
4. The term "judicial notice" as used in this note applies only to adjudica-
tive facts as opposed to legislative facts. PROP. FED. R. EVID. 201, Comment (a)
(Rev. Draft 1971) states:
Adjudicative facts are simply the facts of the particular case. Legislative
facts, on the other hand, are those which have relevance to legal reasoning
and the lawmaking process, whether in the formulation of a legal prin-
ciple or ruling by a judge or court.
For an example of legislative facts see the psychological studies in Brown v. Board
of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
5. Casey v. Phillips Pipeline Co., 199 Kan. 538, 552, 431 P.2d 518, 530 (1967).
6. City of St. Louis v. Niehaus, 236 Mo. 8, 17, 139 S.W. 450, 452 (1911);
Fringer v. Venema, 26 Wis. 2d 366, 372-73, 132 N.W.2d 565, 569, modified, 133
N.W.2d 809 (1965); PROP. FED. R. Evo. 201 (b) (Rev. Draft 1971).
7. Steed v. State, 80 Ga. App. 360, 363, 56 S.E.2d 171, 174 (1949); Reynolds
v. McMan Oil & Gas Co., 11 S.W.2d 778, 784 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1928).
8. State v. Main, 69 Conn. 123, 136, 37 A. 80, 84 (1897); Makos v. Prince,
64 So. 2d 670, 673 (Fla. 1953); Casey v. Phillips Pipeline Co.,'199 Kan. 538, 552,
431 P.2d 518, 530 (1967); Pogue v. Smallen, 285 S.W.2d 915, 917 (Mo. 1956);
Lemel v. Smith, 64 Nev. 545, 566, 187 P.2d 169, 179 (1947).
9. See generally C. McCoRAuCK EvoENcE § 332, at 70 (2d ed. 1972).
10. Id. at 769. See, e.g., Meredith v. Fair, 298 F.2d 696, 701 (5th Cir. 1962)
(Missisippi maintains a policy of segregation in its schools and colleges); Steed
v. State, 80 Ga. App. 360, 363, 56 S.E.2d 171, 174 (1949) (normal periods of gesta-
tion); Casey v. Phillips Pipeline Co., 199 Kan. 538, 552, 431 P.2d 518, 530 (1967)
(gasoline contains anti-oxidants harmful to growth of vegetation); Reynolds v.
McMan Oil &c Gas Co., 11 S.W.2d 778, 784 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1928) (gas from
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Judicial notice in the latter courts is little more than a procedural device
useful in expediting trials by dispensing with proof of self-evident facts."
A slight majority of legal writers12 and cases' 3 favor disputability of judi-
cially noticed facts. The Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence adopt the
position that facts judicially noticed are conclusive, 14 but recognize that
procedural fairness requires an opportunity for the opponent "to be heard
on the propriety of taking judicial notice and the tenor of the matter
noticed."' 5
Timson v. Manufacturer's Coal & Coke Co.' 6 firmly established that,
in Missouri, facts judicially noticed are disputable.17 Various writers argue
that this approach allows contradictory evidence on a judicially noticed
fact and, in effect, treats judicial notice as a "glorified presumption."' 8
They argue that this is a misapplication of the doctrine because it en-
croaches on the fact finding responsibility of the jury.'9 The greatest draw-
back of the Missouri approach is that permitting contradiction of judi-
11. See 481 S.W.2d at 608; State v. Lawrence, 120 Utah 828, 234 P.2d 600
(1951); 9 J. WiGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2567, at 586 (3d ed. 1940). Under this view
judicially noticed facts may be submitted to the jury for determination.
12. J. THAYER, P EUMINARtY TREATisE ON EVIDENCE 308 (1898); 9 J. WioMom,
supra note 11, § 2567.
13. See, e.g., Nielsen v. Carney Groves, Inc., 159 So. 2d 489, 491 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1964); Makos v. Prince, 64 So. 2d 670, 673 (Fla. 1953); Macht v. Hecht
Co., 191 Md. 98, 102, 59 A.2d 754, 756 (1948); Piechota v. Rapp, 148 Neb. 442,
451-52, 27 N.W.2d 682, 688 (1947); Lemel v. Smith, 64 Nev. 545, 565-66, 187
P.2d 169, 179 (1947); State v. Lawrence, 120 Utah 823, 828, 234 P.2d 600, 602
(1951); Annot., 45 A.L.R.2d 1169 (1956). Contra, Bade v. Drachman, 4 Ariz. 55,
69, 417 P.2d 689, 703 (Ct. App. 1966); Schriver v. Tucker, 42 So. 2d 707, 710
(Fla. 1949); McCoy v. Gilbert, 110 Ohio App. 453, 463, 169 N.E.2d 624, 632-33
(1959); Annot., 45 A.L.R.2d 1169 (1956).
See also E. MORGAN, BAsIc PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE 10 (1963). Morgan believes
that few courts really accept contradictory evidence. Morgan says that where
they do, they actually have determined that the fact was outside the domain of
judicial notice.
Jurisdictions holding that judicial notice is conclusive provide an opportunity
for the adverse party to contest the propriety of taking judicial notice. See Fringer
v. Venema, 26 Wis. 2d 366, 373, 132 N.W.2d 565, 570, modified, 133 N.W.2d 809
(1965); Keeffe, Landis & Shaad, Sense and Nonsense About Judicial Notice, 2
STAN. L. REv. 664, 668 (1950).
14. PROP. FED. R. Evm. (Rev. Draft 1971). This draft is currently being con-
sidered by Congress, and is subject to revision. Comment (9) to rule 201 states:
[T]he rule contemplates there is to be no evidence in before the jury
in disproof. The judge instructs the jury to take judicially noticed facts
as established.
15. Id. 201 (e), and Comment (e). See Chubbs v. City of New York, 324 F.
Supp. 1183, 1187-88 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
16. 220 Mo. 580, 119 S.W. 565 (En Banc 1909).
17. The court said:
[I]f the facts judicially noticed are disputable, then the party is not and
should not be prevented from disputing them, if in fact he can do so.
Judicially noticing facts, like many presumptions entertained by the
courts, is but a rule of evidence ....
Id. at 598, 119 S.W. at 569. See, e.g., Scheufler v. Continental Life Ins. Co., 350
Mo. 886, 896, 169 S.W.2d 359, 365 (1943); Jackson v. Cherokee Drug Co., 434 S.W.
2d 257, 264 (St. L. Mo. App. 1968).
18. See E. MORGAN, supra note 13, at 10.
19. See Id. C. McCoa-tcA, supra note 9, at 769.
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36
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 4 [1973], Art. 6
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol38/iss4/6
RECENT CASES
cially noticed facts can confuse the jury. For example, by judicially noticing
that plaintiff could have stopped his car within 15 feet a trial court gives
an appearance of judicial approval of the fact, and thus jurors tend to
accept it as true. This may prejudice their evaluation of contradictory
evidence (e.g., that the road was icy).
A sounder approach would be for the court to judicially notice the
average stopping distance of a similar car under average conditions. 20 The
rationale for judicial notice logically dictates this approach. Although the
court does have access to accepted authorities on average stopping dis-
tances, 21 none of the usual grounds for judicial notice (i.e., common knowl-
edge to the community, competent authoritative sources, or generally ac-
cepted matters of science) exist in reference to the particular car involved
in the instant case. The jury should be instructed to accept the average
statistics as true, leaving the opponent free to show that his car was not
average, or that the conditions were unusual.
Courts that give conclusive effect to judicial notice usually limit its
exercise to truly indisputable facts. Thus, once the court determines to
take judicial notice, the confusing conflict noted above between the fact
judicially noticed and contradictory evidence does not arise.
The second problem Morrison deals with is whether an appellate
court can judicially notice an adjudicative fact where there was no request
for judicial notice at trial. Apparently, a slight majority of courts refuse to
take judicial notice in the first instance on appeal.2 2 One objection to doing
so is that it may remove issues of fact from the jury's consideration. 23
Additionally, there is a strong moral disapproval of a silence that may have
lured the trial court into an erroneous decision.24 Further, as a general
principle appellate courts declare that all intendments and presumptions
should be indulged in to support the trial court's judgment.25 Despite these
considerations a number of courts have taken judicial notice in the first
instance on appeal.2 6
20. Such statistics are available in 9C BLASHFIE.!'S CYCLOPEDIA OF AuTomo-
BILE LAW AND PRAcncE § 6237, at 413 (1967).
21. Id.
22. See, e.g., Millbrae Ass'n For Residential Survival v. City of Millbrae, 262
Cal. App. 2d 222, 236 n.7, 69 Cal. Rptr. 251, 261 n.7 (1968) (statute controls
appellate practice of judicially noticing ordinances); State ex rel. Capurso v. Flis,
144 Conn. 473, 477-78, 133 A.2d 901, 903 (1957); Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v. Miner,
11 Ill. App. 2d 44, 64, 136 N.E.2d 1, 11 (1956) (refusal to notice on appeal that
phone directories have advertising); Wood v. Northwestern Ins. Co., 46 N.Y. 421
(1871) (refusal to notice on appeal that kerosene is inflammable); Comment,
Judicial Notice by Appellate Courts of Facts and Foreign Laws Not Brought to
the Attention of the Trial Court, 42 MICH. L. REv. 509, 511 (1943).
23. See Comment, The Presently Expanding Concept of Judicial Notice, 13
VILL. L. REv. 528, 541 (1968). The author therein states that appellate judicial
notice may violate the constitutional right to trial by jury.
24. See Comment, supra note 22, at 515.
25. Id.
26. Meredith v. Fair, 298 F.2d 696, 701 (5th Cir. 1962) (appellate courtjudicially noticed segregation practices in Mississippi despite a contrary finding
of fact by the trial court); Autrey v. Swisher, 155 F.2d 18, 22 (5th Cir. 1946)
(appellate court considered the average stopping distances of cars, but did not
call the process judicial notice); Steed v. State, 80 Ga. App. 360, 363, 56 S.E.2d
171, 174 (1949) (appellate court took judicial notice of normal periods of gesta-
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Most courts that permit appellate judicial notice require that the
procedure followed provides fairness to the parties. In general, this entails
notice to the opponent and an opportunity to show why judicial notice
should not be taken.27 The Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence provide
for taking judicial notice at any stage of the proceedings. 28 Presumably, the
Federal procedure (i.e., notice and opportunity to protest) is applicable
when appellate courts take judicial notice, although the section on proce-
dure is literally applicable to trial courts only.2 9
Missouri courts require that counsel seek judicial notice at trial to
afford the opponent an opportunity for rebuttal.30 This requirement appears
to foreclose an appellate court from taking judicial notice. Yet, numerous
appellate cases in Missouri involve an appellate court purporting to exer-
cise judicial notice. For example, the court may state that it judicially
knows the appellant could have stopped within 15 feet,8 ' or that it is
"common knowledge" that a car traveling 20 miles per hour can stop within
20 to 25 feet.3 2 Are these cases authority for appellate courts taking judicial
notice in the first instance on appeal? The answer depends on the subject
matter of judicial notice. Judicial notice of some matters may simply dis-
pense with the proponent's burden of coming forward with proof. In such
cases the matter is established prima facie until the opponent produces
contradictory evidence. Thus, if an appellate court exercised judicial notice
of this matter, the opponent would be deprived of an opportunity to con-
tradict.
The considerations are different where an appellate court judicially
notices a matter of common sense or knowledge. By definition such a mat-
ter is largely indisputable, and hence appellate courts do judicially notice
them because, in the court's view, the opponent could not successfully con-
tradict the matter were he given the opportunity to do so.83 Stopping dis-
tion); Casey v. Phillips Pipeline Co., 199 Kan. 538, 552, 431 P.2d 518, 530 (1967)(appellate court judicially noticed general qualities of gasoline, and that when
applied to a lawn, turf or zoysia, the grass will die); Ziegelasch v. Durr, 183 Kan.
233, 237, 326 P.2d 295, 298 (1958) (appellate court may judicially notice stopping
distance charts).
27. Terzian v. California Cas. Indem. Exch., 3 Cal. App. 3d 90, 96 n.7,
83 Cal. Rptr. 255, 258 n.7 (1969); Cuile, Appellate Courts Use of Facts Outside
of the Record by Resort to Judicial Notice and Independent Investigation, 1960
Wis. L. REV. 39, where the author states:
[F]airness to the parties would seem to require that an appellate court
give notice of any comtemplated taking of judicial notice of adjudica-
tive ... facts if the court deems there is any reasonable probability that
the same may turn out to be disputable.
Id. at 51.
28. PROP. Fma. R. Evm. 201 (f), and Comment (f) (Rev. Draft 1971).
29. Id. 201 (e), and Comment (e).
30. E.g., 481 S.W.2d at 607; Jackson v. Cherokee Drug Co., 434 S.W.2d 257,
264 (St. L. Mo. App. 1968).
31. Rosenbalm v. Thompson, 148 S.W.2d 830, 883 (K.C. Mo. App. 1941).
32. Stimage v. Union Elec. Co., 465 S.W.2d 23, 26 (St. L. Mo. App. 1971).
See also Wegener v. St. Louis County Transit Co., 357 S.W.2d 943, 947 (Mo. En
Banc 1962); Brooks v. Stewart, 335 S.W.2d 104, 112 (Mo. 1960); Cooksey v. Ace
Cab Co., 289 S.W.2d 40, 44 (Mo. 1956).
33. "Judicial notice" has been utilized to affirm the trial court-Brooks v.
Stewart, 335 S.W.2d 104 (Mo. 1960); Danner v. Weinreich, 328 S.W.2d 746 (Mo.
1959); Jones v. Fritz, 353 S.W.2d 398 (Spr. Mo. App. 1962)-and to reverse-
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tances are often matters of common sense and therefore appellate courts
do judicially notice them without a prior request at trial. For clarity in
discussion, this process will be referred to as "common sense judicial no-
tice."
Appellate courts in Missouri are using common sense judicial notice
to give the appearance of legal propriety to reversals based on the higher
court's different evaluation of the facts. 34 This is possible because the court
uses its own definition of what is common knowledge, a definition that
can be narrow or broad depending on the result desired. For example, in
Bollinger v. St. Louis-S.F. Ry.,35 plaintiff's vision was obscured while cross-
ing a first track and his car was struck on the second track. Contributory
negligence was an issue on appeal. There was some distance between the
tracks, but plaintiff claimed he could not bring the car to a halt in that
distance. The court reversed and remanded a verdict for the plaintiff,
stating,
[C]ommon knowledge of automobiles, and particularly of Fords,
makes us know that at the speed this car was going, not to exceed
four or five miles per hour, it could have been stopped, if plain-
tiff had looked, when quite close to the east track.38
The Bollinger court, convinced by common sense that the jury's verdict
was not supported by the evidence, used the vehicle of common sense
judicial notice to reverse. The majority of stopping distance cases involve
the same process.3 7
Wegener v. St. Louis County Transit Co., 357 S.W.2d 943 (Mo. En Banc 1962);
Hamell v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 268 S.W.2d 60 (St. L. Mo. App. 1954).
In Stimage v. Union Elec. Co, 465 SW.2d 23 (St. L. Mo. App. 1971), defendant
objected to the appellate court judicially noticing stopping distance because sup-
porting evidence was not introduced. The court stated:
This contention fails to note the difference between judicial notice
based upon common knowledge of mankind, and judicial notice based
upon the availability of a fact in a record easily available to the court
which by statute or court decision carries a presumption of reliability ....
The judicial notice with which we are dealing, however, is the notice
which a court may take of those matters commonly known by mankind,
and which a jury may properly consider in arriving at a verdict without
independent proof of the fact.
Id. at 26.
34. C. MCCOnMICK, supra note 9, § 333, at 774.
35. 334 Mo. 720, 67 S.W.2d 985 (En Banc 1934).
36. Id. at 731, 67 S.W.2d at 991. Whereas most courts would judicially notice"
such a fact, this court applied the more appropriate label of "common knowledge."
37. The following cases state that judicial notice of stopping distance is
never appropriate due to variable road conditions and car qualities. Archer v.
Aristocrat Ice Cream Co., 87 Ga. App. 567, 571, 74 S.E.2d 470, 473 (1953); McCoy
v. Gilbiert, 110 Ohio App. 453, 463, 169 N.E.2d 624, 633 (1959). However, the
majority of cases permit judicial notice of stopping distance. See, e.g., Rodi v.
Florida Greyhound Lines, Inc., 62 So. 2d 355, 358 (Fla. 1952); Ziegelasch v. Durr,
183 Kan. 233, 237, 326 P.2d 295, 298 (1958); Annot., 85 A.L.R.2d 974 (1962).
The Missouri rule is that a court will not specify the exact distance in which
a car may be stopped, but may judicially notice that a vehicle travelling at a
certain speed can be stopped within certain limits. See, e.g., Highfill v. Brown, 340
S.W.2d 656, 664 (Mo. En Banc 1960); Spoeneman v. Uhri, 332 Mo. 821, 828-29,
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The Morrison court refused to judicially notice that plaintiff should
have been able to stop his automobile within 104 feet if he was traveling
80 miles per hour.38 One reason for rejecting defendant's request was that
he failed to seek judicial notice of such fact at trial and thereby afford
plaintiff an opportunity to offer rebuttal evidence. 80 On its face, this hold-
ing appears inconsistent with the prior Missouri cases in which appellate
courts professed to judicially notice stopping distances. 4 0 As a rule, how-
ever, judicial notice of stopping distances is discretionary.41 The court in
City of St. Louis v. Niehaus42 explained the function of judicial notice:
Courts are not bound to take judicial notice of matters of fact.
Whether they will do so or not depends on the nature of the sub-
ject, the issue involved, and the apparent justice of the case. The
rule that permits a court to do so is of practical value in the law
of appeal, where the evidence is clearly insufficient to support the
judgment.4 3
That the court in Morrison did not exercise common sense judicial notice
may simply indicate that the jury's resolution of the issue (whether the
stopping distance of a car traveling 30 miles per hour is less than 104 feet)
did not offend its common sense. Yet, in prior cases the Missouri courts
have judicially noticed stopping distances within similar speed and dis-
tance ranges. 44 Perhaps the "apparent justice of the case" 45 motivated the
Morrison court. Still, Morrison can be viewed as a retreat from prior
appellate practice regarding judicial notice of stopping distance.
The Morrison court's treatment of Hopkins v. Highland Dairy Farms
Co.4 6 supports either view of Morrison. In Hopkins, involving the humani-
tarian doctrine, the appellate court judicially noticed that plaintiff was
driving faster than 80 miles per hour, based on skid marks 90 feet long.
Thus, the court properly gave an instruction absolving the defendant if
the jury found that the plaintiff's negligence was the sole-cause of the
accident. Although this could indicate that the Hopkins court took a dif-
ferent view of judicial notice from Morrison, the effect of the Hopkins
court's ruling was to submit the judicially-noticed fact (that the plaintiff
60 S.W.2d 9, 12 (1933); Stimage v. Union Elec. Co., 465 S.W.2d 28, 26 (St. L.
Mo. App. 1971).
The Missouri appellate courts frequently refer to stopping distance charts
found in 9C BLASHFIELD'S CYCLOPEDIA OF AUTO-MOBILE LAW AND PRACTICE § 6237(1967). See, e.g., Danner v. Weinreich, 828 S.W.2d 746, 752 (Mo. 1959); Cooksey
v. Ace Cab Co., 289 S.W.2d 40, 44 (Mo. 1956); Jones v. Fritz, 353 S.W.2d 393,
397 & n.3 (Spr. Mo. App. 1962).
38. 481 S.W.2d at 607.
39. Plaintiff had offered his own testimony on the issue of how fast he
was traveling. Query: What other evidence could controvert defendant's stopping
distance evidence?
40. See cases cited note 32 supra.
41. See, e.g., City of St. Louis v. Niehaus, 236 Mo. 8, 139 S.W. 450 (En Banc
1911).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 16-17, 139 S.W. at 452.
44. See cases cited note 32 supra.
45. City of St. Louis v. Niehaus, 236 Mo. 8, 16-17, 139 S.W. 450, 452 (En
Banc 1911). See text accompanying note 43 supra.
46. 348 Mo. 1158, 159 S.W.2d 254 (1941).
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was speeding) to the jury, not to conclusively establish it. This is, of course,
perfectly consistent with Morrison.
Morrison reiterates that facts judicially noticed are disputable in
Missouri, and, therefore, notice must be sought at trial to give the opponent
adequate opportunity to rebut the fact noticed. More significantly, Mor-
rison emphasizes that appellate judicial notice based on common knowl-
edge, although available in some cases, is entirely discretionary and may be
a result-oriented doctrine.
PAUL T. LUCKENBILL, JR.
LIMITATION OF ACTIONS-ACCRUAL OF ACTION
AGAINST ABSTRACTER: MISSOURI CHANGES THE RULE
Thorne v. Johnson1
In March, 1957, the Johnsons delivered to Thorne a deed of a one-
half interest in a tract of land. On April 4, 1957, Thorne recorded his
deed.2 Thereafter the Johnsons contracted to sell the tract to other parties.
The Johnsons asked the Douglas-Stewart Abstract and Investment Company
to extend the abstract, and on September 1, 1961, the Abstract Company
delivered an abstract and certificate3 which, although purporting to cover
all items of record to date, allegedly failed to show Thorne's outstanding
interest. The sale was completed and through intervening transactions, the
Johnson Land Development Company, relying on the same abstract, ac-
quired what it thought to be title to the property in 1964. 4
In October of 1968 Thorne filed suit against the Land Company, the
Johnsons, and the holders of the deeds of trust for a partition, accounting,
and declaration of the trustees' interests. The intervening grantors were
brought into the action on their warranties, and third party petitions were
filed against the Abstract Company based on negligent certification of the
abstract.
The Abstract Company moved to dismiss each action based on the
five-year statute of limitations.5 The trial court sustained the motion and
1. 483 S.W.2d 658 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1972).
2. There was allegedly an arrangement between the parties that Thorne
would not record his deed. The purpose of the transaction was to faciliate the han-
dling of Thorne's and Johnsons' joint venture interest in the property.
3. The various documents of title that may be involved in a sale of land
are discussed in note 29 infra.
4. The court noted that, under the holding in Anderson v. Boone County
Abstract Co., 418 S.W.2d 123 (Mo. 1967), the Land Company may be barred
from recovery for lack of privity.
5. § 516.120, RSMo 1969, provides in relevant part:
Within five years:
(1) All actions upon contracts, obligations, or liabilities, express or
implied, except those mentioned in 516.110, and except upon judgments
or decrees of a court of record, and except where a different time is herein
limited;
(5) An action for relief on the ground of fraud, the cause of action
in such case to be deemed not to have accrued until the discovery by the
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the third-party plaintiffs appealed. The Missouri Court of Appeals, Kan-
sas City District, reversed and remanded, holding that section 516.100,
RSMo 1969,6 precluded accrual of the causes of action until the filing of
Thorne's petition. The court noted that the law declared in two prior
cases-that the cause of action accrued on delivery of the defective abstract
-was changed by a 1919 amendment to that section.8
Prior to Thorne, Missouri abstracters could take comfort in the gen-
eral rule that the statute of limitations foreclosed an action filed five years
or more from the date of delivery of the abstract.9 Two pre-1900 decisions
established this majority rule in Missouri.
In Rankin v. Schaeffer,o the plaintiff hired defendants to investigate
the title to certain real estate. Plaintiff purchased in reliance on their cer-
tificate 1 and afterwards discovered the certificate to be in error. He pur-
chased the outstanding interest and sued for the amount he was unable
to recover from his grantor. Although successful at trial, plaintiff's judg-
ment was reversed by the St. Louis Court of Appeals. The court noted that
defendant breached his implicit promise to perform his task with care,
diligence and skill when he delivered the erroneous certificate. Thus, plain-
tiff's cause of action accrued then and his action was barred since not com-
menced within five years of its accrual.' 2
In Schade v. Gehner'3 the Missouri Supreme Court followed Rankin.
Agreeing that the action was contractual, it held that an action accrued
upon delivery of the defective abstract, not when the damage was later
discovered.' 4
6. § 516.100, RSMo 1969, provides:
Civil actions, other than those for the recovery of real property, can only
be commenced within the periods prescribed in the following sections,
after the causes of action shall have accrued; provided, that for the purposes
of sections 516.100 to 516.370, the cause of action shall not be deemed to ac-
crue when the wrong is done or the technical breach of contract or duty
occurs, but when the damage resulting therefrom is sustained and is cap-
able of ascertainment, and, if more than one item of damage, then the last
item, so that all resulting damage may be recovered, and full and complete
relief obtained.
The italicized portion was added in 1919. Mo. Laws 1919, at 211, § 1.
7. Schade v. Gelner, 133 Mo. 252, 34 S.W. 576 (1896); Rankin v. Schaeffer,
4 Mo. App. 108 (St. L. Ct. App. 1877).
8. See statute quoted note 6 supra.
9. 1 Am. JUR. 2D Abstracts of Title § 24 (1962); 1 C.J.S. Abstracts of Title§ 13a (1936); 2 M. GiLL, Missou~i TrrLEs § 1630, at 1026 (4th ed. 1960).
10. 4 Mo. App. 108 (St. L. Ct App. 1877).
11. Their certificate was unlike modern certificates. It stated:
We have examined the title to lots 22, 23, 24, 25, and west half of 26, of
the Taylor Place. In our opinion, the title is good and fully vested in fee
in George N. Stewart, free from all encumbrances.
Id. Modern certificates are discussed in note 29 infra.
12. Id. at 111.
13. 133 Mo. 252, 34 S.W. 576 (1896). The facts are similar to Rankin. Schade
engaged defendant to examine title and render an opinion; defendant rendered
an opinion that the title was "all right". Schade purchased but lost in a subsequent
ejectment action. His widow filed this action as widow and not as personal repre-
sentative.
14. The other ground of decision was the widow's lack of standing (privity)
to bring the suit. Both grounds were fully sufficient for the decision. But see
Maher, The Liability of Abstracters in Missouri, 34 Mo. L. Rxv. 420, 422 & n.17(1969), stating that the limitation holding was only "important dictum."
[Vol. 38
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Both Rankin and Schade applied the five-year statute of limitations
pertaining to implied contracts,15 but neither decision is clearly based
on contract because both frequently use negligence terminology. The
choice between tort and contract is significant in determining when a
cause of action accrues.1 6 It is generally held that a cause of action accrues
and the period of limitation begins to run when a right to sue arises.17 The
right to sue in contract, albeit for nominal damages, arises at the time of
breach; hence, at that time the cause of action accrues and the period of
limitation begins to run.' 8 In contrast, because proximately resulting
damages are essential to an actionable tort, a tort cause of action does not
accrue, nor does the limitation period commence, until such damages have
been suffered. 19 The more recent Missouri cases dealing with abstracter's
liability base the cause of action on contract and not on tort.2
0
The jurisdictions that have considered the problem of when an action
against an abstracter accrues have followed four basic theories.
Contract Theory. A majority of cases appears to say that a cause of
action against an abstracter is based on an implied contract2 ' that the ab-
stracter will perform his services with due care and diligence2 2 and will
15. The Rankin court did not state which statute it applied. Presumably it
was ch. 103, art. II, §§ 1,3, RSMo 1855 [now §§ 516.120 (1), .100, RSMo 1969,
quoted in notes 5 & 6 supra, respectively, without the 1919 amendment to
§ 516.100].
16. The choice may also be significant in determining the applicable limita-
tion period, the period for tort being generally shorter than that for contract. In
Missouri the same five-year statute, § 516.120 (quoted note 5 supra), is applicable
to most torts and implied contracts.
The choice also determines whether a contractual privity requirement is ap-
plicable. Compare Anderson v. Boone County Abstract Co., 418 S.W.2d 123 (Mo.
1967), with Williams v. Polgar, 43 Mich. App. 95, 204 N.W.2d 57 (1972). For a
discussion of the potential plaintiffs to whom an abstracter's errors and omissions
might render him liable see Maher, supra note 14.
Finally, the classification of the action could determine the recoverable dam-
ages. Compare Hillock v. Idaho Title &c Trust Co., 24 Idaho 242, 133 P. 119 (1913),
with Northwestern Title Security Co. v. Flack, 6 Cal. App. 3d 134, 85 Cal. Rptr.
693 (1970).
17. Unexcelled Chem. Corp. v. United States, 345 U.S. 59, 65 (1952); Hunter
v. Hunter, 361 Mo. 799, 804, 237 S.W.2d 100, 103 (1951); Baron v. Kurn, 349 Mo.
1202, 1213, 164 S.W.2d 310, 316 (1942); Columbia ex rel. Exchange Nat'l Bank v.
Johnson Inv. and Rental Co., 462 S.W.2d 133, 136 (K.C. Mo. App. 1970). See also
54 C.J.S. Limitation of Action § 161 at 110 (1948).
18. 51 A. Jum. 2D Limitation of Actions § 109 at 681-82 (1970).
19. Rippe v. Sutter, 292 S.W.2d 86 (Mo. 1956); Eoff v. Clay, 9 Mo. App. 176
(St. L. Ct. App. 1880); 51 A. Jun. 2n Limitation of Actions § 110 (1970).
20. Slate v. Boone County Abstract Co., 432 S.W.2d 305 (Mo. 1968); Ander-son v. Boon County Abstract Co., 418 S.W.2d 123 (Mo. 1967). Both cases in
volved the privity issue and not accrual of the cause of action. Although there is
no dear holding, the Missouri cases strongly indicate that the cause of action
against an abstracter for errors and omissions is in contract
21. Adams v. Greer, 114 F. Supp. 770 (W.D. Ark. 1953); Phoenix Title
Trust Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 43 Ariz. 219, 29 P.2d 1065 (1934); Lattin v.
Gillette, 95 Cal. 317, 30 P. 545 (1892); Russell & Co. v. Polk County Abstract Co.,
87 Iowa 233, 54 N.W. 212 (1893); Corcoran v. Abstract & Title Co., 217 Md. 633,
143 A.2d 808 (1958); Commercial Bank of Mott v. Adams County Abstract Co., 73
N.D. 645, 18 N.W.2d 15 (1945); Garland v. Zebold, 98 Okla. 6, 223 P. 682 (1924);
2 M. GILL, Missoui Trrx § 1630 (4th ed. 1960).
22. See C. FLICK, Aasracr AND Trrrm PRAicaE § 174, at 135 (2d ed. 1958).
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faithfully abstract all items appearing of record which affect the title to
the property.23 Delivery of an abstract deficient because of errors and
omissions constitutes a breach of this implied contract. 21 Thus, a cause of
action accrues immediately2 5 and the statute of limitations begins to run.20
The statutory period is that applicable to parol or implied contracts.27
Courts have replied to attempts to apply a written contract limitation
period by stating that the certificate of the abstracter is not the basis of the
cause of action but is only evidence of the underlying contractual relation-
ship.28
Fraud Theory. Gases following the fraud analysis focus on the rep-
resentations in the certificate 29 and hold that an erroneous certificate con-
23. 1 Am. JuR. 2D Abstracts of Title § 5 (1962). See also Blair, Report of Title
Examination Standards Committee, 5 J. Mo. BAR 133, 134 (1949); Eckhardt, Ab-
stract Certificates, What They Should Cover, 37 TITLE Nrws, Nov., 1958, at 14.
24. Frequently courts employ the term "negligent breach of contract." It is
submitted that a more precise statement would be that in the implied contract
the abstracter promises to use that degree of care which the ordinarily careful and
prudent abstracter would use under the same or similar circumstances. His failure
to use that degree of care constitutes a breach of that implied contract.
25. See cases cited note 17 supra.
26. Adams v. Greer, 114 F. Supp. 770, 775-76 (W.D. Ark. 1953); Lattin v.
Gillette, 95 Cal. 317, 319, 30 P. 545, 546 (1892); Russell & Co. v. Polk County
Abstract Co., 87 Iowa 233, 243, 54 N.W. 212, 214 (1893); Arnold v. Barner, 91 Kan.
768, 773, 139 P. 404, 406 (1914); Provident Loan Trust Co. v. Wolcott, 5 Kan.
App. 473, 475, 47 P. 8, 9 (1896); Johnson v. Crisler, 156 Miss. 266, 269, 125 So.
724, 725 (1930); Commercial Bank of Mott v. Adams County Abstract Co., 73
N.D. 645, 650, 18 N.W.2d 15, 18 (1945); Garland v. Zebold, 98 Okla. 6, 7, 223
P. 682, 683 (1924); Walker v. Bowman, 27 Okla. 172, 173, 111 P. 319, 320 (1910);
1 Am. JuR. 2D Abstracts of Title § 24, at 245-46 (1962); 1 C.J.S. Abstracts of Title
§ 13a, at 399 (1936); 2 M. GILL, Missouvi TrrxLs § 1630 (4th ed. 1960); W.
NiBLAcx, ABsTRA=cRs oF TiTLE § 35 (1908).
27. Lattin v. Gillette, 95 Cal. 317, 30 P. 545 (1892); Provident Loan Trust
Co. v. Wolcott, 5 Kan. App. 473, 47 P. 8 (1896); Lively v. Tablor, 341 Mo. 352,
107 S.W.2d 62 (1937); Herweck v. Rhodes, 327 Mo. 29, 34 S.W.2d 32 (1931);
lAM. JUR. 2D Abstracts of Title § 24, at 246 (1962).
28. Adams v. Greer, 114 F. Supp. 770, 775 (W.D. Ark. 1953); Lattin v. Gil-
lette, 95 Cal. 317, 322-23, 30 P. 545, 547 (1892); Provident Loan Trust Co. v.
Wolcott, 5 Kan. App. 473, 475, 47 P. 8, 9 (1896); 1 AM. JUR. 2D Abstracts of Title
§ 24, at 246 (1962).
29. There are four separate types of documents which may be in issue in a
given case.
(a) The abstracters certificate, in general use throughout nonmetropolitan Mis-
souri, is either appended to or forms the final sheet of the abstract and certifies
that the abstract shows all items and matters of record which affect title to the
property in question, subject to certain exceptions, usually tax liens for the cur-
rent year and potential liens against the land such as pending civil actions and
bankruptcy proceedings. Such a certificate makes a representation as to the
present state and contents of the record, and if false, makes a misrepresentation
of that present state of fact. Query: Should not this misrepresentation give rise
to an immediate action in tort? Only a few cases have so held. See note 32 and
accompanying text infra. As to what these certificates should cover see Eckhardt,
Abstract Certificates, What They Should Cover, 37 TITLE NEws, Nov., 1958, at 14;
Title Examination Standards of the Missouri Bar, Standard Three, ch. 442, RSMo
Appendix (1970).
(b) The title certificate, utilized in the greater St. Louis area, is somewhat com-
parable to the attorney's title opinion and certifies that, for example, John Stiles
holds fee simple title to Blackacre, subject to an outstanding deed of trust. It is
not a part of an abstract, the equivalent of which is retained by the title company
[Vol. 38
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stitutes actual fraud, constructive fraud, or concealment of a cause of
action.30 The limitation period is usually tolled by statute where fraud is
involved.31 Nevertheless, the cause of action remains contractual and the
privity limitation remains viable. The fraud analysis is useful only to de-
lay accrual or toll the statute until such time as the plaintiff discovers the
defect.
Tort Theory. Action under this theory is for negligence with the
action accruing when damages are sustained or the defect is discovered.
32
This theory relaxes considerably the privity requirement as a limitation
on the abstracter's liability.33
Analytically similar are cases that treat liability for professional negli-
gence as sui generis, thereby making irrelevant the choice between contract
issuing the certificate. Thus, although somewhat different from the abstracter's
certificate, the title certificate is arguably subject to the same analysis. These
two documents are what courts refer to in the fraud cases. They should be dearly
differentiated from the following two documents.
(c) The title insurance policy as such does not involve the abstract nor a title
opinion. The policy is a promise to pay any damages the insured sustains by
reason of defects in his title, subject to the policy limits and certain enumerated ex-
ceptions. Consequently, the policy is subject to a different rule of accrual, i.e.,
accrual occurs when there has been actual damage. An action on a contract in
writing is subject to the ten-year statute of limitations, § 516.110, RSMo 1969.
(d) A few cases have dealt with an aberrational document that might be con-
strued as title insurance or as a title certificate within the meaning of categories
a and b above. These documents therefore could be argued under either rule of
accrual. Only the particular language involved can suggest which the court will
determine it to be. See Purcell v. Land Title Guarantee Co., 94 Mo. App. 5, 67
S.W. 726 (K.C. Ct. App. 1902), where the court found a "policy limitation" and
sufficient language of promise to treat the document as a title insurance policy
and thus delay accrual until actual damage had been sustained. Cf. Ballwin Plaza
Corp. v. H. B. Deal Constr. Co., 462 S.W.2d 687, 689 (Mo. 1971).
30. Hillock v. Idaho Title & Trust Co., 27 Idaho 440, 126 P. 612 (1912);
Schwab v. Cornell, 306 Pa. 536, 540, 160 A. 449, 450 (1932); Chicago, R. I. &
Gulf Ry. v. Duncan, 273 S.W. 908 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925). See also Trusler, Exten-
sion of Liability of Abstracters, 18 MicH. L. REv. 127 (1919).
Russell & Co. v. Polk County Abstract Co., 87 Iowa 233, 54 N.W. 212 (1893),
one of the leading cases for the majority contract theory, suggests that allegations
of fraud might have produced a different result.
31. C. FLicK, ABsTRAar AND Ti=x PRAcricE § 174, at 135 (2d ed. 1958). See
statute quoted note 5 supra.
32. Hawkins v. Oakland Title Ins. & Guar. Co., 165 Cal. App. 2d 116, 331
P.2d 742 (1958); Chun v. Park, 51 Hawaii 462, 462 P.2d 905 (1969); Williams v.
Polgar, 43 Mich. App. 95, 204 N.W.2d 57 (1972).
The principle has been applied to other professions. In Atkins v. Crosland,
417 S.W.2d 150 (Tex. 1967), a tort action against an accountant who filled out
plaintiff's income tax was held to accrue when the Commissioner assessed a de-
ficiency against the taxpayer. Similarly, in Walker v. Pacific Indem. Co., 183 Cal.
App. 2d 513, 6 Cal. Rptr. 924 (1960), an action against an insurance broker for
alleged negligent failure to procure auto liability insurance in an amount his
client requested was held to accrue when a verdict against the client was rendered
in excess of the policy limits.
33. In Williams v. Polgar, 43 Mich. App. 95, 204 N.W.2d 57 (1972), after
deciding that the action was in tort and not contract and that the statute of
limitations had not run, the couit stated that the proper question was whether
the abstracter had a "duty" to the plaintiff. It concluded that abstracters could
be liable to future mortgagees and purchasers whose reliance upon the abstract
was forseeable. Id. at 59. See RESTATEM NT OF TORTS § 552 (1938).
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and tort.34 These cases are treated like tort actions for limitation purposes
with accrual occurring at the time of damage or discovery.35
Statutory Modifications. Some states have further modified the above
theories by statute. These fall into three categories:
(1) Statutes that provide special limitation periods for actions against
abstracters, often without consideration of the type of action. These statutes
frequently provide for running of the limitations period from the date of
the abstract certificate or from the date of the last extension of the ab-
stract. 3
6
(2) General statutes of limitation which specifically postpone accrual
of actions against the abstracter for errors or omissions until some criteria
established in the statute are met.37
(3) General statutes of limitation with provisions for postponement
of accrual which, for policy reasons, are applied to abstracters to extend
their liability. Thorne places Missouri in this category but retains the
contract analysis favored by the majority of cases.
The Thorne court rested its decision on the 1919 amendment to sec-
tion 516.100. s 8 Beginning with the proposition that Rankin and Schade,
if not abrogated, would be dispositive of the question presented, the court
found that the legislature's obvious intent in the amendment was to dis-
approve the timing of accrual in those cases. The timing and circumstances
of the 1919 amendment, however, cast doubt on the court's view of the
legislature's intent.3 9
34. Northwestern Title Security Co. v. Flack, 6 Cal. App. 3d 134, 146, 85
Cal. Rptr. 693, 700 (1970); Viotti v. Giomi, 230 Cal. App. 2d 730, 739, 41 Cal.
Rptr. 345, 351 (1964); Mumford v. Staton, Whaley & Price, 254 Md. 697, 714,
255 A.2d 359, 367 (1969).
35. See cases cited note 34 supra.
36. See, e.g., 1 OxiA. STAT. ANN. § 18 (1961):
An action for damages by reason of any imperfect or false abstract
hereafter compiled may be brought at any time within five (5) years from
the date of the abstract certificate.
N.D. C.NT. CoDE § 28-01-45 (1971 Supp.), adopted in 1969 (N.D. Laws 1969, Ch.
390, § 3), is similar but provides a limitation period of twenty years from
the certificate date.
Many of these statutes are part of an abstracters' code and licensing law. For
a comprehensive state by state analysis and criticism of these laws see Eckhardt,
Abstracters' Licensing Laws, 28 Mo. L. Rr v. 1 (1963).
37. E.g., CAL.. CoDE ANN. § 339 (1973 Supp.) provides:
[Within two years a]n action founded upon a contract, obligation or li-
ability, evidenced by a certificate, or abstract or guaranty of title of real
property, or by a policy of title insurance; provided, that the cause of
action upon a contract, obligation or liability evidenced by a certificate,
or abstract or guaranty of title of real property or policy of title insurance
shall not be deemed to have accrued until the discovery of the loss or
damage suffered by the aggrieved party thereunder.
38. See statute quoted note 6 supra.
39. The statutory history of § 516.100, RSMo 1969 does not support the
court's interpretation of legislative intent. Following revision and reenactment
into its present form in 1849 (Mo. Laws 1849, at 74, § 2), the statute continued
substantially unchanged until the 1919 amendment. This amendment was adopted
with an emergency dame: "There being some difference of judicial opinion
as to the construction of the present law, an emergency exists .... " Mo. Laws
1919, at 211, § 2.
The emergency clause no doubt was directed at decisions other than Rankin
[Vol. 38
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The amendment states that the cause of action accrues when the
defect is capable of ascertainment by the plaintiff.40 Respondent urged that
the Johnsons, the original grantors, knew of the omitted deed and nothing
prevented the other plaintiffs from discovering the deed because it ap-
peared of record.41 Thus, even under the amendment the limitation period
would have run. The Johnsons argued,42 however, that although they knew
of the deed to Thorne, its absence from the abstract indicated that their
agreement with Thorne not to record had been honored. 43
The court refused to apply the objective standard of ascertainment
adopted in a previous Missouri case, 44 suggesting instead that the proper
and Schade. In Roberts v. Neale, 134 Mo. App. 612, 114 S.W. 1120 (K.C. Ct. App.
1908) (Ellison, J.), plaintiff had discharged his note to defendant in 1897, but
continued to pay in ignorance of the discharge until 1902. Plaintiff sued in 1905
for money had and received, but only the 1902 payment was within the five year
limit. Plaintiff argued that because one payment was within the statute, it brought
all others in. Held, recovery of all excess payments allowed.
Subsequently, in Stark Bro. v. Gooding, 175 Mo. App. 353, 162 S.W. 333
(K.C. Ct. App. 1914) (Ellison, P.J.), a creditor sued for several installments, all
but the last one having been due for longer than the limitation period. The court
held that recovery of all but the last installment was barred.
Finally, in Boyd v. Buchanan, 176 Mo. App. 56, 162 S.W. 1075 (K.C. Ct.
App. 1914) (Ellison, P.J.), plaintiff sought an injunction against the foreclosure
of a deed of trust securing a note. The last two interest coupons on the note
had been due for longer than the 10 year limitation period, and no principal had
ever been paid. The court agreed with plaintiff that the 10 year statute barred
foreclosure.
Sabine v. Leonard, 322 S.W.2d 831 (Mo. En Banc 1959), held that the
1919 amendment abrogated Stark, supra, and that there is no accrual on install-
ments until the last one becomes due so that all may be recovered in one action.
40. See statute quoted note 6 supra.
41. Brief for Respondent at 11, 483 S.W.2d 658 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1972).
42. Brief for Appellant at 12-13, 483 S.W.2d 658 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1972).
Briefs were made available through the courtesy of Don Chapman, Jr., of Chilli-
cothe, Missouri, Attorney for Respondent.
43. See note 2 supra.
44. Allison v. Missouri Power & Light Co., 59 S.W.2d 771 (St. L. Mo. App.
1933). The facts were, briefly: Plaintiff was struck in the face with a metal bar
in 1926. His physician said there had been no damage. Three years later (1929)
surgery was required to remove crushed bones, etc., that obstructed plaintiff's
airways. Plaintiff filed his action in 1932 and defendant demurred on the ground
that § 860, RSMo 1929 [now § 516.100, RSMo 1969] barred the action. Plaintiff
appealed an adverse judgment arguing that he was within the meaning of the
1919 amendment. Held, dismissal affirmed, accrual is contemporaneous with the
accident; mere developmental damage does not delay accrual. "[T]he resulting
damage is sustained and is capable of ascertainment within the contemplation of
the statute whenever it is such that it can be discovered or made known." Id. at
773. Allison construes the 1919 amendment to require an objective test of ascertain-
ability, which may simply mean the damage is technically discoverable. See Davis,
Tort Liability and the Statutes of Limitation, 33 Mo. L. Rxv. 171, 187-95 (1968),
criticising the Allison rule of objective ascertainability of damage. Because the de-
fect in Thorne could be considered "technically ascertainable," if the Allison rule
were applicable, the cause of action would have accrued, even under the 1919
amendment, at delivery of the abstract.
In explaining its interpretation of § 860, RSMo 1929, the Allison court said
that the effect of the statute, as amended, was to make
accrual of the cause of action contingent, not upon the mere doing of the
legal wrong or the technical breach of duty which might sustain no more
than an action for nominal damages, but upon the damage resulting
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standard is subjective. The test is: was the defect capable of ascertainment
by this plaintiff in the exercise of due diligence.4 5 The court rejected the
contention that recording was constructive notice of the defect (and there-
fore it was ascertainable) as productive of an absurd result,46 but sug-
gested that there may be a question for the trier of fact as to the Johnsons'
reasonable diligence:
[i]t may well be that there were some facts which should have
put at least Johnson on notice at some early date that Thorne
had placed his deed of record. Such facts, if they exist, can be
developed upon trial.4 7
The impact of Thorne should be considered in three contexts. First,
extending the abstracter's potential liability will affect his methods and
costs of doing business.4 8 As long as the basic relationship remains con-
therefrom having been sustained and being capable of ascertainment. In
other words, the statute recognizes the doctrine that, when an injury is
complete as a legal injury at the time of the act, the period of limitation
will at once commence; that if the action is of a nature to be maintained
without proof of actual damage, the period of limitation will begin to runfrom the time the act is done without regard to any actual damage, or the
injured party's knowledge of the wrong; but, that when the act which
gives the cause of action is not legally injurious until certain consequences
occur, then the period of limitation will take date from the consequential
injury.
Id. at 773, The Thorne court limited the italicised portion as dictum, although
it was not necessary to distinguish Allison and its progeny. The supreme court
had already suggested a distinction in Sabine v. Leonard, 332 S.W.2d 831 (Mo.
En Banc 1959), where it pointed out that Allison dealt with damages developing
after accrual and was a personal injury action, not a contract case.
45. 483 S.W.2d at 662. The court found support for its position in Chemical
Workers Basic Union v. Arnold Say. Bank, 411 S.W.2d 159 (Mo. En Banc 1966),
where § 516.100 was held not to delay accrual because "with reasonable diligence
on the part of plaintiff's officers, they could have discovered the unauthorized
act .... " Id. at 165. Supportive, but not cited by the court, is Lewis v. Thom pson,
231 Mo. App. 321, 332, 96 S.W.2d 938, 945 (K.C. Ct. App. 1936), in which an
action for a sales commission was held to accrue only when the inventory was
actually completed as agreed and its value known, even though it could have
been made known earlier. The court stated that "capable of ascertainment" meant
"capable of ascertainment and of being known at the time and not merely sus.
ceptible of ascertainment." Id. at 333, 96 S.W.2d at 946. See Maryland Casualty
Co. v. Kansas City, 128 F.2d 998, 1004 (8th Cir. 1942).
46. 483 S.W.2d at 663; accord, J. H. Trisdale, Inc. v. Shasta County Title
Co., 146 Cal. App. 2d 831, 839, 304 P.2d 832, 836 (1956); Chicago, R.I. & Gulf
Ry. Co. v. Duncan, 273 S.W. 908, 911 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925).
47. 483 S.W.2d at 663.
48. There is currently some concern within the abstracting profession whether
the standard form abstracter's liability policy covers this risk. The language of
a policy issued by the St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company is illustrative
of the problem.
IV. POLICY PERIOD AND TERRITORY. This policy applies.., to
any negligent act, error or omission which occurs:
(A) During the policy period, and then only if claim is made or suit is
brought during the policy period or within one year after the end of the
policy period. If during the period, the INSURED shall have knowledge
or become aware of any negligent act, error or omission and shall, during
the policy period, give written notice thereof to the Company, then such
notice shall be considered a claim ....
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tractual, however, the parties may be able to limit this liability.4 9
Second, the decision may substantially affect professional liability in
general. Because physicians' liability has been specifically controlled by
statute50 and extended by case law,5 1 Thorne may have little impact on
them. For attorneys, however, whose liability is usually held to be con-
tractual, 2 the case may herald expanded accountability.58 Other profes-
sionals, including engineers, surveyors, architects, and accountants, whose
professional errors may not be immediately ascertainable, may also be
affected.
Missouri Titlegram (August 1972) at 2 (emphasis added). Such policies are usually
issued for a one-year term, with option for renewal. If each year is a distinct policy
period, then arguably the action must be brought in the year the negligent act
occurred, or within one year thereafter.
The amount of time necessary to establish adverse possession limits the li-
ability exposure. In many cases this could occur in 10 years. Because of dis-
abilities, however, the period may be substantially longer.
49. The most obvious example of such limitations are the exceptions con-
tained in the abstracter's certificate that state what that cerificate does not cover.
Whether an exculpatory clause limiting the amount of damages would be valid
in Missouri is unclear. Some states have recognized and given them 'effect. See
Corcoran v. Abstract & Title Company, Inc., 217 Md. 633, 637, 143 A.2d 808, 810
(1958); Broser v. Royal Abstract Corp., 49 Misc. 2d 882, 268 N.Y.S.2d 594 (Sup.
Ct. 1966).
Any attempt by a Missouri abstracter to shorten contractually his liability ex-
posure may be precluded by § 431.030, RSMo 1969:
All parts of any contract or agreement hereafter made or entered
into which either directly or indirectly limit or tend to limit the time in
which any suit or action may be instituted shall be null and void.
This section has been construed to preserve the uniformity of the statutes of
limitation as a matter of public policy. It has been litigated frequently in in-
surance cases. See, e.g., Asel v. Order of United Comm'1 Travelers of America, 355
Mo. 658, 197 S.W.2d 639 (En Banc 1946), affg 193 S.W. 74 (K.C. Mo. App. 1946).
50. § 516.140, RSMo 1969.
51. Smile v. Lawson, 435 S.W.2d 325, 327 (Mo. En Banc 1968), construing
the present § 516.280, RSMo 1969.
52. Wilcox v. Plummer, 28 U.S. (4 Pet.) 43 (1830); Maloney v. Graham,
171 InI. App. 409 (1912); Johnson v. Crisler, 156 Miss. 266, 125 So. 724 (1930);
Sullivan v. Stout, 120 N.J.L. 304, 199 A. 1 (Ct. Err. &c App. 1938); See Annots.,
18 A.L.R.3d 978 (1968), 118 A.L.R. 215 (1939).
Missouri law is not settled on this point. The five cases which state the
Missouri position are: Altman, Miller g. Co., v. Loring, 76 Mo. App. 66 (K.C. Ct.
App. 1898); Donahue v. Bragg, 49 Mo. App. 273 (St. L. Ct. App. 1892); Aultman,
Miller & Co. v. Adams &c Sherlock, 85 Mo. App. 503 (K.C. Ct. App. 1889); Mc-
Clurg v. Hill, 7 Mo. App. 579 (St. L. Ct. App. 1879) (mem.); Benton v. Craig,
2 Mo. *198 (1830). These cases reveal two divergent analyses between the St. Louis
and Kansas City Districts of the Missouri Court of Appeals, with each court
ignoring the other's precedents and both ignoring the supreme court.
53. In Mumford v. Staton, Whaley &c Price, 254 Md. 697, 255 A.2d 359(1969), an attorney malpractice action, the court said the cause of action accrued
when the defect was discovered:
It would appear that in recent years the trend has been for courts, in
applying limitations to professional malpractice cases, not to become too
concerned as to whether the action is grounded in contract or tort, but
rather to focus attention on the fact that it is the failure to perform one's
professional duties with reasonable skill and diligence which gives rise to
the cause of action, whether it be a negligent breach of contract or other-
wise.
Id. at 714, 255 A.2d at 367.
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Finally, the court limited Allison v. Missouri Power and Light Co.5 4
to its facts, indicating that the 1919 amendment introduced a subjective
test of ascertainability of damages in determining when a cause of action,
whether tort or contract, accrues.
Thorne is consonant with Missouri's common law expansion of ab-
stracters' liability,55 an expansion other states have accomplished only
through legislative action.5 6 The decision presents a judicial compromise
between the interests of the abstracting profession and the interests of the
public that relies on the accuracy of their product.
STUART W. CONRAD
NEGLIGENT ENTRUSTMENT-AN EXPANSION OF THE
ELEMENT OF SUPPLYING THE CHATTEL IN MISSOURI
Stafford v. Far-Go Van Lines, Inc.'
Ira Perry, a long distance truck driver, hired Howard Roberts in Jack-
sonville, Fla., as a nondriving assistant. Although he paid Roberts from
his own funds, Perry sought and obtained approval of the arrangement
from his employer, Far-Go Van Lines, Inc.,2 the beneficial owner of the
vehicle Enroute to Tacoma, Wa., the two men stopped overnight in Kan-
sas City, Mo. Perry left Roberts with the rig in a truck lot, giving Roberts
a key so he could sleep in the cab. During the night, Roberts drove the
truck to Cameron, Mo., where he crashed into plaintiffs' truck stop. The
plaintiffs sued Far-Go, Perry, and Roberts for property damage.
Perry knew Roberts did not have either a driver's license or experience
operating such equipment. There was no evidence, however, that Roberts
had operated the rig previously or that Perry had ever given him permission
to do so.4 Further, there was no evidence that Far-Go or Perry knew Roberts
had recently escaped from a state penitentiary.5
The trial resulted in a plaintiffs' verdict for $3,000 against Far-Go and
54. See note 44 supra. 483 S.W.2d 658, 662 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1972).
55. See Slate v. Boone County Abstract Co., 432 S.W.2d 305 (Mo. 1968), over-
ruling Zweigardt v. Birdseye, 57 Mo. App. 462 (K.C. Ct. App. 1894), noted in
Maher, note 14 supra.
56. See Eckhardt, Abstracters' Licensing Laws, 28 Mo. L. REv. 1 (1963).
1. 485 S.W.2d 481 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1972).
2. 485 S.W.2d at 483-84. For a discussion of the appointment of subagents
and subservants, see RESTATEAMNT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 5 (1957).
3. Id. at 483. The court infers that Perry, not Far-Go, was the legal owner
of the vehicle. Under common law, this would give rise to an independent con-
tractor relationship between Far-Go and Perry, thus relieving Far-Go of liability.
RESTATEiENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 250, comment a (1957). Therefore, trucking
companies frequently lease their equipment from the driver-owner to avoid a
master-servant relationship. In Missouri and the majority of jurisdictions, how-
ever, the courts have imposed a special rule that holds the company vicariously
liable nonetheless. See Cotton v. Ship-By-Truck Co., 337 Mo. 270, 278, 85 S.W.2d
80, 84 (1935). See also RESTATEiMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 214, comment b (1957).
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a defendant's verdict for Perry. The jury did not return any verdict regard-
ing Roberts; the trial court, however, entered judgment against him for
$3,000 about three weeks after trial.
On appeal by both plaintiffs and defendant Far-Go, the Kansas City
District of the Missouri Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for a new
trial on the issues of liability and damages. The grounds for reversal were
inconsistencies of verdicts,0 improper entering of judgment against Rob-
erts,7 and inadequacy of damages. 8 However, pursuant to Far-Go's assertion
that the trial court erred in denying its motion for judgment n.o.v., the
court had to decide if the plaintiffs had made a submissible case. The court
concluded that the evidence supported a plaintiffs' verdict against Far-Go.
The court apparently recognized that Far-Go's liability could be predi-
cated on two different grounds: (1) Far-Go was vicariously liable for Perry's
negligent entrustment of the truck to Roberts; or (2) Far-Go was itself
negligent in entrusting the truck to Roberts.9 In either case, plaintiffs' claim
was based on negligent entrustment.' 0 The essential elements of negligent
entrustment are found in section 390 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts
(1965), which Missouri courts have adopted1 and the Stafford court
quoted:
6. Id. at 491.
7. Id. at 492.
8. Id. at 493.
9. The court largely ignored the distinction between these two theories.
Because the jury found that Perry was not negligent, it was necessary that Far-Go
be negligent in its own right. Otherwise a verdict for Perry would necessarily dis-
charge Far-Go.
10. Negligent entrustment and "dangerous instrumentality" are distinguish-
able theories, although they are closely related. In negligent entrustment the
chattel is normally not classified as inherently dangerous; it becomes dangerous
because of the user's incompetence. See generally PRossma, LAw oF TORTS 466
(4th ed. 1971); Horack, The Dangerous Instrument Doctrine, 26 YALE L.J. 224
(1916).
11. 485 S.W.2d at 485; Bell v. Green, 428 S.W.2d 724, 782 (Mo. 1968). See
also Tharp v. Monsees, 827 S.W.2d 889, 895 (Mo. 1959); Dinger v. Burnham, 860
Mo. 465, 468, 228 S.W.2d 696, 699 (1950); Thomasson v. Winsett, 310 S.W.2d 38,
86 n.l (Spr. Mo. App. 1958); Ritchie v. Burton, 292 S.W.2d 599, 607 (Spr. Mo.
App. 1956); Lix v. Gastian, 261 S.W.2d 497, 500 (St. L. Mo. App. 1958), all of
which adopted the first Restatement version.
The vast majority of Missouri cases involve motor vehicles. See, e.g., Bell v.
Green, 428 S.W.2d 724 (Mo. 1968); Dinger v. Burnham, 860 Mo. 465, 228 S.W.2d
696 (1950); Thompson v. Winsett, 810 S.W.2d 8 (Spr. Mo. App. 1958); Ritchie
v. Burton, 292 S.W.2d 599 (Spr. Mo. App. 1956); Lix v. Gastian, 261 S.W.2d
497 (St. L. Mo. App. 1953); Saunders v. Prue, 285 Mo. App. 1245, 151 S.W.2d
478 (K.C. Ct. App. 1941); Roark v. Stone, 224 Mo. App. 554, 80 S.W.2d 647
(Spr. Ct. App. 1980); Dailey v. Maxwell, 152 Mo. App. 415, 188 S.W. 851 (K.C.
Ct. App. 1911). See also Annots., 86 A.L.R. 1187 (1925), 68 A.L.R. 1008 (1980),
100 A.L.R. 920 (1936), 168 A.L.R. 1418 (1946), 168 A.L.R. 1364 (1947), 86
A.L.R.2d 785 (1954), 69 A.L.R.2d 978 (1960), and 19 A.L.R.3d 1175 (1968), listing
cases in other jurisdictions applying the doctrine to automobiles.
The doctrine has also been applied to other types of chattels. See, e.g., Cen-
tral Flying Serv. v. Crigger, 215 Ark. 400, 221 S.W.2d 45 (1949) (airplanes);
Miller v. Macalester College, 262 Minn. 418, 428-80, 115 N.W.2d 666, 672-74
(1962) (ladders); Mikel v. Aaker, 256 Minn. 500, 506, 99 N.W.2d 76, 80 (1959)
(boats); Tharp v. Monsees, 827 S.W.2d 889, 896 (Mo. 1959) (gasoline); Charlton
v. Jackson, 183 Mo. App. 618, 620, 167 S.W. 670, 671 (St. L. Ct. App. 1914)
(firearms); Dee v. Parish, 169 Tex. 171, 173 827 S.W.2d 449, 542 (1959) (horses).
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One who supplies directly or through a third person a chattel for
the use of another whom the supplier knows or has reason to
know to be likely because of his youth, inexperience, or otherwise,
to use it in a manner involving unreasonable risk of physical harm
to himself and others whom the supplier should expect to share
in or be endangered by its use, is subject to liability for physical
harm resulting to them.12
Negligent entrustment is a theory of recovery independent of the rules of
ownership, agency, imputed negligence, and respondeat superior. The en-
trustor's liability rests on the combination of his negligence in entrusting
the chattel to the incompetent user, and the user's negligence in using it.1s
The importance of Stafford is its expansion of what constitutes an act of
supplying the chattel to an incompetent user.
The court held that the evidence supported a plaintiffs' verdict against
Far-Go based on its vicarious liability for the negligence of its agent, Perry.
Negligent entrustment requires that the entrustor (Perry) supply the "use"
of the chattel. Perry did not entrust the use of the freight rig to Roberts,
but only supplied him with a key for a purpose unrelated to operational
use. The court cited two cases in support of the proposition that, never-
theless, Perry had supplied the rig for Roberts' use. Each case expoused a
different theory for this conclusion. By relying on these cases to hold that
the plaintiff had made a submissible case, the court apparently accepted
the reasoning of both.
The court cited the California case of Pierce v. Standow,14 which ad-
vances a theory of implied consent. There, a mother and son attended the
same trade school. Because the mother's classes dismissed later, she gave
him the keys each morning so he could wait for her in the car. The mother
knew her son had no driver's license and had frequently forbidden him to
drive, although the son had frequently indicated he was anxious to do so.15
The appellate court held that the mother had impliedly consented to the
son's operation of the car by giving him the power to operate it.10 Thus,
she had in fact supplied him with the use of the vehicle.
It is not necessary to quarrel with the logic in Pierce; Stafford is dis-
tinguishable on its facts. The only notice Perry had that Roberts desired
to drive was on one previous occasion when the two had discussed the
possibility of Roberts securing a learner's permit so he could share the
12. A wide variety of circumstances have been held to be grounds to put
the supplier on notice of possible misuse by the one entrusted with the chattel.
See, e.g., Bell v. Green, 423 S.W.2d 724, 732 (Mo. 1968) (physcial exhaustion;
Dinger v. Burnham, 360 Mo. 465, 468, 228 S.W.2d 696, 699 (1950) (recklessness;
Ritchie v. Burton, 292 S.W.2d 599, 606 (Spr. Mo. App. 1956) (inexperience;
Roark v. Stone, 244 Mo. App. 554, 558, 30 S.W.2d 647, 64849 (Spr. Ct. App.
1930) (youth); Golembe v. Blumberg, 262 App. Div. 759, 27 N.Y.S.2d 692 (1941)(epilepsy); Schneider v. Van Wyckhouse, 54 N.Y.S. 2d 446, 448 (Sup. Ct. Monroe
County 1945) (heart condition); Annot., 19 A.L.R.3d 1175 (1968) (intoxication).
13. See Woods, Negligent Entrustment: Evaluation of a Frequently Over-
looked Source of Additional Liability, 20 ARK. L. Rxv. AND B. As'N J. 101, 109
(1966); Note, The Doctrine of Negligent Entrustment in Texas, 20 Sw. L.J. 202,
206 (1966).
14. 163 Cal. App. 2d 286, 329 P.2d 44 (1958).
15. Id. at 289, 329 P.2d at 46.
16. Id. at 288, 329 P.2d at 45.
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driving load.17 Further, it is more reasonable to imply consent to operate
a family vehicle in the parent-child' 8 context than to operate a tractor-trailer
rig based on the relationship between Perry and Roberts. Although there
was a special relationship between Perry and Roberts, concluding that
Perry impliedly consented to Roberts' operation of the truck by giving him
a key for access to the cab is pure fiction. The doctrine of implied consent
in this context is not grounded in logic, however, but in economic re-
sponsibility. As necessary as that may appear to be, the doctrine should
be kept within logical limits. Instead of approving the doctrine of implied
consent, the court should have expounded an accurate explanation of
liability.
Perry and Far-Go were not vicariously liable for Roberts' negligence
based on traditional agency principles because Roberts' activities were
dearly beyond the scope of his employment. I.C.C.-regulated trucking is
subject to a different rule, however. Where the negligence is that of the
driver, the employer's vicarious liability is virtually absolute, regardless of
whether the act is criminal, wilfull, or dearly beyond the scope of employ-
ment.19 The reasoning behind the stricter rule is equally applicable to
nondriving assistants, especially where the employer (Far-Go) knew of his
presence on the equipment. Stafford should have been decided on this
theory.
The other case the court cited that indicates entrustment of the keys
to Roberts could be entrustment of the use of the rig is Boland v. Love.20
Boland argues that it is foreseeable that one with a background like Rob-
erts' would use the keys to operate the vehicle without authorization. In
that case, one Love left an employee, Hamilton, in general charge of his
property during a protracted absence. While Hamilton was absent, another
employee, the gardener, Coates, an ex-convict, an alcoholic, and unqualified
to drive, took one of the automobiles, obtaining the keys from above the
visor. Both Love and Hamilton knew of Coates' criminal background,2'
17. 485 S.W.2d at 484. Current I.C.C. regulations limit the driving time of a
single operator to 10 hours, after 8 consecutive hours of off duty time. 49 C.F.R.
§395.3 (1968).
18. At least one jurisdiction has suggested that the greater the degree of
relationship existing between the supplier and the user, the greater the likeli-
hood that the courts will find implied consent. See Elkinton v. Cal. State Auto
Ass'n Interstate Ins. Bureau, 173 Cal. App.2d 338, 344, 343 P.2d 396, 399 (1959).
See also Annot., 5 A.L.R.2d 600 (1949).
Relationship as a determinative factor of implied consent is not contrary to
the doctrine of negligent entrustment. Although liability based on negligent en-
trustment can exist independently of any relationship between the user and the
supplier of the chattel, the existence of such a relationship, and the degree thereof,
will affect the amount of evidence required to support a finding of implied con-
sent to use the chattel.
19. See generally 49 C.F.R. § 1057.4 (1967). See also Mellon Nat'l Bank &
Trust Co. v. Sophie Lines, Inc., 289 F.2d 473, 476 (3d Cir. 1961); Cosmopolitan
Mut. Ins. Co. v. White, 336 F.Supp. 92, 98 (D. Del. 1972); Brannaker v. Trans-
american Freight Lines, Inc., 428 S.W.2d 524, 534-36 (Mo. 1968); Duke v. Thomas,
343 S.W.2d 656, 660 (St. L. Mo. App. 1961); Cox v. Bond Transp., Inc., 53 N.J.
186, 205, 249 A.2d 579, 589, cert denied, 395 U.S. 935 (1969).
20. 222 F.2d 27 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
21. Id. at 30.
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and he was dearly not authorized to drive the vehicles. Love was held
vicariously liable in a subsequent damage suit for Hamilton's "entrust-
ment" of the automobile to Coates. Hamilton, however, did not entrust
Coates with even the keys to the car; he merely failed to maintain the auto-
mobiles securely. 22 The case indicates that simply failing to prevent one
with a known criminal background, like Coates, from obtaining the means
of using the chattel satisfies the element of supplying the chattel.
The theory of Boland is hardly applicable to Stafford. Perry had no
reason to suspect Roberts was unreliable. Indeed, he had some reason to con-
sider him reliable.23 Thus, charging Perry, and therefore Far-Go, with
knowledge of Roberts' background places on them an affirmative duty to in-
vestigate employees, a duty well beyond the usual legal obligation of an
employer to use ordinary care in selection of its employees. 2 4 Far-Go's obli-
gation in this regard could be extensive. One of the two alternative grounds
for Far-Go's liability was that Far-Go was negligent in its own right, without
regard to its vicarious liability. Thus, simply because the home office had
consented to its driver's hiring a nondriving assistant out of his own funds,
Far-Go could be liable for negligently entrusting the freight rig to Roberts,
based on its failure to investigate his character. 25
The implications of applying Boland to the Stafford facts could be
broad, as that necessitates an expanded view of the employer's duty to in-
vestigate its employees. The court, of course, did not attempt to delineate
the scope of this duty. This raises several practical questions for employers.
For example, must every potential employee who might work in the vicinity
of a motor vehicle 26 be fingerprinted,2 7 given a lie detector test,28 or in-
22. Case law in Missouri supports the proposition that absent special cir-
cumstances, it is generally not forseeable that leaving the keys in an automobile
will result in unauthorized operation and injury to third parties. The leading Mis-
souri case is Gower v. Lamb, 282 S.W.2d 867 (St. L. Mo. App. 1955), noted in 21 Mo.
L. Rv. 197 (1956) where the court denied recovery from the owner of a vehicle who
left the keys in the ignition while the automobile was parked on a main thorough-
fare in St. Louis. The court emphasized that the criminal nature of the act lessens
the likelihood of its occurrence, and thus evidence approaching actual knowledge by
the owner of thieves in the neighborhood would be necessary to support a finding of
liability. See also Triplett v. Shafer, 300 S.W.2d 528 (K.C. Mo. App. 1957); Zuber v.
Clarkson Constr. Co., 363 Mo. 352, 251 S.W.2d 52 (1952); Annot., 45 A.L.R.3d
787 (1972).
23. When Perry first met Roberts in Jacksonville, Fla., Roberts was serving
another Far-Go driver as nondriving assistant. Perry and the other driver ar-
ranged for Roberts to switch to Perry's rig. Presumably the other driver had been
satisfied with Robert's work. 485 S.W.2d at 483.
24. See Williams v. Mo. Pac. Ry., 109 Mo. 475, 18 S.W. 1098 (1892); Davis
v. Merrill, 133 Va. 69, 112 S.E. 628 (1922); Note, Employer's Duty to Know
Deficiencies of Employees, 16 CLEv.-MAR. L. RPv. 143 (1967). But cf. Galentine
v. Borglum, 235 Mo. App. 1141, 150 S.W.2d 1088 (K.C. Ct. App. 1941).
25. 485 S.W.2d at 489.
26. As to actual drivers of motor vehicles, current I.C.C. regulations include
stringent qualification requirements, including an extended medical examination
every 24 months, passage of a road test and written examination, and completion
of a detailed application for employment. The regulations also require that the
carrier investigate the applicant's driving and employment record for the past
three years. 49 C.F.R. § 391.11 (1970). These latter three requirements were not
effective until Jan. 1, 1971, and do not apply to drivers regularly employed before
that date.
The regulations contain no such requirements for driver's helpers, or other
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vestigated through the F.B.I.? Is the employer entitled to rely on the in-
formation contained in the employment application? Because there was
another ground for the decision in Stafford, viz., implied consent, 29 this
part of the decision is unnecessary. Perhaps it would best have been deferred
to a future case in which it could be more fully delineated.
Before Stafford, Missouri required that there be direct entrustment or
permissive use to constitute supplying the chattel. Stafford adopted two
new theories to expand that element of negligent entrustment, but both
were stretched considerably to support a plaintiff's verdict. The court's
principal concern was probably to ensure that a deserving plaintiff would
be able to realize his damages.3 0
JOHN M. CARNAHAN III
TORTS-PARENTAL IMMUNITY DOCTRINE IN MISSOURI
Bahr v. Bahr1
Joyce and Matthew Bahr were divorced in 1967. The court awarded
Joyce custody of their four year old daughter, Stephanie, and granted
Matthew visitation privileges. While visiting her father in 1969, Stephanie
was severely burned by a barbecue grill, allegedly due to her father's negli-
gence. Stephanie, by her mother as next friend, brought suit against Mat-
thew to recover for these injuries. The trial court sustained defendant's
motion to dismiss based on parental immunity.
On appeal, plaintiff asserted that Missouri should not apply the par-
ental immunity doctrine to actions brought by an unemancipated minor
child against a parent for ordinary negligence. The Missouri Supreme
Court upheld the doctrine, but remanded the case to give the plaintiff an
opportunity to present evidence that no family relationship existed that
required its application.
Whether a tort action by a minor child against his parents would lie
employees that might work in the vicinity of such vehicles. The regulations per-
mit such helpers to accompany the qualified driver, but expressly provide that
only qualified drivers can operate said equipment. 49 C.F.R. §§ 392.60-.61 (1968).
Thus, neither Perry nor Far-Go could have permitted Roberts to drive the vehicle.
27. See generally Annot., 41 A.L.R.3d 732 (1972) for a collection of cases
upholding the validity of statutes, ordinances, or regulations requiring fingerprints
of individuals engaged in specified occupations.
28. For a discussion of the increased use of lie-detector tests by the business
world see Time, March 19, 1973, at 73.
29. As suggested previously, implied consent is also an unsatisfactory theory.
For a satisfactory alternative theory see text accompanying note 19 supra.
30. It is evident from the facts that Roberts would have been unable to per-
sonally satisfy the judgment, and the court pointed out that no insurance was in
effect. 485 S.W.2d at 493. The rationale for holding the corporate defendant liable
is very similar to that offered by some commentators to explain vicarious liability.
The employer is better able to respond to the judgment, and the burden can be
charged to the expenses of production. See generally, BATY, VIcARmous LIABL=Y
154 (1916); MEcHEm, OurLns OF =hE LAw OF AGENCY §§ 349-363 (4th ed. 1952);
Laski, The Basis of Vicarious Liability, 26 YALE L.J. 105 (1916).
1. 478 S.W.2d 400 (Mo. 1972).
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at common law is unclear.2 The modem doctrine of parental immunity for
negligently caused injuries developed from three American cases involving
intentional torts. In Hewellette v. George,8 a Mississippi court denied re-
covery to a minor daughter for malicious confinement in an insane asylum.
The court cited no authority; the justification for the holding was preserva-
tion of family unity. In 1903, a Tennessee court in McKelvey v. McKelvey 4
disallowed a minor's suit against his father and stepmother for cruel and
inhuman treatment. Roller v. Roller5 stretched the doctrine beyond its
logical limits. That court concluded that society's interest in preserving
family harmony precluded a child from suing her father for injuries re-
ceived when he raped her.
Subsequent cases extended parental immunity to negligent torts,0 and
today, a majority of jurisdictions hold that an unemancipated minor child
cannot recover in an action against his parent for ordinary negligence.7
The doctrine has been limited in many jurisdictions,8 however, and com-
pletely abolished in others.9
One justification for parental immunity that many courts have
espoused is preservation of family harmony.10 This rationale can be criti-
cized on several grounds. First, property and contract actions by children
against their parents, although as potentially disruptive of the family as
tort actions, have always been recognized." Similarly, jurisdictions that
support parental immunity often sanction suits betveen siblings,' 2 despite
the similar potential for family discord that they obviously present. Also,
some critics suggest that the public's interest in protecting children from
loss caused by parental negligence must be weighed against the family
harmony rationale. As Judge Fuld stated, to tell children that their "pains
2. "Neither decision now dictum nor text-writer spoke on the subject. The is-
sue is, and must remain, an insoluble mystery." Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 356,
150 A. 905, 907 (1930); See W. PRossEa, Tim LAw oF ToRTS 865 (4th ed. 1971);
McCurdy, Torts Between Persons in Domestic Relations, 43 HAv. L. Rnv. 1030,
1059 (1930). The common law did recognize child-parent property actions. Lamb
v. Lamb, 146 N.Y. 317, 41 N.E. 26 (1895); King v. Sells, 193 Wash. 294, 75 P.2d
130 (1938); McCurdy, supra at 1057.
3. 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891).
4. 111 Tenn. 388, 77 S.W. 664 (1903).
5. 37 Wash. 242, 79 P. 788 (1905).
6. The cases are collected in Akers & Drummond, Tort Actions Between
Members of the Family-Husband & Wife-Parent & Child, 26 Mo. L. R.v. 152, 183,
n.168 (1961).
7. H. CLARK, THE LAW OF Domrsanc RELATIONS 257 (1968).
8. See note 37 infra.
9. Five states have abolished the doctrine in general: Hawaii: Petersen v.
City and County of Honolulu, 51 Hawaii 484, 462 P.2d 1007 (1969); Louisiana:
Jagers v. Royal Indemnity Co., 257 So. 2d 806 (La. 1972); New York: Gelbman v.
Gelbman, 23 N.Y.2d 434, 245 N.E.2d 192, 297 N.Y.S.2d 529 (1969); North Dakota:
Nuelle v. Wells, 154 N.W.2d 364 (N.D. 1967); Pennsylvania: Falco v. Pados, 444
Pa. 372, 282 A.2d 351 (1971).
10. See, e.g., Barlow v. Iblings, 261 Iowa 713, 156 N.W.2d 105 (1968); Bren.
necke v. Kilpatrick, 336 S.W.2d 68 (Mo. En Banc 1960).
11. Hebel v. Hebel, 435 P.2d 8 (Alas. 1967); Streenz v. Streenz, 106 Ariz. 86, 471
P.2d 282 (1970); Gelbman v. Gelbman, 23 N.Y.2d 434, 245 N.E.2d 192, 297
N.Y.S.2d 529 (1969).
12. See Overlock v. Ruedemann, 147 Conn. 649, 165 A.2d 335 (1960); Mid-
kiff v. Midkiff, 201 Va. 829, 113 S.E.2d 875 (1960).
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must be endured for the peace and welfare of the family is something of
a mockery."' 3
A closely related argument for upholding the immunity is that suits
by unemancipated minor children against their parents could interfere
with the rights and obligations of parents to control, discipline and care
for their children.14 Courts fear that the threat of a retaliatory tort action
would unduly restrain parental discipline.' 5 But most tort suits brought
by children against their parents are suits for injuries suffered in auto-
mobile accidents and are unrelated to discipline, control and care. There-
fore, several courts have adopted the position taken by the Wisconsin Su-
preme Court in Goller v. White,16 which abrogated the parental immunity
doctrine except where the negligent act involves (1) an exercise of parental
authority over the child, or (2) an exercise of parental discretion with re-
spect to the provision of food, clothing, housing, medical and dental services,
and other care.17 For the same reasons, other jurisdictions have taken the po-
sition that the doctrine is inapplicable where the injuries are suffered as a
result of the negligent operation of a motor vehicle.1 8 Finally, a California
court recently held that although discipline and care are the parents' duty,
their conduct with respect thereto must be reasonable to qualify for the
immunity.19
Another reason advanced for extending the immunity is that a re-
13. Badigian v. Badigian, 9 N.Y.2d 472, 482, 174 N.E.2d 718, 724, 215
N.Y.S.2d 35, 43 (1961) (Fuld, J., dissenting). This reasoning was later adopted
by the New York Court in Gelbman v. Gelbman, 23 N.Y.2d 434, 245 N.E.2d 192,
297 N.Y.S.2d 529 (1969), which overruled Badigian.
14. See Barlow v. Iblings, 261 Iowa 713, 156 N.W.2d 105 (1968); Luster v.
Luster, 299 Mass. 480, 13 N.E.2d 438 (1938); Rodebaugh v. Grand Truck W. R.R.,
4 Mich. App. 559, 145 N.W.2d 401 (1966); Small v. Morrison, 185 N.C. 577, 118
S.E. 12 (1923); Matarese v. Matarese, 47 R.I. 131, 131 A. 198 (1925).
15. See, e.g., Borst v. Borst, 41 Wash. 2d 642, 251 P.2d 149 (1952).
16. 20 Wis. 2d 402, 122 N.W.2d 193 (1963).
17. Rigdon v. Rigdon, 465 S.W.2d 921 (Ky. 1971); Plumley v. Klein, 388
Mich. 1, 199 N.W.2d 169 (1972); Silesky v. Kelman, 281 Minn. 431, 161 N.W.2d 631
(1968). For conflicting criticisms of this approach see H. CLARK, supra note 7, at
259, and Comment, Child v. Parent: Erosion of the Immunity Rule, 19 HASTINGS
L.J. 201, 219 (1967).
18. Xaphes v. Mossey, 224 F. Supp. 578 (D.C. Vt. 1963) (applying Vermont
law); Hebel v. Hebel, 435 P.2d 8 (Alas. 1967); Streenz v. Streenz, 106 Ariz. 86,
471 P.2d 282 (1970); France v. A.P.A. Transport Corp., 56 N.J. 500, 267 A.2d
490 (1970).
19. Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d 914, 921, 479 P.2d 648, 653, 92 Cal. Rptr.
288, 293 (1971) (the prerogative and duty to exercise authority over a minor child
must be exercised within reasonable limits); H. CLARK, supra note 7, at 260
("[a]bolition of the immunity is desirable .. . [but] ... the parent should have
a privilege to use reasonable physical force in disciplining his child . ); Rr-
STATIMENT (SECOND) or TORTS § 147 (1) (1965):
"A parent is privileged to apply such force or to impose such reasonable
confinement upon his child as he reasonably believes to be necessary for
its proper control, training, or education."
But see 7 CAL. WESxRN L. REv. 466 (1971).
Restricting the immunity to reasonable conduct in effect eliminates the im-
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covery against a parent might deplete the family exchequer.20 Thus, a
recovery by one child against his parent could reduce the resources avail-
able for the entire family. The injured child, however, because of his in-
juries, probably has a legitimate need for a greater percentage of the re-
sources. 21 Further, his own assets of health and strength have been depleted.
Liability insurance has had significant impact on the parental immunity
doctrine. While Missouri and other states consider the existence of insur-
ance immaterial, 22 a number of courts have considered it in assessing the
validity of the rule.23 Courts favoring immunity contend that the existence
of insurance cannot create a liability where none existed before.2 4 The
New York Court of Appeals has rejected this argument, 25 stating that the
presence of insurance does not create a liability, but instead eliminates a
defense to an existing liability.2 6
The major reasons for extending parental immunity vanish when the
parent is insured. The family harmony justification is inapplicable since
the suit is only nominally between parent and child. The common goal of
securing compensation for the injured child may actually unite the fam-
ily.27 The family discipline rationale is inapposite because the parent is
not threatened with ultimate financial responsibility.28 And because the
parent does not have to pay the judgment, family resources will not be
depleted.
Defenders of the parental immunity doctrine contend that the existence
of liability insurance justifies retention of the doctrine to prevent collusive
sUits.2 9 A similar possibility of collusion exists in suits between dose
friends and between relatives, yet these actions are often allowed.80 Of
course, the insurer could exclude actions by children from coverage or
charge higher premiums for the additional risk.31 Nevertheless, some courts
20. Bulloch v. Bulloch, 45 Ga. App. 1, 163 S.E. 708 (1932); Small v. Morrison,
185 N.C. 577, 118 S.E. 12 (1923); Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 79 P. 788 (1905).
21. Briere v. Briere, 107 N.H. 432, 224 A.2d 588 (1966); Borst v. Borst, 41
Wash. 2d 642, 251 P.2d 149 (1952).
22. See, e.g., Baker v. Baker, 364 Mo. 453, 263 S.W.2d 29 (1953).
23. Xaphes v. Mossey, 224 F. Supp. 578 (D.C. Vt. 1963); Hebel v. Hebel, 435
P.2d 8 (Alas. 1967); Streenz v. Streenz, 106 Ariz. 86, 471 P.2d 282 (1970); Gibson V.
Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d 914, 479 P.2d 648, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288, (1971); Briere v. Briere, 107
N.H. 432, 224 A.2d 588 (1966); Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 150 A. 905 (1930);
France v. A.P.A. Transport Corp., 56 N.J. 500, 267 A.2d 490 (1970); Worrell v.
Worrell, 174 Va. 11, 4 S.E.2d 343 (1939); Lusk v. Lusk, 113 W. Va. 17, 166 S.E. 538(1932); Goller v. White, 20 Wis. 2d 402, 122 N.W.2d 193 (1963).
24. See, e.g., Bulloch v. Bulloch, 45 Ga. App. 1, 163 S.E. 708 (1932).
25. Gelbman v. Gelbman, 23 N.Y.2d 434, 245 N.E.2d 192, 297 N.Y.S.2d 529(1969).
26. Id. at 439, 245 N.E.2d at 194, 297 N.Y.S.2d at 532.
27. Parks v. Parks, 390 Pa. 287, 135 A.2d 65 (1957).
28. Hebel v. Hebel, 435 P.2d 8 (Alas. 1967).
29. Villaret v. Villaret, 169 F.2d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1948). The rationale is similar
to that behind the so-called "guest statutes" in force in several jurisdictions.
The parent could also find himself torn between his desire to see his child
recover and his duty to aid the insurer. See Dean v. Smith, 106 N.H. 314, 211 A.2d
410 (1965); Signs v. Signs, 156 Ohio St. 566, 103 N.E.2d 743 (1952).
30. Suits by children against their parents are also allowed in other contexts.
See note 11 and accompanying text supra.
31. Akers and Drummond, supra note 6, at 191.
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have upheld parental immunity because of the possibility of collusive suits.
Some have used the threat of collusion and the threat of disruption of
family harmony to uphold the doctrine,32 even though those reasons con-
flict when applied to any single case. 33
The development of the parental immunity doctrine in Missouri has
been erratic. In 1932, the Kansas City Court of Appeals arguably rejected
the reasoning behind the doctrine.3 4 Subsequently, the Springfield Court
of Appeals applied the doctrine in accordance with the general rule.3 5 In
1953, the Missouri Supreme Court endorsed the doctrine in Baker v. Baker.36
The chief exception to the present immunity rule in Missouri is, as in
other jurisdictions, the emancipation of the child.3 7 Missouri has also recog-
32. See, e.g., Dennis v. Walker, 284 F. Supp. 413 (D.D.C. 1968); Parks v.
Parks, 390 Pa. 287, 135 A.2d 65 (1957).
33. In Borst v. Borst, 41 Wash. 2d 642, 251 P.2d 149 (1952), the court stated
that if insurance was not considered in determining whether the family harmony
argument can be disregarded and immunity therefore denied, neither should it be
taken into account in determining whether the possibility of fraud and collusionjustifies the immunity. Id. at 653, 251 P.2d at 155.
34. Wells v. Wells, 48 S.W.2d 109 (K.C. Mo. App. 1932). In Wells, a mother
sought recovery for injuries received while riding in an automobile driven by her
son. The court rejected the family harmony rationale, noting the lack of similar
concern in property and contract actions. The result might have been the same had
the son sued the mother. See Brown v. Parker, 375 S.W.2d 594 (St. L. Mo. App.
1964) (basis for rule remains the same).
35. Cook v. Cook, 232 Mo. App. 994, 124 S.W.2d 675 (Spr. Ct. App. 1939). In
Cook, an adopted daughter sued her mother for malicious assault. The court re-
jected the suit, and considered that the available criminal sanctions were sufficient.
The court cited only Corpus Juris as authority [46 C.J. Parent and Child § 159
(1928)] and apparently was not aware of the Wells decision; awareness of that
decision might have produced a different result. Id. at 996, 124 S.W.2d, at 676. For
purposes of liability, the court did not distinguish between adoptive and natural
parents.
36. 364 Mo. 453, 263 S.W.2d 29 (1953). A 15 month old infant sued his father
for injuries received when the father backed the family car over the infant. The
court rejected an absolute parental immunity. Id. at 455, 263 S.W.2d at 30. Never-
theless it disallowed the suit on the grounds of public policy. The court reviewed
Wells, but did not expressly overrule it. Id. at 458, 263 S.W.2d at 32.
The Baker court, in dicta, discussed two other aspects of the parental immunity
doctrine. The court stated that the existence of insurance was immaterial. Also,
the court indicated that parental immunity would not bar actions for intentional
torts. Id. (dictum). But, the court did not overrule Cook, which had denied re-
covery for an intentional tort.
In a later case, the St. Louis Court of Appeals ruled that the immunity
ran both ways because both situations disrupted family harmony. The court in-
voked the doctrine to preclude a suit by a mother for injuries received while a
passenger in her son's car. Brown v. Parker, 375 S.W.2d 594 (St. L. Mo. App. 1964).
37. In Wurth v. Wurth, 322 S.W.2d 745 (Mo. En Banc 1959), a 19 year ord
daughter attempted to recover for injuries sustained as a result of her father's
negligent operation of an automobile. The court conceded that an unemancipated
minor child cannot recover from his parent for an unintentional tort, but ruled
that the plaintiff was in fact emancipated and therefore could recover. This ap-
pears to be the only Missouri case involving a tort suit by an emancipated minor
child against his parents.
For a general discussion of emancipation see H. CLARK, supra note 7, at
240-44.
An additional exception is recognized by several courts, which, while uphold-
ing the immunity, does not apply it to injuries caused by the parent's negligence
1973
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nized an exception where the parent-child relationship has been destroyed.
In Brennecke v. Kilpatrick38s the Missouri Supreme Court dealt with the
effect of the negligent parent's death. There, an unemancipated minor
child sued her deceased mother's estate, alleging the mother's negligence.
The court stated that the immunity is predicated on a procedural desirabil-
ity invoked for public policy reasons and not on the theory that no cause
of action arises.3 9 The court also stated:
The rule is not an absolute . . but generally exists . . . only
when the court concludes that to hold otherwise would seriously
disturb the family relations and thus be contrary to public pol-
icy... .40
The court took the position that the policy reasons for the rule had dis-
appeared with the mother's death, the parent-child relationship having
been destroyed, and the action was allowed.4 1
In Bahr, the Missouri Supreme Court stated that it could: 1) abolish
the parental immunity rule; 42 2) abolish the rule in general but delineate
certain exceptions to which immunity would be applied;4 3) abolish the
immunity but apply a standard of reasonableness "viewed in light of the
parental role"; 44 or 4) retain the Brennecke position, adhering to the im-
munity rule only when to hold otherwise would "seriously disturb the
family relations and thus be contrary to public policy.145 Bahr adopted
the latter alternative.
The one serious flaw in the test that Bahr embraces is that it fosters
litigation. The suit will lie only if it will not "seriously disturb the family
relations." This can be ascertained with certainty in some cases-e.g., where
the parent is insured. 46 Often, however, the determination will be quite
occurring in a business or employment activity. Dennis v. Walker, 284 F. Supp.
413 (D.D.C. 1968); Trevarton v. Trevarton, 151 Colo. 418, 378 P.2d 640 (1963);
Signs v. Signs, 156 Ohio St. 566, 103 N.E.2d 743 (1952); Borst v. Borst, 41 Wash.
2d. 642, 251 P.2d 149 (1952). Contra, Luster v. Luster, 299 Mass. 480, 13 N.E.2d
438 (1938).
This exception, which Missouri has not ruled on, exists because an injury
resulting from a parent's vocation is not referrable to the parent-child relationship.
Borst v. Borst, 41 Wash. 2d 642, 251 P.2d 149 (1952). While engaged in his busi-
ness, the parent owes a duty of care to anyone with whom he might come into
contact, including his own children. Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 150 A. 905
(1930). Similarly, immunity has been denied where a carrier-passenger or master-
servant relation existed between the parent and child at the time of injury. Wor-
rell v. Worrell, 174 Va. 11, 4 S.E.2d 343 (1939); Lusk v. Lusk, 113 W. Va. 17, 166
S.E. 538 (1932); Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 150 A. 905 (1930).
38. 336 S.W.2d 68 (Mo. En Banc 1960).
39. Id. at 73.
40. Id. at 70.
41. The action would have been barred had the mother survived. See Baker
v. Baker, 364 Mo. 453, 263 S.W.2d 29 (1953); Brown v. Parker, 375 S.W.2d 594
(St. L. Mo. App. 1964).
42. See cases cited note 9 supra.
43. See notes 17 and 18 and accompanying text supra.
44. 478 S.W.2d at 402. See note 19 supra.
45. Brennecke v. Kilpatrick, 336 S.W.2d 68, 70 (Mo. En Banc 1960).
46. Where the insurance company will pay the damages, the "family har-
mony" rationale is of little force. See text accompanying note 27 supra.
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speculative. For example, should recovery be permitted where the amount
involved is insignificant considering the parent's wealth? The function of
the parental immunity doctrine-to keep the family out of court-is frus-
trated because a lawsuit will often be required to determine if it is applica-
ble. A better approach would be to either abolish the immunity altogether
or apply it except in certain objectively ascertainable situatons.4 7
STEPHEN B. MACDoNALD
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-COMPENSATION FOR
OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE-APPLICATION OF THE
ORDINARY-DISEASES-OF-LIFE EXCLUSIONARY
CLAUSE OF THE MISSOURI OCCUPATIONAL
DISEASE STATUTE
Collins v. Neevel Luggage Manufacturing Co.1
Mrs. Kathryn Collins's duties, as an employee of defendant, included
placing metal valances on pieces of luggage on an assembly line. This re-
quired her to bend her fingers toward the palms of her hands, exerting
pressure downward and inward, approximately one time per second. She
performed this task for one hour a day during the week and for six to
eight hours on Saturdays. After performing this task for two weeks Mrs.
Collins developed pain in her fingers and arms. A neurosurgeon diagnosed
her condition as carpal tunnel syndrome.2 Mrs. Collins filed a claim under
the Missouri Workmen's Compensation Act.3 At the Industrial Commis-
sion hearing, claimant's expert witnesses testified that the predominant,
though not exclusive, cause of carpal tunnel syndrome is constant trauma
resulting from repetitive flexions of the wrists and hands under pressure,
47. Had the Bahr court strictly applied the immunity, it could have created
a problem with regard to the payment of the child's medical expenses. Because the
mother was the custodial parent, she had a duty of caring for child and would
have been responsible for the plaintiff's medical expenses resulting from the in-jury. If the expenses were expected to be substantial, the changed conditions mightjustify a request for increased child support. See Reiter v. Reiter, 225 Ark. 157,
278 S.W.2d 644 (1955); Pearson v. Pearson, 247 Iowa 437, 74 N.W.2d 224 (1956);
Grunder v. Grunder, 186 Kan. 766, 352 P.2d 1067 (1960); Warren v. Warren,
218 Md. 212, 146 A.2d 34 (1958).
Yet, if the husband's financial situation was not sufficient the request would be
denied. See Brown v. Brown, 84 So. 2d 311 (Fla. 1955); Whitney v. Whitney, 325
Mass. 28, 88 N.E.2d 647 (1949); Mowery v. Mowery, 38 N.J. Super. 550, 79 A.2d
793 (1951); Nelson v. Nelson, 225 Ore. 257, 357 P.2d 536 (1960). Thus, Mrs. Bahr
would have to pay the plaintiffs medical expenses, although attributable to the
noncustodical parent's negligence.
1. 481 S.W.2d 548 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1972).
2. An expert witness at the Industrial Commission hearing described carpal
tunnel syndrome as entrapment of the median nerve in the carpal tunnel on
the outside of the wrist, causing sensory numbness and pain in the fingers
and hand and a loss of sensory and motor functions of parts of the thumb and
fingers. Id. at 550.
3. Ch. 287, RSMo 1969.
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and that the repetitive wrist flexions required of claimant caused the
disease.4 The Industrial Commission determined that claimant's carpal
tunnel syndrome was an occupational disease and compensable under
sections 287.063 and 287.067 of the Missouri Workmen's Compensation
Act. The circuit court affirmed the Industrial Commission's award. On
appeal by the employer-and the insurer, the Missouri Court of Appeals,
Kansas City District, affirmed.
Compensable occupational disease is defined by section 287.067, RSMo
1969.5 Missouri courts have declared that section 287.067 incorporates
the legal test of an occupational disease established judicially0 before
enactment of section 287.067 in 1959:7 the disease must arise out of, be a
natural result of, and be peculiar to the employment, and the employment
must create a hazard of exposure to the disease greater than occupations
generally.8 However, the statute denies compensation for "[o]rdinary
diseases of life to which the general public is exposed outside of the em-
ployment."9 The Collins decision significantly clarified the meaning of
this exclusionary clause.
4. 481 S.W.2d at 550.
5. Section 287.067, RSMo 1969, defines occupational disease as:[A] disease arising out of and in the course of the employment. Ordinary
diseases of life to which the general public is exposed outside of the
employment shall not be compensable, except where the said diseases
follow as an incident of an occupational disease as defined in this sec-
tion. A disease shall be deemed to arise out of the employment only if
there is apparent to the rational mind upon consideration of all the cir-
cumstances a direct causal connection between the conditions under
which the work is performed and the occupational disease, and which
can be seen to have followed as a natural incident of the work as a re-
sult of the exposure occasioned by the nature of the employment as the
proximate cause, and which does not come from a hazard to which work-
men would have been equally exposed outside of the employment. The
disease must be incidental to the character of the business and not in-
dependent of the relation of employer and employee. The disease need
not to have been foreseen or expected but after its contraction it must
appear to have had its origin in a risk connected with the employment
and to have flowed from that source as a rational consequence.
6. Subsequent cases have adopted the judicial definition of an occupa-
tional disease stated in Sanford v. Valier-Spies Milling Co., 235 S.W.2d 92 (St.
L. Mo. App. 1950):[A] disease which is the natural incident or result of a particular em-
ployment and is peculiar to it, usually developing gradually from the
effects of long continued work at the employment, and serving, because of
its known relation to the employment, to attach to the employment a
risk or hazard which distinguishes it from the ordinary run of occupa-
tions and is in excess of that attending employments in general.
Id. at 95. See, e.g., Marie v. Standard Steel Works, 319 S.W.2d 871, 875 (Mo.
En Banc 1959); Evans v. Chevrolet Motor Co., 232 Mo. App. 927, 933, 105 S.W.2d
1081, 1084 (St. L. Ct. App. 1937).
7. 481 S.W.2d at 551; Liebrum v. Laclede Gas Co., 419 S.W.2d 517, 521(St. L. Mo. App. 1967).
8. Liebrum v. Laclede Gas Co., 419 S.W.2d 517, 521 (St. L. Mo. App. 1967).
9. See note 5 supra. The Collins court stated that the language of the
ordinary-diseases-of-life exclusionary clause appears to be derived from the Il-
linois and Indiana precursors to the Missouri statute. 481 S.W.2d at 551. See
ILL. Rxv. STAT. Ch. 48, § 172.36d (1969), and IND. ANN. STAT. § 40-2206 (1965).
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The appellants in Collins argued that carpal tunnel syndrome is an
ordinary disease of life to which the general public is exposed within
the meaning of the exclusionary clause.10 Thus, although claimant's work
in fact caused her disease, 1 the exclusionary clause barred compensation
because the disease was not shown to have resulted from a hazard peculiar
to the nature of the employment to which the general public is not ex-
posed.12 Appellants pointed out that many sources outside of claimant's
employment could have caused the disease.13 A housewife, for example,
would make the same movements that claimant made as a part of her
daily routine.1 4
The court rejected this contention, reasoning that the constant
repetitive movements required of claimant were an unusual condition in-
herent in her work and exposed her to a degree of risk of contracting
carpal tunnel syndrome to which she would not have been exposed out-
side of her employment. 15 The fact that any housewife would duplicate,
to some extent, the movements was not controlling. Instead, the court
focused on the relative magnitude of the exposure in the course of the
employment compared to the exposure of the general public.1 6 The court
stated that to deny compensation merely because a disease might be con-
tracted by the general public would be contrary to the legislative purpose
of the statute "to render more certain the employee's compensation for
occupational disease."' 7 The court concluded that it is implicit within
the prior judicial definition of occupational disease, and explicit in the
provisions of section 287.067, that
what is distinctively occupational in a particular employment is
the peculiar risk or hazard which inheres in the work conditions,
and a disease which follows as a natural result of exposure to such
occupational risks, an exposure which is greater or different that
affects the public generally, is an occupational disease, not an
ordinary disease of life.' 8
The court further stated that whether a disease is occupational does not
depend on its being literally peculiar to the occupation of the claimant,
but on whether there is a "recognizable link between the disease and some
distinctive feature of the claimant's job which is common to all jobs of
that sort."19
Prior to Collins, Liebrum v. Laclede Gas Co.20 created some confusion
concerning the scope of the exclusionary clause. The St. Louis Court of
Appeals denied compensation to an employee for a pre-existing sclerotic
10. 481 S.W.2d at 552.
11. Id. at 554.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 552.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 554.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 552, quoting Marie v. Standard Steel Works, 319 S.W.2d 871, 875
(Mo. En Banc 1959).
18. 481 S.W.2d at 552.
19. Id. at 554, quoting from Myers v. Rival Mfg. Co., 442 S.W.2d 138, 141
(K.C. Mo. App. 1969) (Industrial Commission's opinion).
20. 419 S.W.2d 517 (St. L. Mo. App. 1967).
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heart condition that was aggravated by exposure to ammonia gas during
the course of his work. The court concluded that the claimant's sclerotic
heart disease was not an occupational disease as defined by section 287.067
for three independent reasons: (1) Claimant's pre-existing heart disease
had an origin unrelated to the conditions of his employment, and thus
did not arise out of the employment as required by the statute; 21 (2)
heart disease is an ordinary disease of life to which the general public is
exposed, and there was no evidence that it was incidental to the character
of the employer's business; 22 (3) aggravation of a pre-existing ordinary
disease of life by work conditions does not create an occupational disease.23
Confusion resulted from Liebrum because of the second independent
ground for decision above. The court simply stated that heart disease
was an ordinary disease of life to which the general public is exposed,24
implying perhaps a legal test of occupational disease that considers only the
nature of the disease; if the disease is contracted by the general public it
cannot be peculiar to the employment and, therefore, occupational, regard-
less of whether it arose out of and was incidental to the employment. But
the court then stated that there was no evidence that the sclerotic heart
disease was incidental to the character of the employer's business, 25 im-
plying that the exclusionary clause must be read in conjunction with the
rest of section 287.067. Thus, compensation would be denied only when
the disease is one contracted by the general public, and is not incidental
and peculiar to the work (i.e., when claimant is not exposed to a greater
degree of risk of contracting the disease than the general public). The
Collins court concluded that the Liebrum court denied compensation not
because the general public is exposed to sclerotic heart disease but because
claimant did not prove his disease was incidental to the character of the
employer's business.26 The Collins interpretation of the exclusionary
clause should bar a claim for occupational disease only if the employment
does not present a risk or hazard of exposure to the disease greater than
that to which the general public is exposed.
In a subsequent case, Gaddis v. Rudy Patrick Seed Division, 2 7 the
Kansas City District of the Missouri Court of Appeals reaffirmed its
holding in Collins. The court ruled that bronchietasis contracted by an
employee working in close proximity to plant seeds treated with chemical
pesticides and herbicides was an occupational disease. In a footnote the
court pointed out that the ordinary-diseases-of-life exclusionary clause
21. Id. at 521.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 522.
24. Id. at 521.
25. Id.
26. 481 S.W.2d at 552. The Collins court recognized that the broad language
of Liebrum is susceptible of the interpretation appellants urged. Another St. LouisCourt of Appeals case denying compensation, Bess v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of
St. Louis, 469 S.W.2d 40 (St. L. Mo. App. 1971), arguably supported appellants'
contention. The court stated, however, that tuberculosis could be an occupational
disease if it is shown that the peculiar work conditions create a peculiar risk of
contracting the disease. Id. at 46.
27. 485 S.W.2d 636 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1972).
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and the requirement that the disease be incidental to the character of
the business are closely interrelated and involve the same principle.28
Courts in Indiana and Illinois, whose occupational disease statute
Missouri copied verbatim, 29 have construed the exclusionary clause of
their statutes consistently with the holding in Collins.3s In Allis-Chalmers
Manufacturing Co. v. Industrial Commission,31 the Illinois Supreme Court
held that a disease is compensable where the exposure in the course of
the employment is greater than that to which the general public is ex-
posed.3 2 Similarly, in Schwitzer-Cummins Co. v. Hacker,33 the Appellate
Court of Indiana held that whether a disease is occupational depends not
on whether the disease is common to the public, but whether particular
conditions of claimant's work involved a special or inherent risk or hazard
of acquiring the disease.3 4
The Missouri Supreme Court has not construed the definition of
occupational disease in section 287.067. However, in considering Marcus v.
Steel Constructors, Inc.,3 5 an appeal of an award granting compensation
for an occupational disease alleged to have resulted from repeated ex-
posure to benzol fumes, the court remanded the case for additional proof,
if available, that the employee had been exposed to benzol fumes.36 It
was acknowledged that many hundreds of substances could have caused
the disease. 37 Implicit in this ruling is a construction of section 287.067,
consistent with Collins, that would allow compensation for a disease that
could have many non-occupational causes, i.e., to which the general public
is exposed.
The Kansas City District of the Missouri Court of Appeals decided
Collins and Gaddis; the St. Louis Court of Appeals decided Liebrum.
Appellants' argument in Collins, based on Liebrum, giving broad scope to
the exclusionary clause could, therefore, still be viable in the St. Louis
District. This is unlikely for the following reasons: (1) The argument
ignores the Liebrum court's specific reference to a lack of proof that the
disease was incidental to the employer's business; (2) the ruling of the
Missouri Supreme Court in Marcus; and (3) the influence of the Kansas
City District's decision in Collins, significantly increased since the reor-
28. Id. at 638, n.l. This means that the exclusionary clause is to be read in
conjunction with the rest of § 287.067, RSMo 1969. Thus, a disease is an ordinary
disease of life only if it is not incidental to the employment, i.e., the employment
does not expose claimant to a greater or different degree of risk of contracting
the disease than the general public.
29. ILL. RIv. STAT. Ch. 48, § 172.36d (1969); IND. ANN. STAT. § 40-2206 (1965).
The statute provides a general definition of occupational disease. A minority of
states provide a schedule of occupational diseases based on the premise that cer-
tain diseases are peculiar to certain occupations. See IA A. LARSON, WoaRMAN's
COMPENSATION LAW, § 41.11.
30. For a discussion of the construction given to the exclusionary clause
of the Illinois occupational disease statute see Keefe, WORKMAN'S OCCUPATIONAL
DIsEASEs ACT, 67 U. ILL. L.F. 59 (1967).
31. 33 Ill. 2d 268, 211 N.E.2d 276 (1965).
32. Id. at 271, 211 N.E.2d at 278.
33. 123 Ind. App. 674, 112 N.E.2d 221 (1953).
34. Id. at 686, 112 N.E.2d at 225.
35. 434 S.W.2d 475 (Mo. 1968).
36. Id. at 481.
37. Id. at 479.
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ganization of the Missouri Courts of Appeals into a single Court of Ap-
peals. The Missouri Supreme Court, if confronted with the issue, should
follow the Collins rationale, thereby furthering the legislative directive of
liberal construction.38
GARY MAYES
FEDERAL ESTATE TAX-LIFE INSURANCE-POLICY
TRANSFERRED AND PREMIUMS PAID IN CONTEMPLATION
OF DEATH BY INSURED NONOWNER
Revenue Ruling 71-4971; Bel v. United States2
In 1960, John Bel purchased a one-year term renewable accidental
death policy on his life. He executed the application himself and paid the
single premium out of community property funds,3 but he named his chil-
dren as owners and beneficiaries of the policy. Within the year, Bel was
killed and the insurer paid the $250,000 proceeds to the beneficiaries.
Bel's estate tax return excluded these proceeds from the gross estate
and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue assessed a deficiency based on
the inclusion of one-half the proceeds. Because Bel had paid the single
premium less than three years prior to his death, the Commissioner con-
tended that the payment of proceeds to the beneficiaries was a transfer in
contemplation of death. The proceeds were thus includible in his gross
estate under section 2035 of the Internal Revenue Code.4 The executors
paid the tax and filed a refund action.
The district court found that the transfer had been made in contempla-
tion of death and held that one-half the dollar amount of the premiums
paid during the three years prior to death was includible in the gross estate.5
The Fifth Circuit agreed that the transfer was made in contemplation of
death, but held that Bel had transferred the entire policy; therefore,
his community share of the proceeds was properly includible.0
Timely and complete disposition by the insured owner of all incidents
of ownership of a life insurance policy may prevent inclusion of the proceeds
38. § 287.067, RSMo 1969.
1. 1971-2 Cum. BULL. 32.
2. 452 F.2d 683 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 919 (1972).
3. Bel was a resident of Louisiana, a community property state.
4. Unless otherwise indicated, all statutory references are to the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954, as amended. § 2035 (a) provides:
GENERAL RuIL-The value of the gross estate shall include the value of all
property to the extent of any interest therein of which the decedent has
at any time made a transfer (except in case of a bona fide sale for an
adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth), by trust or
otherwise, in contemplation of his death.
5. Bel v. United States, 310 F. Supp. 1189 (W.D. La. 1970). Bel initially
purchased the one-year term renewable policy in 1957 and renewed it each succeed-
ing year.
6. Bel v. United States, 452 F.2d. 683 (5th Cir. 1971).
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in his gross estate.7 Prior to 1954, if the insured paid all policy premiums
the proceeds were includible in his gross estate regardless of the ownership
of the policy.8 If the insured shared the premium expense with another, then
a portion of the proceeds corresponding to the part of the premiums the
insured paid were includible.9 Because this statutory rule was unrelated
to the question of the transferor's testamentary intent, an insured who had
once paid a premium could never entirely remove the proceeds from his
gross estate.' 0
Congress repealed the statutory premium payment test in 1954 with
the enactment of section 2042.11 The legislative history of section 2042 in-
dicates an intent to eliminate estate tax discrimination against life insurance
7. In any donative transfer consideration should be given to the federal
gift tax. Because the gift tax is cumulative, the tax benefits of an inter vivos trans-
fer become increasingly attenuated for the donor who has previously made sub-
stantial inter vivos gifts. See C. LOWNDES & R. KRAMER, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFr
TAxEs 251 (2d ed. 1962). The gift tax on life insurance, however, falls on the
purchase price instead of the proceeds. Guggenheim v. Rasquin, 312 U.S. 254
(1941).
Two types of life insurance should be distinguished. Ordinary or whole life
insurance provides coverage for the entire life of the insured and includes a sav-
ings or investment feature. The insured may elect to surrender his policy for cash
and recover a portion of his premium outlay with interest, or he may build up a
reserve of funds held by the insurer until the dividends from his investment cover
further premium expense. Term insurance, on the other hand, is pure insurance
protection, providing only for the payment of the face value if the insured dies
within a stated period. See R. K xron, BAsic TE.xT ON INSURANcE LAw 14 (1971).
The purchase of whole life insurance may have a life-related motive; term insur-
ance is more dearly testamentary.
8. INT. Rnv. CODE of 1939, ch. 3, § 811 (g), 53 Stat. 122, as amended, 56
Stat. 944 (1942). Proceeds were also includible on two other tests: (1) designation
of the insured's estate as beneficiary or (2) retention by the insured of any incident
of ownership. See 1 A. CASNER, ESTATE PLANNING 322 (3d ed. 1961). The premium
payment test did not unconstitutionally discriminate against life insurance as a form
of property. United States v. Manufacturers' National Bank, 363 U.S. 194 (1960).
9. The Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 302 (g) (now INT. REv. CODE OF 1954,
§ 2042), provided that proceeds were includible to the extent that the policy was
"taken out" by the decedent. The Treasury adopted payment of premiums as the
test of includibility of proceeds, first as an alternative criterion (Treas. Reg. 80,
Arts. 25, 27 (1934)), and then as the exclusive one (1941-1 CuM. BULL. 427). In
1942 the Code was amended to resolve the ambiguity of "taken out" by adopting
the premium payment test. Revenue Act of 1942) § 404, 56 Stat. 944 (1942).
10. See LOWNDES & KRAMER, supra note 7, at 274-76.
11. § 2042 provides:
The value of the gross estate shall include the value of all property-
1) To the extent of the amount receivable by the executor as insurance
under policies on the life of the decedent.
2) To the extent of the amount receivable by all other beneficiaries as in-
surance under policies on the life of the decedent with respect to which
the decedent possessed at his death any of the incidents of ownership,
exercisable either alone or in conjunction with any other person. For
purposes of the preceding sentence, "incident of ownership" includes
a reversionary interest (whether arising by the express terms of the
policy or other instrument or by operation of law) only if the value
of such reversionary interest. exceeded 5 percent of the value of the
policy immediately before the death of the decedent.
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as a form of property.12 Proceeds are includible in the gross estate under
section 2042 only if the insured retains at his death any of the incidents of
ownership in the policy. 13
Although the insured may avoid inclusion under section 2042 by trans-
ferring all incidents of ownership before his death, he must also satisfy the
contemplation-of-death rules of section 2035 to avoid inclusion in the gross
estate. The purpose of section 2085 is to prevent avoidance of the federal
estate tax by returning to the gross estate assets that were disposed of by
inter vivos transfers, for less than an adequate and full consideration, in-
tended as substitutes for a testamentary disposition.14 To aid in the admin-
istration of the estate tax law, section 2035 (b) provides that gifts made
within three years of death are presumed to be in contemplation of death.lt.
This presumption can be rebutted by a showing of "life-related" motives.10
The test is whether the decedents dominant motive was to avoid estate
taxes.17 This motive includes not only gifts made in apprehension of immi-
nent death, but also estate planning concerns entertained while in good
health.' 8 Transfers made before the three-year period, however, are con-
clusively presumed not to be in contemplation of death.
Transfers of the ownership of insurance policies and payments of
12. S. RYP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 472 (1954) states in part:
No other property is subject to estate tax where the decedent purchased it
and long before his death gave away all rights to the property and to dis-
criminate against insurance in this regard is not justified.
[Section 2042] revises existing law so that payment of premiums is no
longer a factor in determining the taxability under this section of in-
surance proceeds.
Id. See also H. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. A316, 1317 (1954).
13. "Incidents of ownership" is a term of art meaning control over the
benefits of the policy amounting to substantial ownership. The termination of such
control, incident to the passing of the proceeds upon the death of the insured,
constitutes a transfer taxable under the estate tax. Chase Nat'l Bank v. United
States, 278 U.S. 327 (1929). Incidents of ownership include powers to "change the
beneficiary, to surrender or cancel the policy, to assign the policy, to revoke an
assignment, to pledge the policy for a loan, or to obtain from the insurer a' loan
against the surrender value of the policy .... Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1*(c) (2) (1973).
14. United States v. Wells, 283 U.S. 102, 116-17 (1931).
15. § 2035 (b) provides:
If the decedent within a period of 3 years ending with the date of his
'death (except in case of a bona fide sale for an adequate and full con-
sideration in money or money's worth) transferred an interest in property,
relinquished a power, or exercised or released a general power of appoint-
ment, such transfer, relinquishment, exercise, or release shall, unless shown
to the contrary, be deemed to have been made in contemplation of death
within the meaning of this section and sections 2038 and 2041 (relating
to revocable transfers and powers of appointment); but no such transfer,
relinquishment, exercise, or release made before such 3 year period shall
be treated as having been made in contemplation of death.
See, e.g., Issac W. Baldwin, 18 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 902 (1959).
16. "Life-related" means not associated with the distribution of property after
one's death.
17. Allen v. Trust Co. of Georgia, 326 U.S. 630 (1946); Treas. Reg. § 20.2035
(1973).
18. United States v. Wells, 283 U.S. 102 (1931). See LOWNDES & KRAMER,
.supra note 7, at 63-64.
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premiums on them are subject to this test. Where the policy owner transfers
it to another within three years of his death, the courts are often unwilling
to find the presumption of section 2035 (b) rebutted.' 9 Conversely, if the
decedent survives for three years after the transfer of the policy and makes
no premium payments within that period, the proceeds are not included in
the gross estate. If, however, the decedent fully transfers ownership of the
policy more than three years before his death but continues to pay the
premiums, he may have made a transfer proscribed by section 2035. But,
is the transfer a transfer of the premium (a gift of cash) or of a correspond-
ing share in the matured value of the policy (the proceeds)?
The Internal Revenue Service announced its position on this issue in
Revenue Ruling 67-643.20 Under the ruling, a premium payment was con-
sidered a transfer of an interest in the policy even though the putative
transferee already possessed all incidents of ownership. Thus, the proportion
that the premium payments the insured made within three years prior to his
Oeath bore to the total premiums paid would determine the proportion of
the proceeds includible in his gross estate.2 ' The ruling thus revived the pre-
mium payment test Congress rejected in 1954.22 The courts, however, did
not follow the ruling2 s and limited the amount includible to the dollar
amount of premiums paid within the three-year period.24
19. See Garret's Estate v. Commissioner, 180 F.2d 955 (2d Cir. 1950); Vander-
lip's Estate v. Commissioner, 155 F.2d 152 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 728
(1946); First Trust and Dep. Co. v. Shaughnessy, 134 F.2d 940 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 320 U.S. 744 (1943); Slifka v. Johnson, 63 F.Supp. 289 (S.D.N.Y. 1945).
But see Hull's Estate v. Commissioner, 325 F.2d 367 (3d Cir. 1963) (gift to di-
vorcee daughter for security); Verne C. Hunt, 14 T. C. 1182 (1950) (gift to place
policies beyond reach of possible judgment creditors); Louis Baskind, 10 P-H
B.T.A. Mem. 546 (1941) (gift as part of planned-series of cash gifts to children).
20. 1967-2 CuM. BULL. 327. The ruling also applied to policies owned initially
by others if decedent made contributions.
21. Id.
22. Although the Senate committee report on § 2042 (See note 12 supra)
made payment of premiums irrelevant to the taxability of life insurance proceeds
only "under this section" and there is no indication that Congress sought to change
the contemplation-of-death rules under § 2035 or to alter the taxability of life
insurance under other Code provisions, this method of valuation of the interests
transferred went beyond the express mandate of § 2035. See notes 35, 37 infra.
28. See Gorman v. United States, 288 F. Supp. 225 (E.D. Mich. 1968).
24. In Inez G. Coleman, 52 T.C. 921 (1969), the decedent-insured paid the
premiums for five years on her children's policies (the record does not disclose
the type of policy). The Tax Court limited inclusion to the value of the premium
payments because they represented the only diversion of funds from the estate.
Decedent held no interest whatsoever in the policy or its proceeds ....
To be sure, these payments kept the economic substance of the policy
alive. But the decisive point is that what these payments created or main-
tained was theirs and not hers. In these circumstances ... the only thing
diverted from her estate was the money paid.
52 T.C. at 923.
First Nat'l Bank of Midland v. United States, 423 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1970),
involved whole life policies that the decedent-insured purchased for his daughters
eight years prior to his death. The court found that the right to collect the pro-
ceeds existed in the beneficiaries from the inception of the policies and therefore
that there was nothing to transfer except the prmiums themselves, which were
includible at their value when transferred. An earlier district court case, Gorman
v. United States, 288 F. Supp 225 (E.D. Mich. 1968), raised the issue of coverage
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Revenue Ruling 71-49725 revoked 67-643 and preserved the 'govern-
ment's appeal in Bel, then pending. The two hypothetical cases posed in
the ruling show that the Internal Revenue Service now considers the date
the insured purchases or assigns the policy as the determinative factor.
In situation 1, the decedent purchased and assigned to another both a
whole life policy and a five-year term policy on his life. He continued to
pay the premiums for four years, until his death. The ruling states that only
an amount equal to the premiums paid in the last three years is includible
with respect to either policy. This ruling indicates that premium payments
in contemplation of death on policies owned by another for more'than
three years before the insured's death do not transfer any interest in such
policies. 20 Situation 2 is Bel: nine months prior to death decedent pur-
chased a one-year term policy on his life for another and paid the full pre-
mium. The proceeds are ruled includible, and the premium payment is con-
ceptualized as a transfer of "the economic benefit.., in substance.., of the
right to insurance for the one-year period." 27' Bel 'thus holds that where
the decedent procures a term policy on his life for a beneficiary within the
three-year period, there is a presumptive transfer in contemplation of death
thereof, regardless of who initially possesses the incidents of ownership. 28
For estate tax purposes, the policy is valued at the full amount of the
proceeds because the insurer is a mere "third party conduit" for the de-
cedent's transfer.29
The remainder of this casenote discusses two questions: (1) Whether
the five-year term annual premium policy in situation one in the ruling
should be treated differently from the one-year term annually renewable
policy in situation two (Bel); and (2) whether the payment of a premium
on a term policy is a transfer of an interest in the policy proceeds.
beginning within the three-year period. Nine months before his death the insured
had purchased a five-year renewable term policy in his wife's name. The govern-
ment argued that the decedent's payment of the premiums made the proceeds
taxable to his estate and also contended that the proceeds were fully includible
because the policy had been purchased within the presumptive three-year period.
Tlie court held only the value of the premiums includible and attacked Rev. Rul.
67-643 as administrative usurpation. Id. at 230.
25. 1971-2 GuM. BULL. 329.
26. The ruling states that the government will follow the decision in Mid.
land. See note 24 supra.
27. 1971-2 Cum. BULL. 329.
28. The court said that "by paying the premium, [Bel] designated ownership
of the policy and created in his children all of the contractual rights to the in-
surance benefits. These were acts of transfer." 452 F.2d at 691. Bel relied on Chase
Nat'l Bank v. United States, 278 U.S. 329 (1929), which in dictum stated that trans.
fers of insurance policies may include property other than that passing directly
from the insured to the transferee. Id. at 327. The Bel court used this statement
to justify inclusion of the proceeds rather than the dollar amount of premiums.
Chase, however, did not consider the relationship of premiums to proceeds.
Bel's implicit approval of Rev. Rul. 71-497 indicates that the 1954 adoption of§ 2042 had no effect on § 2035. 425 F.2d at 690. See also Treas. Reg. § 20.
2042-1 (a) (2) (1973).
Where the decedent purchases the policy for another, as in Bel, it is arguable
that "upon a technical construction" of § 2035, a decedent cannot transfer what lie
never owned. Detroit Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 467 F.2d 964, 968-69 (6th
Cir. 1972), following Bel. See 8 HOUSTON L. REv. 168, 172 (1970).
29. 452 F.2d at 690.
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The reasoning behind the different results in situations one and two
turns on the assumption that a complete transfer of rights in the policy can
occur at a particular point in time. Where a term policy is purchased for
another, this transfer occurs at the time of purchase. Where the insured
initially owns but then assigns the term policy, the transfer occurs at the
time of the assignment. In both cases the transfer occurs when someone
other than the insured acquires the incidents of ownership. Because this
transfer occurs in situation one before the three-year period it is not a
transfer in contemplation of death. Because the transfer does occur within
the three-year period in situation two, that transfer is presumptively in
contemplation of death.
This conceptualization of an ascertainable, completed transfer at a
time certain is probably sound only in regard to single-premium insurance
policies. The transfer, by purchase or assignment, of such policies is indeed
complete because all rights in the policy and the proceeds are vested after
the transfer. Transfer of single-premium policies is thus analogous to the
transfer of most chattels.
Most term policies, however, involve continuing premium payments.
Continued payment is essential to preserving the beneficial rights in the
policy, the principal one of which is the right to receive the proceeds. The
initial transfer, by purchase or assignment, is of little consequence absent
the subsequent premium payments. Each premium payment recreates the
"bundle of rights" 30 the policy represents. Nothing more is transferred to
the beneficiaries in the initial transfer than is transferred later when each
premium is paid. Thus, there is no difference between a five-year annual
premium term policy and a one-year term policy renewable annually.31 In
either case the entire "bundle of rights" the policy represents will disappear
if no premium is paid, and will be vested for another year if the premium
is paid. Thus, in determining whether a transfer in contemplation has been
made, the date of the initial "transfer," by assignment or purchase, is ir-
30. The court in Bel stated that
the premium paid by the decedent less than one year prior to his death
engendered the entire right, title, and interest which the decedent's chil-
dren had in the accidental death policy. Essentially, every stick in the
bundle of rights constituting the policy had a genesis within three years
of the decedent's death.
The court's use of the term "bundle of rights" is misleading when applied to term
insurance. Virtually the only beneficial interest is the proceeds. See Howard, The
Estate Tax Impact of Paying Life Insurance Premiums in Contemplation of Death,
5 FORUM 97, 106 (1970); note 31 infra.
31. Bel treated annual renewals of a renewable policy as successive acquisi-
tions of new policies. See 1 A. CASNER, Es'rArE PLAMNING 328 n. 85a (Supp. 1973).
This rule curtails estate tax benefits for a common type of policy. See Rosenberg,
Section 2035-Premiums Made in Contemplation of Death-The Bel Has Sounded,
605 INS. L.J. 311, 318 (1973).
There is one possible difference in the two types of policies. A five-year term
policy has a fixed (level) premium whereas a one-year term renewable policy may
have an increasing premium. Thus, the insured's initial transfer of the former may
convey more to the beneficiary than the subsequent premium payments do, the
added benefit being the right to the insurance coverage in the future for a fixed
amount. It is submitted that this is not significant enough to justify different treat-
ment for the two types of policies.
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relevant. It would seem the same estate tax consequences should obtain in
both situations one and two.
What that consequence should be-proceeds or only premiums includi-
ble-depends on whether the payment of a premium is a transfer of an
interest in the proceeds.32 The most persuasive argument for an affirmative
answer to this question is that each premium payment recreates and vests
the beneficial rights in the policy. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion
that the premium payment thus transfers to the beneficiary an interest in
the proceeds. It can be argued, however, that section 2035, because it pur-
ports to include in the gross estate those assets that would have been in-
cluded absent the testamentary gift,83 does not reach the "appreciation" of
property after it has been transferred to the donee. Clearly, in the case of
a transfer of cash, the appreciation the donee may realize through his use
of it is not includible.3 4 The gross estate arguably never included the value
of the proceeds-only the premiums.
Assuming that the payment of premiums is a transfer of an interest
iii the proceeds, at least theoretically, Congress may have rejected, pursuant
to enactment of section 2042, the idea that premium payment alone should
render proceeds includible in the gross estate.35 Section 2035 and 2042
are not in para materia,36 however, and the enactment of section 2042,
eliminating the statutory premium payment test, does not necessarily
restrict section 2035. There is evidence both ways on the question whether
32. If premium payment is viewed as a transfer of an interest in the proceeds,
then the corresponding proportional part of the proceeds should arguably be in-
cluded in the gross estate.
33. Igleheart v. Commissioner, 77 F.2d 704, 711 (5th Cir. 1935). The gift tax,
of course, impacts only on the premiums paid. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1 (h) (8) 1973.
Courts have, however, adopted expanded concepts of transfer in other contexts,
such as a gift for a prearranged purpose. In Geoffrey G. Davies, 40 T.C. 525 (1963),
decedent paid a sum of cash to the account of the donee in a bank in England for
the purpose of purchasing land in Hawaii. The Tax Court construed the gift tax
statutes to find this transaction to be a gift of realty in the United States.
An expanded concept of "transfer," in regard to a transfer with a retained life
interest under § 2036, is illustrated by United States v. O'Malley, 383 U.S. 627(1966), where decedent had established irrevocable trusts, each of which provided
that the trustees could at their discretion pay income to the beneficiaries or accumu-
late it. The Supreme Court held that a transfer was made, not only of the property
originally transferred, but also of that portion of the res representing accumulated
income.
34. Cash transferred in contemplation of death is to be valued at face amount,
regardless of gains or losses resulting from the utilization of such cash by the donee
during the interim period before death. See Humphrey's Estate v. Commissioner,
162 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1947), in which business losses suffered by legatees were held
not to affect the value of the bequest of the business.
35. The 1954 repeal of the statutory premium payment test was contested in
a House committee minority report. H. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. B14
(1954). It urged reenactment on the grounds that life insurance is a special type
of property, designed to serve as a will substitute, (Id. at B15), and it was rejected.
The refusal of Congress in 1957 to enact a proposed partial reinstatement of the
premium payment test strengthens the 1954 policy determination. H.R. 8381, 85th
Cong., 1st Sess. § 56 (1957).
86. 452 F.2d at 690; Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1 (a) (2) (1973).
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Congress intended to dispatch the premium payment test as an "inde-
pendent generating force for includability"3 7 for all purposes. If so, then
the proceeds of term policies with annual premium or renewal should
not be includible in the gross estate in any case, regardless of when
purchased or assigned. Conversely, if the Congressional action pursuant to
section 2042 has no bearing on section 2035, and if premium payment on
a term policy is in fact a transfer of an interest in the proceeds, such pay-
ment will always render a proportional part of the proceeds includible.
It is submitted that the above conclusion-that the date of the initial
transfer of the policy should not determine whether the three-year presump-
tion will operate-is equally applicable to whole life policies with annual
premiums. Doubtless, the "bundle of rights" involved in whole life policies
is greater, 83 and an ascertainable time when vested rights in the investment
feature of the policy are transferred can be identified.39 As to the insurance,
as opposed to investment, portion of the policy, however, continued annual
payment of the premiums is essential to preserve the rights in the proceeds,
just as in the case of term insurance.40 Each succeeding premium pay-
ment is thus a transfer of an interest in the proceeds. Whether the proceeds
are properly includible, or only the premiums applicable thereto, should de-
pend not on when the policy was assigned or purchased, but on the same
considerations applicable to term insurance.41
It is unclear whether a whole life policy assigned to or purchased for
another within the three-year period is covered by Revenue Ruling 71-497
37. S. REP. No. 1622, supra, note 12, states that premium payment is irrelevant
in determining indudibility under § 2042. A fair connotation, however, is that
Congress believed the inclusion of life insurance proceeds in the gross estate was
unfair when based solely on premium payment, regardless what section is involved.
The court in Inez v. Coleman, 52 T.C. 921 (1969), thought it quite possible that
the Congressional rejection of the premium payment test was applicable under
§ 2035:
Nevertheless, it is clear from the legislative history that Congress sought
to inter the premium payment test with the ashes of the 1939 Code as an
independent generating force for the indudability of insurance proceeds.
Id. at 922.
38. In First Nat'l Bank v. United States, 423 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1970) (see
note 24 supra), involving a whole life policy purchased for the insured's daughters
eight years prior to his death, on which insured paid the premiums, the court
found that the right to collect the proceeds existed in the beneficiaries from the
inception of the policies; thus, only the premiums themselves could be transferred,
not an interest in the proceeds. The court is correct in finding that the right to the
proceeds existed from the inception of the policy, but ignores the fact that this
right completely disappears upon nonpayment of subsequent premiums. Hence, in
terms of the proceeds (as opposed to the cash value), the insured transferred
nothing more to the beneficiaries when he purchased the policy than he did when
he paid subsequent premiums.
39. Once transferred, the cash surrender value is a vested property interest
of the transferee and cannot be lost upon nonpayment of premiums.
40. See note 88 supra.
41. E.g., whether the Congressional rejection of the premium payment test
is applicable under § 2035, whether the premiums can be properly analogized to
cash gifts that appreciate in the hands of the donee, whether the proceeds can be
considered part of the gross estate, etc. See text accompanying notes 32-37 supra.
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and Bel.42 If so, the investment feature of whole-life insurance may indi-
cate life-related motives and rebut the presumption of a gift in contempla-
tion of death.
Whatever their logical merits, Revenue Ruling 71-497 and Bel, until
rejected or changed, are the law. It is important that the beneficiary-owner
pay as much of the premiums as possible during the first three years. If this
is infeasible, the estate planner might advise them to channel funds pro-
vided by the donor-insured in such a way that they are traceable to other
expenditures in their regular budgets and to pay the insurer out of their
own resources. The courts might accept the transaction at face value;
they frequently rejected such gambits, however, under the statutory premi-
um payment test, and the old cases are presumably good law for this pur-
pose.43 For renewable term policies the premium discount plan may be
useful.44
The estate planner should not neglect opportunities to rebut the stat-
utory presumption. If the donor makes transfers as part of a pattern of
disposal of assets or as provision of security for dependents, a foundation
is laid for the assertion of life-related motives. 45
Revenue Ruling 71-497 represents a significant change in the position
of the Internal Revenue Service. One can now be confident of the exclusion
of proceeds from the gross estate once the insured nonowner has survived
three years beyond the date of issuance to the beneficiary. Term policies
42. Because, under the court's analysis, criticized herein, the genesis of the
beneficial rights is within the three-year period, Bel and Rev. Rul. 71497 should
apply to whole life policies.
43. Charles B. Wolf, 29 T.C. 441 (1957); Clarence H. Loeb, 29 T.C. 22 (1957);
E.A. Showers, 14 T.C. 902 (1950). See Simmons, IRS Rules Premium Payments
Within 3 Years of Death Puts Proceeds into Estate, 28 J. TAx. 146, 148.
44. Under the premium discount plan, the insured-donor would put money
for the payment of three additional premiums into a fund at the same time he takes
out the policy and pays the first premium. In each following year, he would deposit
an additional premium amount in the fund. At his death, three years worth of his
most recent gifts would still be in the fund. See 1 A. CASNER, ESTATE PLANNNG 328
n. 85a. (Supp. 1973). This scheme was proposed as a means of limiting inclusion
to the dollar amount of the premiums under Rev. Rul. 67-643. It would be of no
use in the Bel situation, where the insured dies before the elapse of the first three
years, except that it might be tried where annual renewable term policies are pur-
chased. If the insured survives for the first three years, the taxpayer might argue
that the proceeds are excludible on his term policy even though contractual rights
arose during the presumptive period.
45. See Oliver Johnson, 10 T.C. 680 (1948), for a discussion of life-related
motives. See also Kimbrell, Planning Insurance Transactions to Avoid Transfers in
Contemplation of Death, 36 U.M.K.C.L. REv. 1 (1968); Freilicher & Freiman, Life
Insurance and Living Motives, 110 TRUSTS & ESTATES 105-07 (1971). See cases cited
note 19 supra.
The Fifth Circuit has rejected a government contention that accidental death
policies are inherently testamentary. First Nat'l Bank v. United States, 463 F.2d
716, 721 (5th Cir. 1972). An irrebutable presumption of testamentary intent is an
unconstitutional deprivation of due process. Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U.S. 812
(1932).
Combining accidental death benefits with disability coverage in a corporate
group policy has been held to demonstrate life-related motives. Kahn v. United
States, 349 F. Supp. 806 (N.D. Ga. 1972).
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entail this benefit as much as whole life policies provided that the term
exceeds three years. Bel and the ruling have won judicial acceptance; 4,6 its
concessions mark the limit of estate tax benefits for life insurance for the
foreseeable future.
HUGH R. LAw
FEDERAL COURTS-RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL
IN CIVIL ACTIONS INVOLVING EQUITABLE CLAIMS
Dawson v. Contractors Transport Corp.'
The plaintiff worked for a subcontractor, William H. Singleton Co.,
on the Watergate Apartments construction site. Singleton had a contract
with Contractors Transport Corporation [hereinafter Transport] for the
delivery of refrigeration equipment. Plaintiff was injured while unload-
ing this equipment. He applied for and received workmen's compensation
from Singleton. He then sued the general contractor and Transport for
negligence. The general contractor filed a third party complaint against
Singleton for indemnification (pursuant to the contract between them).
Transport, although precluded by the applicable workmen's compensation
statute from seeking contribution from Singleton, filed a cross-claim against
it seeking a credit of fifty percent on any judgment rendered against Trans-
port.2 Plaintiff moved for and was granted a jury trial of his action against
the general contractor and Transport.
46. Detroit Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 467 F.2d 964 (6th Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 410 U.S. 929 (1973) (decedent created an irrevocable trust for his
children and gave the trustee the funds for a policy on his life six months before
his death; on the authority of Bel the proceeds were held includible); Kahn v.
United States, 349 F. Supp. 806 (N.D. Ga. 1972) (purchase of group insurance by
a close corporation for an employee and his wife is transfer within § 2035 (a), but
presumption rebutted); First Nat'l Bank v. United States, 352 F. Supp. 1157 (D.
Ore. 1972) (decedent caused his wife to take out two twenty-year decreasing term
policies on his life that were convertible to whole life; insured died within the
presumptive period and proceeds held includible).
1. 467 F.2d 727 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
2. This credit is called the Murray credit after the case in which it was estab-
lished, Murray v. United States, 405 F.2d 1361 (D.C. Cir. 1968). The Dawson court
explained the credit:
The so-called "Murray credit" is an extension of the equitable doc-
trine of contribution in the context of workmen's compensation claims.
Under the principle of contribution, a tortfeasor against whom a judg-
ment is rendered is entitled to recover proportional shares of the judgment
from other joint tortfeasors whose negligence contributed to the injury
and who are liable to the plaintiff. Since employers covered by workmen's
compensation statutes are not liable in tort to their injured employees,
other tortfeasors are not entitled to contribution from negligent employers,
and thus, before Murray, bore the entire burden of the tort damages.
To mitigate the harshness of this result, we held in Murray that a per-
son against whom the employee was awarded damages in a tort action
could reduce the judgment by 50 percent if he could show that the em-
ployer's negligence contributed to the injury.
467 F.2d at 729.
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Transport contended that Singleton was solely responsible for plain-
tiffs injury. The jury, however, returned a general verdict for the general
contractot and against Transport. The trial judge ruled against Transport
on its cross-claim, finding that Singleton had not been negligent. Transport
appealed, contending that under the Seventh Amendment to the United
States Constitution the jury should have decided the cross-claim. The Dis-
trict of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that that a cross-
claim for a judgment credit is equitable in nature and, therefore, the
seventh amendment did not require that the factual issues underlying the
cross-claim be submitted to the jury.3
The seventh amendment 4 traditionally has meant that the right to
trial by jury shall be preserved (as opposed to being extended)5 as that
right existed under the English common law0 as of the date of adoption
of the seventh amendment, 1791.7 Thus, since the right to a jury determina-
tion of factual issues was limited to actions at law in England,8 the seventh
amendment guarantees that right only in actions that are legal in nature,9
and not in cases arising in equity, admiralty,' 0 or in administrative pro-
ceedings.11 Further, there is not an automatic constitutional right to a jury
trial regarding rights or remedies that Congress has created since the adop-
tion of the seventh amendment.' 2
Prior to the enactment of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, law
and equity were separate areas of jurisdiction in the federal courts. Separate
actions were required to obtain both legal and equitable relief,18 causing
hardship for plaintiffs seeking both.14 "Equitable clean-up" was the federal
courts' response to the problem.' 5 Equitable clean-up meant that when any
portion of a controversy invoked the subject matter jurisdiction of equity,
the court could, at its discretion,16 retain equitable subject-matter juris-
diction over the remaining legal aspects of the controversy and award legal
3. 467 F.2d at 731.
4. U.S. CONsT. amend. VII provides:
In suits at common law where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty
dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by
a jury shall be otherwise re-examined in any court of the United States,
than according to the rules of common law.
5. F. JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 8.1 (1965).
6. Baltimore &: C. Line, Inc. v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654, 657 (1935); Slocum
v. New York Life Ins. Co., 228 U.S. 364, 377 (1913).
7. Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 476 (1935); F. JAMEs, supra note 5; C.
WMRGHr, FEDERAL COURTS § 92, at 404 (2d ed. 1970).
8. 3 W. BLACYSTONE, COMMENTARIES *451.
9. SHIELDS v. THOMAS, 59 U.S. 209, 216 (1855); Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S.
474, 479 (1830).
10. United States v. Louisiana, 339 U.S. 699, 706 (1950); Luria v. United
States, 231 U.S. 9, 27-28 (1913); Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. 474, 479 (1830).
11. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 447 (1944); NLRB v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 48 (1936).
12. See 47 AM. JUR. 2D JURY § 30 (1969).
13. 5 J. MoORE, FEDERAL PRACICE § 38.03 (2d ed. 1971).
14. Levin, Equitable Clean-up and the Jury: A Suggested Orientation, 100
U. PA. L. REv. 320, 321 (1951).
15. Id.
16. James, Right to a Jury Trial in Civil Actions, 72 YALE L.J. 655, 683 (1963);
O'Neill, Law or Equity: The Right to Trial by Jury in a Civil Action, 35 Mo. L.
r v. 43, 48-50 (1970).
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relief.'7 There was no right to a jury trial for a legal claim so adjudicated
because, the reasoning went, the party asserting the legal claim had
"waived" his right to a jury trial by raising it in an equitable proceeding.l&
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure did away with bifurcated juris-
diction in the federal courts.19 Moreover, certain of the rules require that
legal and equitable claims be asserted in the same action. For example,
federal rule 18 effectively compels a party seeking both legal and equitable
relief to request both in a single action.20 Similarly, federal rule 13 (a)
requires that a party assert certain counterclaims, including legal counter-
claims in equitable actions.21 Application of equitable cleanup in these
situations would result in loss of the right to a jury trial of the issues under-
lying the claim for legal relief.
Three Supreme Court cases have attempted to resolve the hopeless
confusion in which the lower federal courts found themselves when con-
fronted with the problem of the post-rules right to a jury trial.22 Two of
17. American Life Ins. Co. v. Stewart, 300 U.S. 203, 215 (1937); Alexander
v. Hillman, 296 U.S. 222, 224 (1935); -American Mills Co. v. American Sur. Co.,
260 U.S. 360, 364-65 (1922); 1 J. POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE §§ 181, 231 (5th
ed. 1941).
If the determination of the issues involved in the equitable claim also deter-
mined the issues involved in the legal claim, the court could:
(1) award the plaintiff the appropriate legal relief, if the plaintiff had
asserted the legal claim, Alexander v. Hillman, 296 U.S. 222, 242
(1935); or
(2) award the defendant the appropriate legal relief, if the legal claim
was presented by the defendant as a counterclaim and if the deter-
mination of the issues was in his favor, 1 J. POMEROY, supra, § 231; or
(3) enjoin the further prosecution of the defendant's legal counterclaim,
if the determination was made in the plaintiff's favor, American Life
Ins. Co. v. Stewart, 300 U.S. 203, 215 (1937).
However, if the disposition of the equitable claim did not dispose of the legal
claim, the court could dismiss the suit for want of subject-matter jurisdiction, Amer-
ican Mills Co. v. American Sur. Co., 260 U.S. 360, 364-65 (1922); or resolve the
remaining issues, 1 J. POMEROY, supra § 182.
18. American Mills Co. v. American Sur. Co., 260 U.S. 360, 366 (1922); Note,
The Right to Jury Trial Under Merged Procedures, 65 HARv. L. REv. 453, 455
(1952).
19. The first rule provides that the federal rules will apply to actions both
at law and in equity, FED. R. Civ. P. 1. The second declares that there is only one
form of action, the civil action, FED. R. Civ. P. 2.
20. C. CLAm, CODE PLEADING § 73 (2d ed. 1947); McCoid, Right to Jury Trial
in the Federal Courts, 45 IOWA L. REv. 726, 731 (1960).
21. Cf. Ring v. Spina, 166 F.2d 546, 550 (2d Cir. 1948).
22. For the view that there was no right to a jury trial in an action combining
legal and equitable claims see Tanimura v. United States, 195 F.2d 329 (9th Cir.
1952); Orenstein v. United States, 191 F.2d 184 (ist Cir. 1951); Boucher v. DuBoyes,
Inc., 137 F. Supp. 639 (S.D.N.Y. 1955), affd, 253 F.2d 948 (2d Cir. 1958), cert.
denied, 357 U.S. 936 (1958).
For the view that there was a right to a jury trial in this situation see Leimer
v. Woods, 196 F.2d 828 (8th Cir. 1952); Bruckman v. Hollzer, 152 F.2d 730, 732
(9th Cir. 1946) (distinguished by the same court in Tanimura); Banana Distrib. v.
United Fruit Co., 19 F.R.D. 11 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); Chappell &c Co. v. Cavalier, Cafe,
Inc., 13 F.R.D. 321 (D. Mass. 1952).
See also Thermo-Stitch, Inc. v. Chemi-Cord Processing Corp., 294 F.2d 486 (5th
Cir. 1961); 39 IowA L. Rlv. 350, 351 (1954).
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these cases, Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover23 and Dairy Queen, Inc. v.
Wood,24 require that where both legal and equitable claims are asserted
in a single action, the legal claim must be determined by a jury first, if a
prior court determination of the equitable claim would preclude, by col-
lateral estoppel, a subsequent jury determination of a factual issue in the
legal claim. 25 Thus, issues of fact common to both claims must be decided
by the jury, if otherwise the jury would be foreclosed in its consideration
of facts involved in the legal issue.26
Dawson did not raise this possibility. As to plaintiff's legal claim,
the jury was obviously not foreclosed on any issue because it was decided
first. The court's subsequent judgment on the equitable cross-claim was
consistent with the jury's determination. Even if the court's judgment had
23. 359 U.S. 500 (1959). The plaintiff sought both a declaratory judgment
that a contract between plaintiff and defendant was not in violation of the anti-
trust laws and an injunction restraining the defendant from bringing future liti-
gation under those laws. Defendant counterclaimed, asserting that the contract was
an unreasonable restraint on trade and prayed for treble damages. The lower
courts, on the basis of the equitable cleanup doctrine, denied defendant a jury
trial. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because the determination of the
plaintiff's equitable claim would, by collateral estoppel, also determine the primary
issues in the defendant's legal counterclaim, the defendant had a right to a jury
trial first on his claim. The Court held that, except under the most imperative
circumstances, parties have a right to a jury trial of factual issues that are common
to both the legal and equitable claims in their actions. Ad. at 510-11.
24. 369 U.S. 469 (1962). Dairy Queen followed Beacon Theatres's rationale.
The plaintiff brought an action for breach of a trademark licensing agreement.
Plaintiff sought both temporary and permanent injunctions against the defendant's
use of plaintiff's trademark, an accounting to determine the exact amount defendant
owed plaintiff, and an injunction, pending the decision, to prevent defendant from
collecting the proceeds from its use of the trademark. The Supreme Court found
that plaintiff's request for an accounting was essentially a prayer for damages re-
sulting from defendant's breach of contract, and that therefore plaintiff had asserted
both legal and equitable claims involving the same facts. Accordingly, the Court, re-
lying on Beacon Theatres, granted the plaintiff a jury trial, on the legal claim, hold-
ing that "the legal claims involved in the action must be determined prior to any
final court determination of respondent's equitable claims" since there were com-
mon issues of law and fact. Id. at 479.
25. Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 479 (1962); Beacon Theatres,
Inc., v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 510 (1959).
26. The Dawson court stated the rule of Beacon Theatres and Dairy Queen
to be that if there are common factual issues, either party has the right to a jury
determination of those issues. The two claims in Dawson did not involve common
factual issues, the court concluded, because the defense to plaintiff's claim was
that Singleton was solely liable, whereas the issue in the cross-claim was whether
Singleton was negligent at all. The two claims could, however, be viewed as present-
ing common issues regarding the operative facts of the episode. For example, much
of the evidence relevant to plaintiff's assertion of Transport's negligence would
also be relevant to whether Singleton was negligent. Under the test the Dawson
court described, Transport would have a right to a jury determination of those
factual issues. That test thus omits a key requirement of Beacon Theatres, viz., the
operation of collateral estoppel. With a general verdict, of course, the only facts
upon which collateral estoppel can operate are those essential to the verdict, i.e.,
whether Singleton was solely negligent. Thus, the court's statement of the Beacon
Theatres rule is accurate only insofar as it speaks of common facts upon which
collateral estoppel can operate.
[V/ol. 38
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not been consistent with the jury's, the jury's judgment would have pre-
vailed and plaintiff's right to a jury trial would have remained intact.2 7
The defendant had a right to a jury trial on all fact issues common
to his cross-claim and the plaintiff's claim to the extent that, if the equit-
able claim had been decided first, that decision would, by collateral estop-
pel, foreclose any of the fact issues in the legal claim from jury considera-
tion. A prior court determination that Singleton was not negligent would
not so foreclose the jury regarding plaintiff's claim against Transport.
This is because (1) there were no common fact issues, or (2) the court's
general judgment could not identify and estop collaterally those common
fact issues that did exist.
Thus, defendant's right to a jury trial in Dawson depended on the
characterization of his claim as legal or equitable, and not on whether it
presented issues of fact common to plaintiff's claim. A third Supreme
Court decision, Ross v. Berhard,28 illuminates the characterization process.
Ross was a shareholder's derivative action in which plaintiff sued the
corporation's directors and brokers (the corporation was a closed-end in-
vestment company) for violation of the Investment Company Act of 1940,29
breach of fiduciary duty, waste, and gross negligence. The Supreme Court
held that a shareholder's derivative action is essentially two actions: an
equitable action to determine if the shareholder may bring suit on the cor-
poration's behalf, and the corporation's legal claim. 30 Thus, Beacon
Theatres and Dairy Queen required that the shareholder receive a jury
27. See Jones v. Schramm, 436 F.2d 899 (D.C. Cir. 1970). Jones held that if
the jury verdict is inconsistent with the court's determination on the cross-claim
for contribution, the jury's verdict controls. To hold otherwise would be to denyjury determination of the legal claim.
28. 396 U.S. 531 (1970).
29. 15 U.S.C. §§ 30 (a) (1)- (52) (1970).
30. 396 U.S. at 533. See DePinto v. Security Life Ins. Co., 323 F.2d 826 (9th
Cir. 1963), cert. denied, Gorsuch v. DePinto, 376 U.S. 950 (1964), a court of ap-
peals case decided some six years before Ross holding that a shareholder's deritative
suit is actually two separate actions.
Several commentators have suggested that Beacon Theatres, Dairy Queen, and
Ross indicate a pro-jury bias on the part of the Supreme Court. C. WPRGHT, supra
note 7, § 92; The Supreme Court, 1958 Term, 73 HARV. L. Rav. 186, 187 (1959).
Others find the rationale of these three cases deep within the historical roots of the
law-equity dichotomy. For instance, a number suggest that the Supreme Court is
attempting to prevent the right to a jury trial of a claim from being denied where
equity obtained subject-matter jurisdiction over the claim by procedural, as op-
posed to substantive, means. 5 J. MooRE, supra note 13, 38.16[4]; McCoid, Pro-
cedural Reform and the Right to a Jury Trial: A Study of Beacon Theatres, Inc.
v. Westover, 116 U. PA. L. Rav. 1, 12-13 (1967); Note 24 Sw. L.J. 860, 964 (1971).
In the words of one writer:
The Beacon Court's principle is directed exactly to those cases where
equity jurisdiction was founded on procedural inadequacies at law:
where the remedy at law is adequate in light of contemporary procedure,
equity lacks jurisdiction, though such jurisdiction might have existed
under earlier and different procedure.
McCoid, supra at 12-13.
For other interpretations of the underlying rationale of Beacon Theatres,
Dairy Queen, and Ross, see Rothstein, Beacon Theatres and the Constitutional
Right to a Jury Trial, 51 A.B.A.J. 1145, 1148 (1965); The Supreme Court, 1969
Term, 84 HAR . L. Rav. 172, 175 (1970); note 81 YALE L.J. 112, 120-21 (1971).
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trial on the legal issue, even though equity had to determine beforehand
his right to sue in place of the corporation. 31 Although recognizing that a
derivative action is traditionally considered equitable, the Court held that
the "Seventh Amendment question depends on the nature of the issue to
be tried rather than the character of the overall action." 32 Whether an is.
sue is legal in nature depends, the Court said, on three considerations:
(1) The pre-merger custom with reference to such questions; (2) the
remedy sought; and (3) the practical abilities and limitations of juries.83
Dawson distinguished Ross as involving an essentially legal claim or
right (that of the corporation), whereas the cross-claim in Dawson was
wholly equitable.8 4 The court distinguished between the fact of negligence
and negligence as a legal cause of action.36 The fact of negligence is rele-
vant to actions for contribution, the court stated, yet contribution is an
equitable action that may be tried without a jury.38 Thus, merely because
Singleton's alleged negligence was relevant to the cross-claim did not convert
it into an essentially legal action.37
The dissent by Senior Judge Fahy disagreed with the majority's char-
acterization of the judgment credit claim as equitable. The dissent ap-
31. The lower federal courts have rejected the idea that the merger of law
and equity extends the seventh amendment right to all cases where an equitable
remedy is sought in lieu of an inadequate legal remedy.
Klein v. Shell Oil Co., 386 F.2d 659 (8th Cir. 1967) (specific performance
requested). Injunctions were requested in: Coca-Cola Co. v. Cahill, 330 F. Supp.
354 (W.D. Okla. 1971); Farmers Chem. Ass'n v. Union Camp Corp., 312 F. Supp.
214 (E.D.N.C. 1970); Adams v. Fazzio Real Estate Co., 268 F. Supp. 630 (E.D. La.
1967). At least one federal court refused to give a party a jury trial where he
interposed a "legal defense" to an equitable claim. Kennedy v. Rubin, 254 F. Supp.
190 (N.D. Ill. 1966). Another court refused to rule that, under Beacon Theatres,
a party is entitled to a prior jury determination of his legal claim if there is a
possibility that the party may be prevented from asserting his legal claim to ajury in a subsequent action. Wilkinson v. United States, 189 F. Supp. 413 (D. Ore.
1960).
The lower federal courts have traditionally been reluctant to use the under-
lying rationale of Beacon Theatres, Dairy Queen, and Ross as an excuse to broaden
the right to a jury trial. To the extent that a case has facts that clearly fall within
the purview of those cases, they are of course controlling. See, e.g., Ell Lilly & Co.
v. Generix Drug Sales, Inc., 460 F.2d 1096 (5th Cir. 1972); Tights, Inc. v. Stanley,
441 F.2d 336 (4th Cir. 1971); Bruce v. Bohanon, 436 F.2d 733 (10th Cir. 1971);
Stockton v. Altman, 432 F.2d 946 (5th Cir. 1970); King v. United Benefit Fire Ins.
Co., 377 F.2& 728 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 857 (1967); AMF Tuboscope,
Inc. v. Cunningham, 352 F.2d 150 (10th Cir. 1965); Swofford v. B & W, Inc., 336
F.2d 406 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 962 (1965); Robine v. Ryan, 310
F.2d 797 (2d Cir. 1962); Thermo-Stitch, Inc. v. Chemi-Cord Processing Corp., 294
F.2d 486 (5th, Cir. 1961); Burgess v. General Elec. Co., 285 F. Supp. 788 (D.N.J.
1968); Minnesota Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Brodish, 200 F. Supp. 777 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
32. 396 U.S. at 538.
33. Id. n. 10.
34. 467 F.2d at 731-32.
35. Id. at 732.
36. Id., citing for that proposition Jones v. Schramm, 436 F.2d 899, 900-01
(D.C. Cir. 1970).
37. 467 F.2d at 732.
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plied38 the tripartite test for characterization supplied in Ross.39 First,
the dissent examined the remedy sought according to how such remedies
were treated at English common law prior to 1791 and by American courts
prior to 1938,40 concluding that "contribution was accorded a negligent
joint tortfeasor by a court of law."41 As the majority noted, this is highly
uncertain. 42 The dissent then looked at "pre-merger custom with reference
to trial of the issues," and found that negligence is typically tried to a
jury, ignoring the majority's distinction between the fact of negligence
and negligence as a cause of action. 43 The dissent's conclusion, however, is
that in a suit for a legal remedy, based on negligence, there is a constitu-
tional right to a jury trial.44 This assumes, of course, that contribution is
a legal remedy.
The dissent's most compelling argument is based on the third part of
the Ross test, viz., the feasibility of a jury trial. Judge Fahy noted that the
jury, in trying plaintiff's claim, had already heard the relevant evidence. 45
Further, negligence is an issue juries are considered particularly qualified
to judge,46 and the majority noted that the court can, in its discretion,
submit equitable issues to the jury.47
Finally, the majority gives little substance to the federal policy favor-
ing jury trials. In Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric Corp.,48 the Supreme
Court announced that there was a federal policy favoring jury determina-
tion of factual issues.4 9 The Court in a later case said that this federal
policy was of "historic and continuing strength."50 This federal policy has
been applied in situations similar to Dawson in which there are claims
that are, by themselves, outside the scope of the seventh amendment, but
which are incidental to, or minor in comparison with, the main legal
claim and are easily tried to the jury.51
The majority and dissent in Dawson agree that the tripartite Ross test
is the proper one to apply to determine the nature of the action. Their dif-
38. Id. at 736.
39. 396 U.S. at 538 n. 10.
40. The date of adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
41. 467 F.2d at 737 (dissenting opinion) (emphasis added).
42. Id. at 732 n. 7. The majority stated that the dissent's historical analysis
of the cases "demonstrates at most that the early origins of contribution are
shrouded in obscurity and confusion." Id. It is submitted that the original nature
of contribution is too uncertain to be a basis for determining the nature of the
action today.
43. Id. at 739-40.
44. Id. at 740.
45. Id. at 734.
46. Id. at 740.
47. Id. at 730.
48. 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
49. Id. at 537-39.
50. Simler v. Connor, 372 U.S. 221 (1963).
51. See Fitzgerald v. United States Lines Co., 374 U.S. 16 (1963); Close v.
Calmar S.S. Corp., 44 F.R.D. 398 (E.D. Pa. 1968). But see United States v. Reynolds,
397 U.S. 14 (1970).
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ferent conclusions on the results of the test suggests that considerations
of the proper role of juries as factfinders today determines the courts' appli-
cation of it.52 Also, the different conclusions portend much future litigation.
TONY K. VOLLERS
52. At fitst blush, it appears that the difference between the dissent and the
majority lies in their perception of the nature of the Murray credit. This is un-
doubtedly true. There is, however, another major divergence in their views. The
majority points out that an enthusiastic reception of the "expansive nature" of Ross
might have a "potentially severe impact ... upon the already overtaxed resources
devoted to civil litigation." 467 F.2d at 732 n. 8. Contrast the majority's philosophy
with that of Judge Fahy:
Maintenance of the jury as a fact finding body is of such importance and
occupies so firm a place in our history and jurisprudence that any seem-
ing curtailment of the right to a jury trial should be scrutinized with the
utmost care.
Id. at 734 n. I (dissenting opinion).
Perhaps the issue of the suitability of a jury trial in a particular situation
should not be relegated to footnotes while the hoary questions of law versus equity
do battle in the text. The third Ross test, i.e., the suitability of jury determination
of the issue, should be the predominant one. This is particularly true where the
precise nature of the daim, whether legal or equitable, is reasonably debatable.
[Vol. 88
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